

No. 75.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 17, 1914.

(Translation.)

Monsieur le Ministre,

EN réponse à votre dépêche du 7 août, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Gouvernement britannique ne peut se rallier à la proposition belge tendant à respecter la neutralité des possessions des Puissances belligérantes dans le bassin conventionnel du Congo.

Les troupes allemandes de l'Est Africain allemand ont déjà pris l'offensive contre le protectorat anglais de l'Afrique centrale. D'autre part, des troupes britanniques ont déjà attaqué le port allemand de Dar-es-Salaam, où elles ont détruit la station de télégraphie sans fil.

Dans ces circonstances, même si le Gouvernement anglais était persuadé de l'utilité politique et stratégique de la proposition belge, il ne pourrait l'adopter.

Le Gouvernement de Londres croit que les forces qu'il envoie en Afrique seront suffisantes pour vaincre toute opposition. Il fera tous ses efforts pour empêcher des soulèvements dans la population indigène.

La France est du même avis que l'Angleterre, vu l'activité allemande que l'on remarque près de Bonar et Ekododo.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

(Signé) COUNT DE LALAING.

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

No. 76.

Monsieur Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to Monsieur Renkin, Belgian Minister for the Colonies.

Elizabethville, August 26, 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

(Telegram.)

ALLEMANDS continuant leurs escarmouches au Tanganyika ont attaqué le 22 août, le port de Lukuga. Ils ont eu deux noirs tués et deux blessés. De nouvelles attaques sont attendues.

(Signé) TOMBEUR.

THE Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected.

No. 77.

Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.)
The Hague, August 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

D'ORDRE de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de notifier à votre Excellence ce qui suit :

“ Vu que la Belgique après avoir refusé d'accepter les propositions qui lui avaient été adressées à plusieurs reprises par l'Allemagne, prête sa coopération militaire à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes deux ont déclaré la guerre à l'Autriche-Hongrie, et en présence du fait que, comme il vient d'être constaté, les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux des autorités Royales, dû subir un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité et inadmissibles même vis-à-vis des sujets d'un État ennemi, l'Autriche-Hongrie se voit dans la nécessité de rompre les relations diplomatiques et se considère dès ce moment en état de guerre avec la Belgique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la légation et confie la protection de mes administrés au Ministre des États-Unis d'Amérique en Belgique. De la part du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal les passeports sont remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele.”

(Signé) CLARY.

ON the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform your Excellency as follows :—

“ Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity and inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations and considers herself from this moment in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the staff of the legation and I am entrusting the protection of Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium. The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his passports to Count Errembault de Dudzeele.”

No. 78.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.

Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

PRÈRE accuser réception à Légation Autriche par intermédiaire, Minister Affaires Etrangères déclaration de guerre Autriche-Hongrie à Belgique et ajouter ce qui suit :

“ La Belgique a toujours entretenu des relations d'amitié avec tous ses voisins sans distinction. Elle a scrupuleusement rempli les devoirs que la neutralité lui impose. Si elle n'a pas cru pouvoir accepter les propositions de l'Allemagne, c'est que celles-ci avaient pour objet la violation des engagements

(Telegram.)

PLEASE inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Belgium, and add the following :—

“ Belgium has always entertained friendly relations with all her neighbours without distinction. She had scrupulously fulfilled the duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she has not been able to accept Germany's proposals, it is because those proposals contemplated the violation of her engagements

qu'elle a pris à la face de l'Europe, engagements qui ont été les conditions de la création du Royaume de Belgique. Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple, quelque faible qu'il soit, puisse méconnaître ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s'inclinant devant la force. Le Gouvernement a attendu, non seulement les délais de l'ultimatum, mais la violation de son territoire par les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel à la France et à l'Angleterre, garantes de sa neutralité au même titre que l'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie, pour coopérer au nom et en vertu des traités à la défense du territoire belge.

En repoussant par les armes les envahisseurs, elle n'a même pas accompli un acte d'hostilité aux termes de l'article 10 de la Convention de La Haye sur les droits et devoirs des Puissances neutres.

L'Allemagne a reconnu elle-même que son agression constitue une violation du droit des gens et ne pouvant la justifier elle a invoqué son intérêt stratégique.

La Belgique oppose un démenti formel à l'affirmation que les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois auraient subi en Belgique un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité.

Le Gouvernement Royal a donné, dès le début des hostilités, les ordres les plus stricts quant à la sauvegarde des personnes et des propriétés austro-hongroises.

(Signé) DAVIGNON.

towards Europe, engagements which form the conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom. She has been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yielding to force. The Government have waited, not only until the ultimatum had expired, but also until Belgian territory had been violated by German troops, before appealing to France and Great Britain, guarantors of her neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and Austria-Hungary, to co-operate in the name and in virtue of the treaties in defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid down by the provisions of article 10 of the Hague Convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers.

"Germany herself has recognised that her attack constitutes a violation of international law, and, being unable to justify it, she has pleaded her strategical interests.

"Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hungarian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgium contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity.

"The Belgian Government, from the very commencement of hostilities, have issued the strictest orders for the protection of Austro-Hungarian persons and property."

No. 79.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers abroad.

Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

(Translation.)

Monsieur le Ministre,

Sous la date du 17 août, j'ai adressé au Ministre du Roi à Londres une lettre dans laquelle j'ai cru devoir relever certaines allégations produites par le Gouvernement allemand, et dont faisait mention le "Blue Book" publié récemment par le Gouvernement anglais.

J'ai l'honneur de placer sous vos yeux une copie de cette lettre et de ses annexes.

Veuillez, je vous prie, en donner connaissance au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité.

Veuillez agréer, &

(Signé) DAVIGNON.

Sir,

UNDER date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch to the Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to call attention to certain allegations made by the German Government which are mentioned in the Blue Book recently published by the British Government.

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the despatch in question and of its enclosures.

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count de Lalaing,
Belgian Minister at London.*

Brussels, August 17, 1914.

(Translation.)

Monsieur le Comte,

Le "Blue Book" publié récemment par le Gouvernement britannique reproduit, sous le No. 122 (page 65), le texte d'un télégramme adressé de Berlin, le 31 juillet, par Sir E. Goschen à Sir E. Grey, télégramme dont j'extrais le passage suivant :

"It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary of State] said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already."

Le fait auquel le Secrétaire d'Etat allemand des Affaires Etrangères a fait allusion dans son entretien avec Sir E. Goschen, et qu'il considérait comme un acte hostile de la part de la Belgique, se rapporte sans doute à l'application des arrêtés Royaux du 30 juillet, qui ont prohibé provisoirement l'exportation de Belgique de certains produits. Comme vous le constaterez par l'exposé que je tiens à vous faire ci-après, le fait qui nous est reproché n'a nullement le caractère qu'on a voulu lui donner en Allemagne.

Des arrêtés Royaux datés du 30 juillet et publiés au "Moniteur belge" du lendemain ont prohibé à titre provisoire, par toutes les frontières de terre et de mer, l'exportation d'une série de produits, des céréales notamment. Sous la date du 31 juillet, M. le Ministre d'Allemagne à Bruxelles me signala que la douane d'Anvers retenait des chargements de grains à destination de l'Allemagne qui, simplement transbordés dans notre port, ne faisaient en réalité qu'y *transiter*. M. de Below Saleske demandait la libre sortie des bateaux portant ces chargements. Le jour même où il reçut la réclamation du Ministre d'Allemagne, mon Département en saisait le Ministère des Finances, et dès le surlendemain 2 août, celui-ci nous annonça qu'il avait été transmis à la douane belge des instructions donnant pleine et entière satisfaction à l'Allemagne.

Je crois ne pouvoir mieux faire, Monsieur le Comte, que de placer sous vos yeux une copie de la corre-

Sir,

THE Blue Book recently published by the British Government contains (see No. 122, p. 65) the text of a telegram despatched from Berlin on the 31st July by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in which the following passage occurs :—

"It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary of State] said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already."

The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as an hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has wished to attribute to it.

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the "Moniteur belge" the following day forbade, provisionally, the export, both by land and by sea, of a series of products, more especially of cereals. On the 31st July the German Minister at Brussels called my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely transhipped in our port, were in reality only in *transit*. Herr von Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the German Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought the matter to the notice of the Ministry of Finance, and the following day, the 2nd August, that Department informed us that instructions had been forwarded to the Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction to Germany.

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the correspondence

spondance échangée à ce sujet avec M. de Below Saleske. Vous y verrez que rien dans notre attitude ne pouvait être considéré comme témoignant de dispositions hostiles à l'égard de l'Allemagne ; les mesures prises par le Gouvernement belge à ce moment ne constituaient que les simples précautions que tout État a le droit et le devoir de prendre dans des circonstances aussi exceptionnelles.

Il serait bon que vous adressiez au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique une communication afin de d'éclairer sur la réalité des faits.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,
(Signé) DAVIGNON.

exchanged on this subject with Herr Below Saleske. You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as showing any hostile dispositions towards Germany ; the steps taken by the Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those simple precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to adopt in such exceptional circumstances.

It would be as well that you should address a communication to the British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

(Translation.)

Monsieur le Ministre,

On m'a informé d'Anvers que la douane a défendu le départ des bateaux chargés de grains pour l'Allemagne.

Vu qu'il ne s'agit pas dans ces cas d'une *exportation* de grains, mais d'un *transit*, parce que la marchandise a été seulement transbordée à Anvers, j'ai l'honneur de recourir à votre bienveillante entremise afin qu'on laisse partir pour l'Allemagne les bateaux en question.

En même temps, je prie votre Excellence de me faire savoir si le port d'Anvers est fermée pour le transit des marchandises énumérées au "Moniteur" d'aujourd'hui.

En attendant la réponse de votre Excellence dans le plus bref délai possible, je profite de cette occasion, &c.

(Signé) DE BELOW SALESKE.

Sir,

I AM informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany.

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the *export* of grain, but of grain in *transit*, the goods in question having been merely transhipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your good offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to leave for Germany.

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the "Moniteur" of to-day.

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible convenience, I have &c.,

Enclosure 3 in No. 79.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

(Translation.)

Monsieur le Ministre,

EN réponse à la lettre de votre Excellence du 31 juillet, j'ai l'honneur de lui faire savoir que l'arrêté belge du 30 juillet ne vise que l'exportation et non le transit des produits cités.

Sir,

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July concerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned.

J'ai eu soin de faire part de votre communication à mon collègue des Finances, en le priant de vouloir bien donner aux bureaux de la douane des instructions précises de nature à prévenir toute erreur dans l'application de l'arrêté précité.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) DAVIGNON.

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance and begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials in order that any error in the application of the abovementioned decree might be avoided.

Enclosure 4 in No. 79.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

(Translation.)

COMME suite à la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser le 31 juillet, j'ai l'honneur de lui faire savoir que mon collègue des Finances a porté à la connaissance du service des douanes que les prohibitions établies par les arrêtés Royaux du 30 juillet écoulé ne visent que l'exportation proprement dite et ne s'étendent donc pas aux marchandises régulièrement déclarées en transit lors de l'importation. Au surplus, lorsque des marchandises libres de droits sont déclarées en consommation, bien qu'elles soient en réalité destinées à l'exportation, elles font communément l'objet de déclarations de libre entrée spéciales qui sont considérées comme des documents de transit. Enfin, s'il arrivait que de telles marchandises avaient été déclarées en consommation sans restrictions, comme si elles devaient rester effectivement dans le pays, la douane en permettrait encore la sortie du moment où il serait dûment établi, par les documents d'expédition - manifestes, connaissances, &c., qu'elles devaient être exportées immédiatement en transit.

Je puis ajouter que l'exportation des grains auxquels se rapportait la lettre précitée de la Légation Impériale a été autorisé le 1^{er} août.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) DAVIGNON.

Sir,

WITH reference to the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs that the prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th July last only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods regularly declared in transit at the time of import. Moreover, when duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consumption, although they are really intended for export, they are commonly the object of special declarations of free entry, which are considered as transit documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods had been declared as for consumption without restriction, as though they were to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow them to leave the country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch receipts, bills of lading, &c., that they were to be exported forthwith in transit.

I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals was authorised on the 1st August.

Simla, the 7th December 1914.

No. 676-F.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Indian Salt Act, 1882 (XII of 1882), as in force in the territories administered by the Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan as such Agent, the Governor General in Council is pleased to make the following rules, in addition to the Baluchistan Salt Rules, 1914, published with the Notification of the Government of India in the Department of Commerce and Industry, No. 12690—18, dated the 21st November 1914, namely:—

1. The provisions of rules 3 to 7, relating to salt manufactured in the Kalat State, shall apply, so far as may be, to all other salt which it is desired to import into the town of Quetta, except salt in respect of which duty leviable under section 7 of the Act has already been paid. Permits in all cases of importation of salt into the Quetta district or town will be issued by the Treasury Officer, Quetta.

2. The provisions of rules 9 to 17 shall, in the Nasirabad tahsil of the Kohlu, Nasirabad and Railway district, apply also, so far as may be, to salt and saltpetre illicitly manufactured. In applying the provisions of rule 16 to the said tahsil the following addition shall be made thereto, namely:—

“When a Magistrate orders the confiscation of works, materials or implements under section 9 of the Act, they shall be sold or destroyed by dismantling or otherwise under the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer.”

3. The Nasirabad Salt Rules, 1911, published with Notification No. 1186-I. B., dated the 9th July 1911, are hereby rescinded.

No. 2705-G.—With reference to Notification No. 2198-G., dated the 19th September 1914, the provisional recognition of the appointment of Mr. Jumpei Shinobu as Consul General for Japan at Calcutta has been confirmed by His Majesty’s Government.

No. 2708-G.—With reference to Notification No. 2271-G., dated the 30th September 1914, the provisional recognition of the appointment of Mr. Yasukichi Yatabe as Consul for Japan at Bombay has been confirmed by His Majesty’s Government.

The 9th December 1914.

No. 2720-G.—The Governor-General in Council is pleased to recognise the appointment of Mr. G. K. Walker as Acting Consular Agent for France at Madras, during the absence of Mr. F. E. L. Worke.

The 10th December 1914.

No. 3026-Est. A.—Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Macwatt, Indian Medical Service, (Bengal), an officiating Agency Surgeon of the 1st Class, and Chief Medical Officer in Rajputana and Civil Surgeon, Ajmer, is appointed temporarily to hold visiting charge of the office of Residency Surgeon, Western Rajputana States, in addition to his own duties, with effect from the 12th November 1914, and until further orders.

Delhi, the 9th December 1914.

No. 638-D.—Captain J. A. Brett, of the Political Department, is posted, on recall from leave, as City Magistrate, Peshawar, with effect from the 25th November 1914.

No. 639-D.—Mr. D. G. Mackenzie, of the Political Department, is posted as Assistant Commissioner, Peshawar, with effect from the 25th November 1914.

The 10th December 1914.

No. 670-D.—Major R. Garratt, of the Political Department, is attached to the Kurram Agency, with effect from the 23rd November 1914.

The 11th December 1914.

No. 689-D.—Captain R. D. O. Hill, Commandant, Chitral Scouts, is appointed temporarily to hold charge of the current duties of the office of Assistant Political Agent, Chitral, in addition to his own duties, with effect from the 28th October 1914.

No. 684-D.—In exercise of the powers conferred by the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (II of 1899), as applied to the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore, by the notification of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 732-D., dated the 19th March 1913, the Governor-General in Council is pleased to make the following rules in supersession of all rules now in force under the Act in the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore as published

with the following notifications of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, namely:—

Notification No. 4870-I. A., dated the 7th December 1906.

Notification No. 2131-I. B., dated the 2nd November 1910.

Rules under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY.

Short title.

1. These rules may be called the Bangalore Stamp Rules, 1914.

Definitions.

2. In these rules—

(a) "The Act" means the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (II of 1899), as applied to the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore.

(b) "Section" means a section of the Act.

(c) "Schedule" means a schedule of the Act.

Description of Stamps.

3. (1) Except as otherwise provided by the Act or by these rules—

(i) all duties with which any instrument is chargeable shall be paid and such payment shall be indicated on such instrument by means of stamps issued by Government for the purposes of the Act, and

(ii) a stamp which by any word or words on the face of it is appropriated to any particular kind of instrument, shall not be used for an instrument of any other kind.

(2) There shall be two kinds of stamps for indicating the payment of duty with which instruments are chargeable, namely:—

(a) impressed stamps, and

(b) adhesive stamps.

(3) The adhesive stamp or stamps used to denote the duty of one anna and the adhesive stamp used to denote the duty of half an anna shall be those of British manufacture; all other stamps shall be of the same pattern as may from time to time be in use in the territories of Mysore and shall be only such as have been purchased from the Resident's Treasury or from a licensed vendor in the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore appointed under the orders of the Collector.

CHAPTER II.

OF IMPRESSED STAMPS.

4. A Promissory Note or Bill of Exchange shall, except as provided by section 11 or Promissory notes and bills of exchange. by rule 11, be written on paper on which a stamp of the proper value has been engraved or embossed.

5. Every other instrument chargeable with duty shall, except as provided by section 11 or by rule 11, be written on paper, on which a stamp of the proper value has been engraved or embossed.

6. (1) Where two or more sheets of paper, on which stamps are engraved or embossed, are used to make up the amount of duty chargeable in respect of any instrument, a portion of such instrument shall be written on each sheet so used.

(2) Where a single sheet of paper is insufficient to admit of the entire instrument being written on the side of the paper which bears the stamp, so much plain paper may be subjoined thereto as may be necessary for the complete writing of such instrument:

Provided that in every such case a substantial part of the instrument shall be written on the sheet which bears the stamp before any part is written on the plain paper subjoined.

7. The Collector of the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore is empowered to affix and impress labels and he shall be deemed to be "the proper officer" for the purposes of the Act and of these rules.

8. Labels may be affixed and impressed by the proper officer in the case of any of the affixing and impressing of labels by proper officer following instruments, namely:—
permissible in certain cases.

- (i) those specified in Appendix I, and the counterparts thereof: and
- (ii) those specified in Appendix II, when written in any European language, and accompanied, if the language is not English, by a translation in English.

9. (1) The proper officer shall, upon any such instrument specified in Appendix I or II being brought to him before it is executed, and

Mode of affixing and impressing labels. upon application being made to him, affix thereto a label or labels of such value as the applicant may require and pay for, and impress such label or labels by means of a stamping machine, and also stamp or write on the face of the label or labels the date of impressing the same. In the case of instruments written on parchment, the labels shall be further secured by means of metallic eyelets.

(2) On affixing any label or labels under this rule, the proper officer shall, where the duty amounts to rupees five or upwards, write on the face of the label or labels his initials, and, where the duty amounts to rupees twenty or upwards, shall also attach his usual signature to the instruments immediately under the label or labels.

10. Instruments executed out of British India or the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore, and requiring to be stamped after their receipt in the said Civil and Military Station (other than instruments which, under section 11 or rule 11, may be stamped with adhesive stamps) shall be stamped with impressed labels.

CHAPTER III.

OF ADHESIVE STAMPS.

Use of adhesive stamps on certain instruments.

11. The following instruments may be stamped with adhesive stamps, namely:—

- (a) Bills-of-exchange payable otherwise than on demand and drawn in sets, when the amount of duty does not exceed one anna for each part of the set.
- (b) Transfers of debentures of public companies and associations.
- (c) Copies of maps and plans and printed copies when chargeable with duty under Article 24 of Schedule I.
- (d) Instruments chargeable with duty under Articles 5 (a) and (b) and 43 of Schedule I.

12. When any instrument of transfer of shares in a Company or Association is written on a sheet of paper on which a stamp of the proper value is engraved or embossed, and the value of the stamp so engraved or embossed is subsequently, in consequence of a rise in the value of such shares, found to fall short of the amount of duty chargeable under Article No. 62 (a) of Schedule I, one or more adhesive stamps bearing the words "Transfer Stamp, Mysore," as hereinafter prescribed, may be used to make up the amount required.

13. Except as otherwise provided by these rules the adhesive stamp or stamps used to denote the duty of one anna shall bear the words "One anna" or "Half anna," as the case may be, and the adhesive stamp used to denote the duty of half an anna shall bear the words "Half anna", and such stamp or stamps may be inscribed for use either for postage or for revenue, or for both postage and revenue.

14. The following instruments when stamped with adhesive stamps shall be stamped with the following descriptions of such stamps, namely:—

- (a) Separate instruments of transfer of shares and transfers of debentures of Public Companies and associations: with stamps bearing the words "Transfer Stamp, Mysore."
- (b) Notarial acts: with stamps bearing the word "Notarial Stamp, Mysore."
- (c) Copies of maps or plans and printed copies certified to be true copies: with court-fee stamps.
- (d) Instruments chargeable with stamp duty under Articles 5 (a) and (b) or 43 of Schedule I; with stamps bearing the words "Agreement Mysore" or "Broker's Note—Mysore."

CHAPTER IV.

MISCELLANEOUS.

15. When an instrument bears a stamp of proper amount, but of improper description, the Collector may, on payment of the duty with Provision for cases in which improper description of stamp is used. which the instrument is chargeable, certify by endorsement that it is duly stamped:

Provided that, if application is made within three months of the execution of the instrument, and the Collector is satisfied that the improper description of stamp was used solely because of the difficulty or inconvenience of procuring one of proper description, he may remit the further payment of duty prescribed in this rule.

16. The Collector may require any person claiming a refund or renewal under Chapter V of the Act, or his duly authorised agent, to Evidence as to circumstances of claim to make an oral deposition on oath or affirmation refund or renewal. or to file an affidavit, setting forth the circumstances under which the claim has arisen, and may also, if he thinks fit, call for the evidence of witnesses in support of the statement set forth in any such deposition or affidavit.

17. When an application is made for the payment, under Chapter V of the Act, of an allowance in respect of a spoiled or misused stamp, Payment of allowances in respect of spoiled or or on the renewal of a debenture, and an order is misused stamps or on the renewal of debentures. passed by the Collector sanctioning the allowance or calling for further evidence in support of the application, then, if the amount of the allowance or the stamp given in lieu thereof is not taken, or if the further evidence required is not furnished, as the case may be, by the applicant within one year of the date of such order, the application shall be struck off and the spoiled or misused stamp (if any) sent to the Superintendent of Stamps, Mysore, for destruction.

18. Where the Collector makes a refund under section 55 he shall cancel the original debenture by writing on or across it the word Mode of cancelling original debenture in case "Cancelled" and his usual signature with the under section 55 of Act. date thereof.

19. On the conviction of any offender under the Act the Collector may grant to any person, who appears to him to have contributed thereto, a reward not exceeding such sum as the Resident in Mysore may fix in this behalf.

APPENDIX I.

List of Instruments referred to in rule 8 (i).

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APPENDIX II.

List of instruments referred to in rule 8 (ii).

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J. B. WOOD,

Secretary to the Government of India.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

NOTIFICATIONS.

COMMERCE AND TRADE.

Delhi, the 12th December 1914.

No. 1428-W.—Whereas by paragraph 5 (1) of Trading with the Enemy Proclamation No. II of 9th September 1914 as amended and extended by Proclamation, dated the 5th of November 1914, payment of any sum of money to or for the benefit of persons or a body of persons resident in the territories of the German Empire or in the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary or in the respective colonies and dependencies thereof or in the territories of the Sultan of Turkey other than Egypt, or any territory in the occupation of the British Government or its colonies, in this licence and in the said Proclamations referred to as "enemy country" is prohibited; and

Whereas, by paragraph 8 of the said Proclamation it is provided that nothing in the Proclamation shall be taken to prohibit anything which shall be expressly permitted by licence, whether such licence be granted to individuals or be announced as applying to persons; and

Whereas, by paragraph 3 of Proclamation dated 8th October 1914, power to grant such licences on behalf of the Crown may be exercised in India by the Governor General;

Now, therefore, I, CHARLES, Baron Hardinge of Penshurst, hereby authorise all British subjects residing, being, or carrying on business in British India to make payments for the purpose of obtaining possession of their cargoes in neutral ports to the agents of shipowners resident in an enemy country.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST,

Viceroy and Governor-General.

No. 1674-W.—In pursuance of section 5 of the Commercial Intercourse with Enemies Ordinance, 1914 (VI of 1914), the Governor General in Council is pleased to authorise the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay to sign certificates for the purposes of the said section.

No. 1682-W.—In supersession of the Notification in this Department, No. 420-W., Commerce and Trade, dated the 31st October 1914, the following Royal Proclamation is published for general information :—

BY THE KING.

A PROCLAMATION

EXTENDING THE PROHIBITIONS CONTAINED IN THE PROCLAMATION OF THE 9TH SEPTEMBER, 1914,
RELATING TO TRADING WITH THE ENEMY.

GEORGE R.I.

WHEREAS by Our Proclamation dated the 9th day of September, 1914, called the Trading with the Enemy Proclamation, No. 2, certain prohibitions, as therein more specifically set forth, were imposed upon all persons therein referred to :

And whereas by Our Proclamation dated the 30th day of September, 1914, the prohibitions contained in the Trading with the Enemy Proclamation, No. 2, were extended, and the importation of sugar was prohibited as therein more specifically set forth :

And whereas by Our Proclamation dated the 8th day of October, 1914, Our Proclamation of the 9th September, 1914, called the Trading with the Enemy Proclamation, No. 2, was amended as therein more specifically set forth :

And whereas it is desirable to revoke Our Proclamation dated the 30th day of September, 1914 :

Now, THEREFORE, We have thought fit, by and with the advice of Our Privy Council, to issue this Our Royal Proclamation declaring, and it is hereby declared, as follows :—

1. The aforesaid Proclamation of the 30th day of September is hereby as from the date hereof revoked, and from and after the date hereof this present Proclamation is substituted therefor.

2. The importation into the United Kingdom of all sugar is hereby prohibited, provided that the foregoing prohibition shall not extend to sugar (not being raw or refined sugar made or produced by an enemy or in an enemy country, or refined sugar made or produced from raw sugar made or produced by an enemy or in an enemy country)—

(a) cleared from the port of shipment to this country on or before the 26th October 1914 ;

(b) imported under contract made prior to the 4th August, 1914.

3. Nothing in this Proclamation shall be taken to prohibit anything which shall be expressly permitted by Our licence, or by the licence given on Our behalf by a Secretary of State or the Board of Trade, whether such licence be granted especially to individuals or be announced as applying to classes of persons.

4. The words "enemy" and "enemy country" and "person" shall have the same meaning in this Our Proclamation as in Our said Proclamation of the 9th day of September, 1914.

Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, this Twenty-sixth day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, and in the Fifth year of Our Reign.

GOD SAVE THE KING. *

CUSTOMS.

The 9th December 1914.

No. 1669-W.—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (VIII of 1878), as amended by Act XII of 1914, the Governor General in Council is pleased to prohibit the bringing, by sea or by land, into British India of all goods, from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland and Italy, unless Certificates of Origin in the form prescribed in the annexed Schedule are presented to the Customs Collector at the port of import in respect of such goods, wares or merchandise :

Provided that nothing in this notification shall apply to :—

(a) Goods imported under a general or special licence granted by the Governor General in pursuance of the Trading with the Enemy Proclamation No. 2 as amended by the Proclamation of the 8th October 1914.

(b) Goods shipped for India on or before the 21st December 1914 ;

(c) Imports of food-stuffs, timber of any kind including pit-props, straw board, wood-pulp, iron ore, granite, tar or calcium carbide; and

(d) Imports of individual consignments not exceeding £25 in value.

Provided also that the Collector of Customs may, at his discretion and if he sees no reason for suspecting that the goods have emanated from an enemy country, allow delivery of any goods, wares or merchandise imported from the above mentioned countries, even if unaccompanied by Certificates of Origin and not covered by the first proviso to this notification, on the importer furnishing him with a deposit or bond to the amount of three times the value of the goods to ensure the production of the necessary certificates within a prescribed period.

FORM OF CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN.

I, hereby certify that Mr.
 (Producer, Manufacturer, Merchant, Trader, etc.), residing at
 in this town has declared before me that the merchandise designated below, which is to be
 shipped from this town to , consigned to
 (Merchant, Manufacturer, etc.), in India is not of German, Austrian, Hungarian or Turkish
 production or manufacture, and has produced to my satisfaction invoices or other trustworthy
 documents in proof thereof.

Number and description of cases.	Marks.	Numbers.	Weight or Quantity.	Total Value.	Contents.

This certificate is valid only for a period of not more than from
 the date hereof.

(Signature of person
 declaring.)

(Signature of Consular Authority issuing Certificate, and date.)

No. 1670-W.—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (VIII of 1878), as amended by Act XII of 1914, the Governor General in Council is pleased to direct that no goods shall be taken either by sea or by land out of British India to any foreign place in Europe or on the Mediterranean or the Black Seas, with the exception of Russia, Belgium, France, Spain and Portugal, unless declarations of Ultimate Destination, in the form prescribed in the annexed Schedule and signed by the actual exporter or by some responsible representative of the actual exporter (or in the case of a limited Company by a Director, Secretary, Manager or other responsible officer) having a personal and first-hand knowledge of the enquiries made and of the fact stated in the Declaration, are presented to the Customs Collector at the port of export in respect of such goods, wares or merchandise;

Provided that a single Declaration may be used to cover any number of consignments by the same exporter from the same port by the same ship at the same time;

Provided further that nothing in this notification shall apply to:—

- (a) Goods exported under a general or special licence granted by the Governor General in pursuance of the Trading with the Enemy Proclamation No. 2 as amended by the Proclamation of the 8th October 1914; and
- (b) Goods in respect of which shipping bills have been accepted before the 15th December 1914.

FORM OF DECLARATION.

I, of
 do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:—

I have made all necessary inquiries in order to satisfy myself as to the ultimate destination of the goods, particulars of which are set out in the Schedule below, to be exported by me or

on my behalf on board , and consigned to
 of , and do hereby declare that
 to the best of my knowledge and belief none of such goods are intended for consumption in any

State at present at war with His Majesty, and I make this declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true.

SCHEDULE.

Number and description of cases.	Marks.	Numbers.	Weight or Quantity.	Total Value.	Contents.

(Signature of Declarant.)

Dated
This day of

The 12th December 1914.

No. 1683-W.—In supersession of the Notifications in this Department Nos. 9182, 9183, 9184 and 9185, dated the 12th September 1914, 9780, dated the 19th September 1914, 10667, dated the 3rd October 1914, 11016 and 11017, dated the 10th October 1914, 343-W., dated the 31st October 1914, 554-W., dated the 7th November 1914, and 974-W., dated the 21st November 1914, the following Royal Proclamation is published for general information:—

BY THE KING.

A PROCLAMATION

PROHIBITING UNDER SECTION 8 OF "THE CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE ACT, 1879," AND SECTION 1 OF "THE EXPORTATION OF ARMS ACT, 1900," AND SECTION 1 OF "THE CUSTOMS (EXPORTATION PROHIBITION) ACT, 1914," THE EXPORTATION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM OF WARLIKE STORES.

GEORGE R. I.

WHEREAS by section 8 of "The Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1879," it is enacted that the exportation of arms, ammunition, and gunpowder, military and naval stores, and any articles which We shall judge capable of being converted into or made useful in increasing the quantity of military or naval stores, provisions, or any sort of victual which may be used as food for man may be prohibited by Proclamation:

And whereas by Section 1 of "The Exportation of Arms Act, 1900," it is enacted that We may by proclamation prohibit the exportation of all or any of the following articles, namely, arms, ammunition, military and naval stores, and any article which We shall judge capable of being converted into or made useful in increasing the quantity of arms, ammunition, or military or naval stores, to any country or place therein named whenever We shall judge such prohibition to be expedient in order to prevent such arms, ammunition, military or naval stores, being used against Our subjects or forces or against any forces engaged or which may be engaged in military or naval operations in co-operation with Our forces:

And whereas by Section 1 of "The Customs (Exportation Prohibition) Act, 1914," it is enacted that Section 8 of the aforesaid Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1879, shall have effect while a state of war in which We are engaged exists as if in addition to the articles therein mentioned there were included all other articles of every description:

And whereas it is further enacted by Section 2 of "The Customs (Exportation Prohibition) Act, 1914," that any Proclamation or Order in Council made under Section 8, as so amended, of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1879, may whilst a state of war exists be varied or added to by an Order made by the Lords of the Council on the recommendation of the Board of Trade:

And whereas various Proclamations and Orders dated respectively the 3rd, 5th, 10th, 20th and 28th August, the 1st, 8th, 11th, and 25th September, and the 6th and 19th October, prohibiting the exportation of certain articles therein referred to from the United Kingdom to certain or all destinations, have been issued in pursuance of the aforesaid powers:

And whereas it is expedient that these various Proclamations and Orders should be consolidated, with amendments and additions and that such Proclamations and Orders should be revoked:

And whereas the articles, other than arms, ammunition, or military or naval stores herein-after enumerated are articles which We judge capable of being converted into or made useful in increasing the quantity of arms, ammunition, or military or naval stores:

And whereas in order to prevent such arms, ammunition, or military or naval stores being used against Our subjects or forces or against any forces engaged or which may be engaged

in military or naval operations in co-operation with Our forces, We have deemed it expedient to prohibit the exportation of the articles hereinafter enumerated :

Now, THEREFORE, We have thought fit, by and with the advice of Our Privy Council, to issue this Our Royal Proclamation, declaring, and it is hereby declared, that the aforesaid Proclamations and Orders be and the same are hereby revoked :

And We have further thought fit, by and with the advice aforesaid, and in virtue and in exercise of the powers aforesaid, to further declare, and it is hereby declared, as follows :—

That the exportation of the following goods be prohibited to all destinations :—

Acetanilide ;	Heliographs ;
Acetone ;	Hemp cordage and twine, not including cordage or twine of manila hemp or reaper or binder twine ;
Acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin) ;	Henbane and its preparations ;
Aconite and its preparations and alkaloids ;	Hexamethylene tetramin (urotropin) and its preparations ;
Aeroplanes, airships, balloons, of all kinds, and their component parts ;	Hides of all kinds, dry or wet ;
Alcohol, methyllic ;	Horse shoes ;
Ammonium sulphocyanide ;	Hydrobromic acid ;
Animals, pack, saddle, and draught, suitable for use in war ;	Hydroquinone ;
Antimony ;	Indigo, natural ;
Antipyrine (phenazone) ;	Ipecacuanha ;
Belladonna and its preparations and alkaloids ;	Khaki woollen cloth ;
Benzoic acid (synthetic) and benzoates ;	Lead, pig, sheet or pipe ;
Benzol ;	Leather, undressed or dressed, suitable for saddlery, harness or military boots ;
Blankets, coloured, exceeding 3½ lbs. in weight, known as "woollen" blankets ;	Manganese, including ferro-manganese ;
Boots, heavy, for men ;	Mercury ;
Bromine and alkaline bromides ;	Neo-salvarsan ;
Cantharides and its preparations ;	Nets, torpedo ;
Carbolic acid ;	Nickel ore, nickel, and ferro-nickel ;
Carbons suitable for searchlights ;	Nitrate of sodium ;
Cartridges, charges of all kinds, and their component parts, other than sporting cartridges, charges and their component parts ;	Nitrate of thorium ;
Caustic potash ;	Nitrotoluol ;
Chloral and its preparations, including chloramid ;	Novocain ;
Chrome and ferro-chrome ;	Oil, blast furnace ;
Cloth, hempen ;	Oil, coal tar ;
Coal sacks ;	Oil fuel, shale ;
Coal tar products for use in dye manufacture, except aniline oil and aniline salt ;	Oil, mineral, lubricating ;
Coca and its preparations and alkaloids ;	Oil, olive ;
Collodion ;	Oil of turpentine ;
Compasses, other than ships' compasses ;	Opium and its preparations and alkaloids ;
Cotton waste of all descriptions ;	Paraffin, liquid medicinal ;
Cresol and all preparations thereof (including cresylic acid) and nitro-cresol ;	Paraffin, soft ;
Diethylbarbituric acid (veronal) and veronal sodium ;	Paraldehyde ;
Dimethylaniline ;	"Peptone Witte" ;
Dyes and dyestuffs obtained from coal tar ;	Peroxide of manganese ;
Emetin hydrochlor ;	Petroleum, fuel oil ;
Ergot of rye, not including liquid extract or other medicinal preparations of ergot ;	Petroleum, gas oil ;
Eucaine hydrochlor ;	Petroleum spirit and motor spirit (including Shell spirit) ;
Field glasses and telescopes ;	Phenacetin ;
Fire-arms, rifled, of all kinds, and their component parts ;	Pigskins, dressed or undressed ;
Forage and food of all kinds for animals ;	Potash salts, namely :—
Formic aldehyde ;	Bicarbonate ;
Fulminate of mercury ;	Bichromate ;
Gentian and its preparations ;	Carbonate ;
Glycerine, crude and refined ;	Chlorate ;
Goldbeaters' skin ;	Chloride ;
Guncotton ;	Nitrate (saltpetre) ;
Gunpowder ;	Permanganate ;
Harness and saddlery which can be used for military purposes ;	Prussiate ;
	Sulphate ;
	Projectiles of all kinds and their component parts ;
	Protargol, not including silver proteinate ;
	Saccharin (including "saxin") ;
	Salicylic acid and salicylate of soda ;
	Salol ;
	Salvarsan ;
	Santonin and its preparation ;

Signalling lamps operated by electricity and capable of being used for signalling Morse or other code ;
Silk cloth, silk braid, silk thread, suitable for cartridges ;
Silk noils ;
Spirits of a strength of not less than 43 degrees above proof ;
Sulphate of zinc ;

Sulphonal ;
Surgical bandages and dressings ;
Tartaric acid and alkaline tartrates ;
Thymol and its preparations ;
Toluol ;
Trional ;
Tungsten ;
Wolfram ore ;
Zinc ;

THAT THE EXPORTATION OF THE FOLLOWING GOODS BE PROHIBITED TO ALL FOREIGN PORTS IN EUROPE AND ON THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEAS, OTHER THAN THOSE OF FRANCE, RUSSIA (EXCEPT BALTIC PORTS), BELGIUM, SPAIN, AND PORTUGAL :—

Accoutrements ;
Aluminium ;
Aluminium alloys ;
Armour plates, armour quality castings, and similar protective material ;
Asbestos ;
Bags and sacks of all kinds (not including paper bags) ;
Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same ;
Bauxite ;
Bismuth and its salts ;
Bladders, casings, and sausage skins ;
Cables, telegraph and telephone ;
Camp equipment, articles of ;
Camphor ;
Cannon and other ordnance, and parts thereof ;
Carriages and mountings for cannon and other ordnance and for machine guns, and parts thereof :
Castor oil ;
Chronometers and all kinds of nautical instruments ;
Compasses for ships, and parts thereof, including fittings such as binnacles ;
Copper ore ;
Copper, unwrought or part wrought, all kinds, including unwrought brass, gunmetal, naval brass, and delta metal ;
Engine and boiler packings ;
Explosives of all kinds ;
Farriers', carpenters', wheelers', and saddlers' tools ;
Ferro-silicon ;
Fire arms, unrifled, for sporting purposes ;
Flaxen canvas, namely :—
Hammock canvas ;
Kitbag canvas ;
Merchant Navy canvas ;
Royal Navy canvas ;
Four-wheeled wagons, capable of carrying 1 ton and over ;
Goat skins, undressed ;
Graphite, suitable for the manufacture of crucibles ;
Herring, cured or salted ;
Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms or of war material for use on land and sea ;
India rubber sheet, vulcanised ;
Intrenching tools, intrenching implements, picks and grubbers, whether of combination pattern or otherwise, and helves and handles for the same.
Iodine and its preparations and compounds ;

Iron ore ;
Iron, haematite pig ;
Iron pyrites ;
Jute, raw ;
Jute yarns ;
Jute piece goods ;
Linen close canvas ;
Linen duck cloth ;
Material for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones ;
Mercury, salts and preparations of ;
Mica ;
Military equipment ;
Mineral jellies ;
Mines, and parts thereof ;
Molybdenum and ferro-molybdenum ;
Nitrate of ammonia ;
Nitric acid ;
Nux vomica and its alkaloids and preparations ;
Pickaxes, shovels, and spades of all descriptions, and helves and handles for the same ;
Picric acid and its components ;
Portable forges ;
Railway material, both fixed and rolling stock ;
Range finders, and parts thereof ;
Rope (steel wire) and hawsers ;
Rubber, raw ;
Shantung silk in the piece ;
Sheep skins woolled, *i.e.*, with the wool left on ;
Shipbuilding materials, namely :—
Boiler tubes ;
Condenser tubes ;
Iron and steel castings and forgings for hulls and machinery of ships ;
Iron and steel plates and sectional materials for shipbuilding ;
Marine engines, and parts thereof ;
Ships' auxiliary machinery ;
Sounding machines and gear ;
Steam vessels, lighters, barges, and boats of all descriptions ;
Sulphur ;
Sulphuric acid ;
Swords, bayonets, and other arms (not being firearms), and parts thereof ;
Torpedo tubes ;
Torpedoes, and parts thereof ;
Two-wheeled carts, capable of carrying 15 cwt. and over ;
Tyres for motor vehicles ;
Vanadium and ferro-vanadium ;
Walnut wood of scantling which could be made into rifle butts or fore-ends.

THAT THE EXPORTATION OF THE FOLLOWING GOODS BE PROHIBITED TO ALL DESTINATIONS ABROAD OTHER THAN HIS MAJESTY'S DOMINIONS, COLONIES NOT POSSESSING RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, BRITISH INDIA, TERRITORIES UNDER HIS MAJESTY'S PROTECTION, CYPRUS, THE CHANNEL ISLANDS, AND EGYPT :—

Cartridges, charges of all kinds, and their component parts, for sporting purposes ;
Provisions and victuals which may be used as food for men, namely :—
Animals, living, for food ;
Barley and oats ;
Butter ;
Cheese ;
Eggs ;
Margarine ;
Wheat and wheat flour ;
Wool, raw (sheep and lambs') ;
Wool tops ;

Wool noils ;
Wool waste ;
Woollen rags, applicable to other uses than manure, pulled or not ;
Woollen and worsted yarns ;
All woollen and worsted cloth suitable for uniform clothing, not including women's dress stuffs or cloth with pattern ;
Uniform clothing ;
Cardigan jackets, woollen jerseys, woollen gloves, woollen socks, and men's woollen underwear of all kinds.

THAT THE EXPORTATION OF—

Sugar, refined and candy ; Sugar, unrefined ;
BE PROHIBITED TO ALL DESTINATIONS OTHER THAN :—
The Channel Islands ; St. Helena ;
Malta ; East Africa Protectorate ;
Gibraltar ; British West African Colonies and Protectorates.
Falkland Islands ;

That the carriage coastwise of "Animals, pack, saddle, and draught, suitable for use in war" be prohibited.

Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, this Tenth day of November, in the year of our Lord One thousand nine hundred and fourteen, and in the Fifth year of Our Reign.

GOD SAVE THE KING.

No. 1717-W.—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (VIII of 1878), as amended by Act XII of 1914, the Governor General in Council is pleased to direct that the words "other than Nux Vomica, Castor Seed and Mustard Seed" shall be added after the entry "Medical and surgical stores and equipment of every description," in column I of the Schedule appended to the Notification in the Department of Commerce and Industry No. 25-W. (Customs), dated the 17th October 1914.

CUSTOMS ESTABLISHMENTS.

The 12th December 1914.

No. 14459-2.—Mr. P. W. Singleton, an Assistant Collector in the Imperial Customs Service, is granted privilege leave for three months with effect from the 15th December 1914, or such subsequent date as he may avail himself of the leave.

No. 14480-2.—On his return from leave on the forenoon of the 27th November 1914, Mr. C. R. Watkins, an Assistant Collector in the Imperial Customs Service, was reposted to Bombay.

The unexpired period of his leave is hereby cancelled.

EMIGRATION.

The 12th December 1914.

No. 14470-157.—The following draft of a rule which it is proposed to issue in exercise of the powers conferred by section 81 of the Indian Emigration Act, 1908 (XVII of 1908), is published as required by the said section for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby and notice is hereby given that the draft will be taken into consideration by the Governor General in Council on or after the 12th January 1915.

2. Any objection or suggestion which may be received from any person with respect to the draft before the date fixed aforesaid will be considered by the Governor General in Council.

DRAFT.

The following amendments shall be made in the rules published with Notification of the Government of India in the Department of Revenue and Agriculture, No. 94-E., dated the 18th March 1886, namely—

- (a) In Rule 101, the words "the Local Government through the office of" shall be deleted.
- (b) In Form 23, paragraph 1, for the words "the approval of the Government" the words "your approval" shall be substituted and the words "and to request the favour of your submitting my application to Government" shall be deleted.
- (c) In Rule 121, for the words "submit to the Local Government. . . . license" the words "grant in form No. 40 the license applied for by the Master in accordance with Rule 102" shall be substituted.
- (d) Forms No. 36 and 36 (A) shall be deleted.
- (e) For Rule 122, the following shall be substituted—"At any time after the first inspection the Master may and if he has received his license (Form No. 40) shall when required, execute, in duplicate, in the Protector's office in Form No. 37 the bond required by Section 58, sub-section (1) of the Indian Emigration Act, 1908".
- (f) In Form No. 37, for the words "Government of" the words—"Protector of Emigrants" shall be substituted.
- (g) For Form No. 40, the following shall be substituted—

"COLONIAL EMIGRATION FORM NO. 40.

Form of license for Master of Emigrant ship.

WHEREAS I am satisfied that according to the provisions of the Indian Emigration Act, 1908, the ship burthen about tons Master, belonging to is legally capable of accommodating emigrants over the age of ten years; and whereas I am further satisfied that the said Master has conformed to the several provisions of the aforesaid Act and to the rules made thereunder, I hereby permit Master of the aforesaid ship to receive on board and accommodate with a passage to not more than emigrants being natives of India subject to the execution of a bond binding himself and the owner of the ship in a penal sum of Rs. 10,000 to perform the duties imposed by the said Act or any rule made under the Act on a Master and owner respectively.

Protector of Emigrants.

Registered in the office of the Protector of Emigrants as No. of 19 .

Head Assistant".

MERCHANT SHIPPING.

Delhi, the 12th December 1914.

No. 1651-W.—The following notice to Mariners issued by the Admiralty is published for general information:—

New pilotage stations established at certain ports in the United Kingdom on account of defensive minefields.

In view of the extension of the system of mine defence notice is hereby given that on and after the 27th instant pilotage will be compulsory at the following ports, and that it will be highly dangerous for any vessel to enter or leave without a pilot on board.

(1) *River Humber.*—All incoming vessels must call at a pilot station established in latitude $53^{\circ} 36' N.$ Long. $0^{\circ} 30' E.$ Outgoing vessels must discharge their pilots at the same stations.

(2) *River Tyne.*—All incoming vessels from the northward must call for a pilot off Blyth, and those from the southward off the River Wear. Outgoing vessels to discharge their pilots at one of these same stations.

(3) *Firth of Forth.*—All incoming vessels must call for a pilot at a station to be established on the Isle of May. Outgoing vessels to discharge their pilots at the same station. It will be dangerous for any vessel to be underway to the westward of the Isle of May without a pilot on board.

(4) *Moray Firth.*—All vessels bound to Cromarty or Inverness must call for a pilot at Wick or Burghead. All outgoing vessels must discharge their pilots at one of these stations.

It will be dangerous for any vessel to be underway south westward of the line joining Findhorn and Tarbetness without a pilot.

(5) *Scapa Flow*.—All entrances except Hoxa Sound are dangerous and this entrance also is dangerous unless the instructions given below are obeyed.

The only vessels permitted to enter Hoy Sound from the westward are those bound for Stromness. Vessels cannot enter Scapa Flow from Stromness.

Examination services have been established in the entrances to Hoxa and Hoy Sounds.

Vessels wishing to enter must communicate with the examination vessel and follow very carefully the instructions received from her.

POST OFFICE.

The 12th December 1914.

No. 14350-161.—In exercise of the powers conferred by the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (VI of 1898), the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that the following amendments shall be made in the rules issued with the Notification of the Government of India in the Department of Commerce and Industry, No. 2883-45, dated the 26th April 1913 :—

- (1) The words 'of the Post Office' should be omitted after 'Director-General' in rule 71.
- (2) For the existing schedule of rates in rule 144 the following shall be substituted, namely,

On an unpaid postcard, letter, or packet	The prepaid rate.
On an insufficiently paid postcard, letter, or packet	The deficiency.

POST AND TELEGRAPH ESTABLISHMENTS.

The 12th December 1914.

No. 14477-31.—Mr. J. N. Mukerji, Superintendent, Telegraph Engineering, Dacca Division, is appointed temporarily to the first division of the Superior Traffic Branch as Deputy Postmaster General, Telegraph Traffic, Bengal and Assam Circle, with effect from the 26th October 1914, *vice* Mr. G. P. Roy transferred to the Engineering Branch.

R. E. ENTHOVEN,
Secretary to the Government of India.

ARMY DEPARTMENT.

Delhi, the 11th December 1914.

ARMY DEPARTMENT.

No. 1101.—The following appointments are made, *vice* the Hon'ble Major-General W. R. Birdwood, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department with effect from the afternoon of the 12th December 1914 :—

Colonel B. Holloway, Indian Army, Deputy Secretary, to be Secretary, *sub pro tempore*,
Major A. H. O. Spence, 39th King George's Own Central India Horse, Assistant Secretary, to be Deputy Secretary, *sub pro tempore*,
Mr. A. A. Whelan, Registrar, to be Assistant Secretary, *sub pro tempore*,
Mr. R. Tharle-Hughes, Superintendent, to be Registrar, *sub pro tempore*.

APPOINTMENTS.

PERSONAL STAFF.

No. 1102.—The following is substituted for Army Department Notification No. 1080, dated the 4th December 1914 :—

The Vicereoy and Governor General has been pleased to make the following appointment on His Excellency's Personal Staff :—

Second Lieutenant A. Brown, 4th Battalion, Wiltshire Regiment, to be Aide-de-Camp, *vice* Captain A. A. Tod, Rifle Brigade, resigned. Dated 17th November 1914.

INDIAN ARMY.

No. 1103.—The following admissions to the Indian Army are made, subject to His Majesty's approval, with effect from the dates specified:—

Lieutenants to be Lieutenants.

Lieutenant Eustace Hammick, Double Company Officer, 17th Infantry (The Loyal Regiment), from the South Lancashire Regiment. Dated 15th August 1914, but to rank from the 19th December 1910.

Lieutenant Charles Thornton Warner, Double Company Officer, 22nd Punjabis, from the South Lancashire Regiment. Dated 19th August 1914, but to rank from the 6th May 1917.

Lieutenant George Newall Watson, Squadron Officer, 13th Duke of Connaught's Lancers (Watson's Horse), from the 14th (King's) Hussars. Dated 25th July 1914, but to rank from the 27th April 1911.

Lieutenant George John Townsend, officiating Double Company Officer, 66th Punjabis, from the Worcestershire Regiment. Dated 7th August 1914, but to rank from the 6th May 1911.

Lieutenant Allen Leigh Johnston, Double Company Officer, 126th Baluchistan Infantry, from the King's (Shropshire Light Infantry). Dated 20th August 1914, but to rank from the 18th December 1911.

Lieutenant Claude Napier Buist, Double Company Officer, 51st Sikhs (Frontier Force), from the Royal Field Artillery. Dated 8th July 1914, but to rank from the 23rd October 1911.

Lieutenant George Edward Masters, officiating Double Company Officer, 89th Punjabis, from the Worcestershire Regiment. Dated 6th September 1914, but to rank from the 18th December 1911.

Lieutenant Richard James Killingworth Todd, Double Company Officer, 93rd Burma Infantry, from The Duke of Cambridge's Own (Middlesex Regiment). Dated 24th August 1914, but to rank from the 6th February 1912.

Lieutenant Arthur William Beam Gompertz, Double Company Officer, 94th Russell's Infantry, from The Prince of Wales's (North Staffordshire Regiment). Dated 22nd August 1914, but to rank from the 22nd August 1911.

Lieutenant Malcolm Eccles, Double Company Officer, 119th Infantry (The Mooltan Regiment), from the East Yorkshire Regiment. Dated 13th August 1914, but to rank from the 18th December 1914.

Lieutenant Christopher Theodore Corrie Irvine, officiating Double Company Officer, 25th Punjabis, from the Connaught Rangers. Dated 15th August 1914, but to rank from the 11th March 1912.

Lieutenant Basil Ivor Jones, Double Company Officer, 38th Dogras, from Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish Fusiliers). Dated 14th October 1914, but to rank from the 25th March 1912.

Lieutenant James Dunbar MacKenzie, Double Company Officer, 41st Dogras, from The East Surrey Regiment. Dated 14th August 1914, but to rank from the 6th May 1911.

Lieutenant Eric Alfred Bald, Double Company Officer, 10th Gurkha Rifles, from The Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment). Dated 26th October 1914, but to rank from the 14th January 1911.

Lieutenant George Jerome Dunlop Kellie, Double Company Officer, 30th Punjabis, from Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish Fusiliers). Dated 6th September 1914, but to rank from the 11th March 1912.

Lieutenant John Henry Crofton, Double Company Officer, 53rd Sikhs (Frontier Force), from the Royal Irish Regiment. Dated 16th August 1914, but to rank from the 18th December 1911. (Since deceased.)

COMMANDS.

No. 1104.—Colonel C. H. U. Price, C.B., D.S.O., Indian Army, to be Colonel on the Staff in succession to Major-General Sir J. A. Bell, K.C.V.O., Indian Army, and is granted the temporary rank of Brigadier-General whilst so employed. Dated 16th November 1914.

INDIAN ARMY.

ARMY RESERVES.

No. 1105.—The following gentlemen are appointed to the Indian Army Reserve of Officers, subject to His Majesty's approval; with effect from the 11th December 1914:—

To be second Lieutenants.

Philip Pipon Braithwaite	},—Cavalry Branch.
Henry James Leigh Fremlin	
Leslie Irvine Lumsden Thornton	
Harold Sinclair Higgin	
Arthur William Strachan	
Thomas Griffin	
Job Clarke	
Colin Edward Dunlop	
Douglas Gregory Smyth Osbourne	
Alfred Edmund Lowrie	
Patrick Joseph Roche	
John Ernest Bate Roberts	
Arthur Edward Powell	
Montague Arthur Stephen Cousins	
John Richard Milligan	},—Infantry Branch.
Robert Mair	
Donald MacDougall	
Alfred Butler Cross	
James Wilson Herbert Benson	
Guy St. George Higginson	
William Sydney Halliley	
Roderick Lewis O'Connor	
Frederick William Sprott	
Leslie Johnstone Carroll	
Percy William Walpole	

No. 1106.—Hugh Stanley Cheshire to be Lieutenant in the Infantry Branch of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers, subject to His Majesty's approval, dated 4th December 1914.

That portion of Army Department notification No. 1082, dated the 4th December 1914, which relates to this officer is cancelled.

No. 1107.—The appointment of Charles William Fysshe Palmer Roberts as Lieutenant in the Cavalry Branch of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers notified in Army Department Notification No. 946, dated 23rd October 1914, is cancelled.

No. 1108.—The appointment of Norman Paterson Tucker as second Lieutenant in the Cavalry Branch of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers notified in Army Department Notification No. 1035, dated the 20th November 1914, is cancelled.

LONDON GAZETTE.

No. 1109.—The following extracts are published for general information:—

"London Gazette," dated the 9th November 1914, pages 9109, 9110, 9112 and 9114.

* * * * *

War Office,
9th November 1914.

REGULAR FORCES.

Commands and Staff.

The undermentioned appointments are made:—

* * * * *

Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General—

Major John G. Griffith, 32nd Lancers, Indian Army. Dated 25th October 1914.

* * * * *

SPECIAL APPOINTMENTS.

(Graded for purposes of pay as Staff Lieutenants.)

Brevet Colonel George B. Renny, retired pay, Indian Army, *vice* Captain W. C. Hunter, Reserve of Officers. Dated 20th October 1914.

* * * * *

Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Atkinson, retired pay, Indian Army. Dated 24th October 1914.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. D. Strettell, retired pay, Indian Army. Dated 24th October 1914.

* * * * *

Railway Transport Officers—

(Graded for purposes of pay as Staff Captains.)

* * * * *

Arthur W. U. Pope, late Lieutenant-Colonel, Indian Railway Volunteers, and to be temporary Major. Dated 21st September 1914.

James A. Douglas, late Captain, Indian Volunteers, and to be temporary Major. Dated 21st September 1914.

* * * * *

INFANTRY.

Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders), Captain John F. Mackay, V.C., is seconded as Adjutant, Indian Volunteers. Dated 8th August 1914.

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MEMORANDA.

The undermentioned to be temporary local Colonels:—

Lieutenant-Colonel George e S. Barrow, 35th Seinde Horse, Indian Army. Dated 10th October 1914.

* * * * *

"London Gazette," dated the 10th November 1914, page 9132.

War Office,
10th November 1914.

REGULAR FORCES.

Commands and Staff.

The undermentioned appointments are made:—

General Staff Officer, 1st Grade—

Colonel Alexander S. Cobbe, V.C., D.S.O., Indian Army, Aide-de-Camp to The King, *vice* Colonel T. E. O'Leary, C.B. Dated 18th October 1914.

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"London Gazette," dated the 11th November 1914, pages 9231, 9232, 9233, 9234 and 9237.

* * * * *

War Office,
11th November 1914.

REGULAR FORCES.

Commands and Staff.

The undermentioned appointments are made :—

* * * * *

Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General—

Colonel St. George L. Steele, C.B., Indian Army, *vice* Colonel G. Cockburn, D.S.O., retired pay. Dated 3rd November 1914.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals—

Captain John P. Villiers-Stuart, 55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force), Indian Army. Dated 14th October 1914.

Captain James Whitehead, 1st Brahmans, Indian Army. Dated 14th October 1914.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-Generals—

Major John G. Griffith, 32nd Lancers, Indian Army. Dated 18th October 1914.

* * * * *

Brigade Major—

Major G. R. de Herriez Smith, retired pay, Indian Army, *vice* Major I. A. Finlay, Scottish Horse Yeomanry. Dated 8th October 1914.

* * * * *

The undermentioned temporary appointment is made :—

General Staff Officer, 3rd Grade—

Major Frederick H. Pigou, retired pay, Indian Army. Dated 24th October 1914.

* * * * *

ARMY MEDICAL SERVICE.

* * * * *

Major Robert J. Blackham, C.I.E., is seconded for service under the Government of India. Dated 4th November 1914.

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ARMY VETERINARY SERVICE.

Army Veterinary Corps, Thomas William Isaac Gardiner to be temporary Captain. Dated 30th October 1914.

Robert Wallace Simpson to be temporary Lieutenant. Dated 30th October 1914.

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INFANTRY.

Service Battalions.

* * * * *

The Highland Light Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Arundel S. Begbie, retired pay, late Indian Army, to command the 12th Battalion, *vice* Albert Giles, who has resigned on account of ill-health. Dated 5th November 1914.

* * * * *

War Office,
11th November 1914.

TERRITORIAL FORCE.

YEOMANRY.

* * * * *

Nottinghamshire (South Nottinghamshire Hussars); the following announcement is substituted for that which appeared in the *London Gazette* of the 3rd November 1914 :—

Colonel Edward H. Cole, Indian Army, to be Lieutenant-Colonel (temporary). Dated 4th November 1914.

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TERRITORIAL FORCE RESERVE.

General List.

* * * * *

Charles Chetwode Hardy (late Captain, East Indian Railway Volunteers). Dated 10th October 1914.

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"London Gazette," dated the 12th November 1914, page 9239.

War Office,
12th November 1914.

REGULAR FORCES.

Commands and Staff.

The undermentioned appointments are made :—

* * * * *

Special Appointments—

(Graded for purposes of pay as Staff Lieutenants.)

Brevet Colonel J. E. Main, retired pay, Indian Army.
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry W. Lowry, retired pay, Indian Army.
Commissary and Honorary Captain J. Hunter, retired pay, Indian Army Department. } Dated 31st October 1914.

* * * * *

"London Gazette," dated the 13th November 1914, pages 9266, 9275, 9278, and 9279.

War Office,
13th November 1914.

REGULAR FORCES.

Commands and Staff.

* * * * *

The date of appointment of Colonel C. W. Muir, C.B., C.I.E., retired pay, Indian Army, as an Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General is 17th September 1914, and not as stated in the Gazette of 4th November 1914.

* * * * *

The undermentioned temporary appointments are made :—

General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade—

Colonel John S. E. Western, retired pay, Indian Army, *vice* Major E. V. D. Riddell, Royal Artillery. Dated 20th October 1914.

* * * * *

War Office,
13th November 1914.

TERRITORIAL FORCE.

Royal Field Artillery

* * * * *

2nd Highland Brigade.

Captain John McPherson from the Cossipore Artillery Volunteers, to be Captain. Dated 24th September 1914.

* * * * *

*Royal Army Medical Corps.**Attached to Units other than Medical Units.*

Lieutenant-Colonel John Macfarlane Cadell, M.B., retired pay (late Indian Medical Service), to be Major. Dated 21st October 1914.

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GENERAL LIST.

The undermentioned to be Captain :—

George William Lindsley (late Captain, Indian Railway Volunteers). Dated 16th October 1914.

* * * * *

PROMOTIONS.**INDIAN ARMY.**

No. 1110.—The following promotions are made, subject to His Majesty's approval :—

Majors to be Lieutenant-Colonels.

Augustus Hodson Coke, 96th Berar Infantry. Dated 5th December 1914.

Herbert Hastings Harington, 72nd Punjabis.

William Edward Gordon Lillingston, 29th Lancers (Deccan Horse).

George Aubrey Strahan, 90th Punjabis.

Godfrey Lambert Carter, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

William Christian Anderson, 6th Gurkha Rifles.

Richard Anson Firth, 10th Gurkha Rifles.

Dated 8th December 1914.

Captains to be Majors.

Douglas Moncrieff Govan, 5th Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force).

Dated 9th December 1914.

Douglas Stewart George, 98th Infantry.

ARMY CLOTHING DEPARTMENT.

No. 1111.—The Christian name of Sub-Conductor Robert Mackay is as now stated, and not as notified in Army Department Notification No. 665, dated the 24th July 1914.

NATIVE ARMY.**APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS.**

No. 1112.—The following promotions are made ;

8th Cavalry.

Ressaider Hulas Singh to be Risaldar, Jemadars Mirza Riyazul Hussain and Har-bakhsh Singh to be Ressaiders, Kot-Dafadars Wazir Muhammad Khan and Jamaiyat Singh to be Jemadars and Dafadar Malak Sher Khan to be Jemadar, to complete the establishment ; with effect from the 29th October 1914.

32nd Lancers.

Ressaider Yakub Khan to be Risaldar, Jemadar Saitan Singh to be Ressaider and Kot-Dafadar Sher Singh to be Jemadar, vice Muhammad Abad Khan transferred to the pension establishment ; with effect from the 15th September 1914.

Jemadar Hasan Ali Khan to be Ressaider, *vice* Jus Singh deceased; with effect from the 31st October 1914.

Kot-Dafadar Ali Bakhsh Khan to be Jemadar, *vice* Jemadar Yasin Khan seconded; Kot-Dafadar Muhammad Hayat Khan to be Jemadar, *vice* Jemadar Sundar Singh seconded; with effect from the 29th October 1914.

37th Lancers (Baluch Horse).

Ressaider Nur Sher Khan to be Risaldar, Jemadar Narayan Singh to be Ressaider and to remain seconded, and Kot-Dafadar Kutab Sher Shah to be Jemadar, *vice* Dargai Khan seconded; with effect from the 15th October 1914.

Jemadar Ata Muhammad Khan to be Ressaider, and Kot-Dafadar Yakub Khan to be Jemadar, *vice* Waragan Singh seconded; with effect from the 15th October 1914.

39th King George's Own Central India Horse.

Dafadar Bachittar Singh to be Jemadar, *vice* Jemadar Fauja Singh seconded; with effect from the 24th August 1914.

Kot Dafadar Sulaiman Khan to be Jemadar, *vice* Jemadar Abbas Ali Khan seconded; with effect from the 29th October 1914.

Dafadar Malik Sher Muhammad Khan to be Jemadar, *vice* Malik Bakhsh Khan seconded; with effect from the 29th October 1914.

Kot Dafadar Bachan Singh to be Jemadar, *vice* Jemadar Basant Singh seconded; with effect from the 18th November 1914.

10th Jats.

Jemadar Hathi to be Subadar and Havildar-Major Jot Ram to be Jemadar; *vice* Subadar Ganeshi seconded;

Havildar Molar (ii) to be Jemadar, *vice* Jemadar Molar seconded;

Colour Havildar Tirkha, to be Jemadar, *vice* Jemadar Neki Ram seconded; with effect from the 27th October 1914.

14th King George's Own Ferozepore Sikhs.

Jemadar Wazir Singh to be Subadar and Havildars Rur Singh, Sant Singh, Jiwan Singh, Partab Singh, Minan Singh and Phuman Singh to be Jemadars, to complete the establishment; with effect from the 16th October 1914.

51st Sikhs (Frontier Force).

Jemadar Khan Baz Khan to be Subadar and Havildars Kadir Khan, Akbar Khan, Mathura, Chanda Singh, Khushal Singh and Labh Singh to be Jemadars, to complete the establishment; with effect from the 12th October 1914.

58th Vaughan's Rifles (Frontier Force).

Havildar Diwan Singh to be Jemadar, *vice* Jemadar Harnam Singh seconded, Havildar Rasila to be Jemadar, *vice* Jemadar Bhag Singh seconded, and Havildar Hazrat Khan to be Jemadar, *vice* Jemadar Tar Dil seconded; with effect from the 25th October 1914.

109th Infantry.

Subadar Alladitta Khan to be Subadar-Major, Jemadar Narayan Chawan to be Subadar, Colour Havildar Tukeram Gaikwar to be Jemadar, *vice* Mahadeorao Sawant transferred to the pension establishment; with effect from the 1st November 1914.

117th Mahrattas.

Jemadar Babu Parab to be Subadar, Colour Havildar Govindrao Powar, Havildars Marutirao Kadam, Tatobaamre, Mahomed Ibrahim and Naick Hari Jadhao to be Jemadars, to complete the establishment; with effect from the 19th August 1914.

127th Queen Mary's Own Baluch Light Infantry.

Jemadar Muhammad to be Subadar, Havildar Muhammad Yusuf, Colour Havildars Nurdad, I.O.M., and Fateh Jang to be Jemadars, to complete the establishment; with effect from the 2nd November 1914.

2nd Battalion, 10th Gurkha Rifles.

Jemadar Dhandhoj Rai to be Subadar, Colour Havildars Makun Sing Limbu, Barkhabadur Rai and Sukman Rai to be Jemadars, to complete the establishment; with effect from the 11th September 1914.

RETIREMENTS.**INDIAN ARMY.**

No. 1113.—Lieutenant-Colonel Charles William Westbrooke Burton has been permitted by the Most Hon'ble the Secretary of State for India to retire from the service, subject to His Majesty's approval; with effect from the 20th November 1914.

No. 1114.—Major Charles Hallyburton Campbell Grace, 105th Mahratta Light Infantry, has been permitted by the Most Hon'ble the Secretary of State for India to retire from the service, subject to His Majesty's approval; with effect from the 16th November 1914.

VOLUNTEER CORPS.**APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS AND RESIGNATIONS.***Bihar Light Horse.*

No. 1115.—Robert McNeil to be Second Lieutenant, to fill an existing vacancy. Dated the 4th October 1914.

Moulmein Volunteer Rifles.

No. 1116.—Lieutenant Dennis O'Sullivan to be Captain, *vice* G. P. Andrew transferred to the Supernumerary List. Dated the 13th November 1914.

Second Lieutenant Edward Gerard Noël Kinch to be Lieutenant, *vice* D. O'Sullivan promoted. Dated the 13th November 1914.

John James Alexander Shaw to be Second Lieutenant, *vice* E. G. N. Kinch promoted. Dated the 13th November 1914.

1st Battalion, The Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Rifles.

No. 1117.—Lieutenant Lewis Hawker Kirkness resigns his commission. Dated the 24th November 1914.

Lieutenant Godfrey George Armstrong resigns his commission. Dated the 24th November 1914.

Lieutenant Hugh Stuart Glass resigns his commission. Dated the 24th November 1914.

1st Battalion, Bengal Nagpur Railway Volunteer Rifle Corps.

No. 1118.—Rupert Grant to be Second Lieutenant, to fill an existing vacancy. Dated the 1st February 1914.

Patrick Joseph Gahan to be Second Lieutenant, to fill an existing vacancy. Dated the 25th September 1914.

Charles William Bluett to be Second Lieutenant, to fill an existing vacancy. Dated the 25th September 1914.

Eastern Bengal Volunteer Rifles.

No. 1119.—Frederick William Needham to be Major, to fill an existing vacancy. Dated the 12th October 1914.

Medals and Decorations.

No. 1120.—His Excellency the Governor-General of India is pleased to confer the Volunteer Officers' Decoration upon the undermentioned officer:—

Surma Valley Light Horse.

Captain Harry Morton Girling.

JUDICIAL.

No. 1121.—The following revised scale of relative rank for precedence for civil officials of the Public Works and State Railway Establishments with an army in the field is published in supersession of that notified in Clause 100 of India Army Circulars of 1890:—

Relative Military Rank.	Engineering.	Railway Revenue Establishment.
<i>Superior Establishment.</i>		
Lieutenant-Colonel	Chief and Superintending Engineers.	Officers in class I.
Major	Executive Engineers of 18 years' service and over.	Officers in class II of 18 years' service and over.
Captain	Executive Engineers of under 18 years' service and Assistant Engineers of 9 years' service and over.	Officers in class II of under 18 years' service and officers in class III of 9 years' service and over.
Lieutenant	Assistant Engineers of under 9 years' service.	Officers in class III of under 9 years' service.
<i>Subordinate Establishment. (European.)</i>		
Deputy Commissary	Sub-Engineers, 1st Grade (Rs. 400 per mensem).	Revenue subordinates drawing Rs. 400 per mensem and above.
Assistant Commissary	Sub-Engineers, 2nd Grade (Rs. 300 per mensem).	Revenue subordinates drawing pay from Rs. 300 to Rs. 399 per mensem.
Conductor	Sub-Engineers, 3rd Grade (Rs. 250 per mensem).	Revenue subordinates drawing pay from Rs. 250 to Rs. 299 per mensem.
Sub-Conductor	Supervisors, 1st and 2nd Grades (Rs. 200 and 150 per mensem).	Revenue subordinates drawing pay from Rs. 150 to Rs. 249 per mensem.
Sergeant	Overseers, 1st, 2nd and 3rd grades (Rs. 100, Rs. 80 and Rs. 60 per mensem).	Revenue subordinates drawing pay from Rs. 60 to Rs. 149 per mensem.
<i>Indian.</i>		
Subadar	Sub-Engineers	Revenue subordinates drawing Rs. 250 and over per mensem.
Jemadar	Supervisors	Revenue subordinates drawing pay from Rs. 150 to Rs. 249 per mensem.
Warrant Officer	Overseers	Revenue subordinates drawing pay from Rs. 50 to Rs. 149 per mensem.

2. The ranks hereby conferred do not give these departmental officers any disciplinary powers whatever over soldiers, but entitle the officers concerned to take their places on mixed committees according to dates of commission. Officers holding commissions as volunteers will not take that rank on service, but will hold the rank conferred by their departmental standing.

3. Military Officers borne on the permanent cadres of the Public Works and State Railways establishments when employed departmentally in the field will retain the Army rank to which they are entitled, except in cases where their civil positions according to the above comparative table entitle them to higher rank. In such cases they will be given local rank according to the foregoing table.

RECRUITING.

INDIAN ARMY.

No. 1122.—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 113 of the Indian Army Act, 1911 (VIII of 1911), the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that recruits wishing to serve as Combatants in His Majesty's Indian Army, for the duration of the present war, shall be enrolled and attested on the following form:—

Form No. 1-A.

COMBATANTS.

ENROLMENT OF

(a) _____

No. _____ Name _____ as a Combatant in the _____ Corps

Questions to be put before Enrolment.

You are warned that if after enrolment it is found that you have given a wilfully false answer to any of the following nine questions you will be liable to be punished as provided in the Indian Army Act.

1. What is your name? 1. _____
2. What is your father's name? 2. _____
3. What is your religion, class and tribe? 3. _____
4. What is your Village, Thana, Pergunnah and District? 4.

Village _____
Thana _____
Pergunnah _____
Tehsil _____

 District _____
5. Have you ever been imprisoned by the Civil Power? 5. _____
6. Do you now belong to His Majesty's Forces, the Reserve, or the Imperial Service Troops of any Native State? 6. _____
7. Have you ever served in His Majesty's Forces, the Reserve, or the Imperial Service Troops of any Native State? If so, state in which, and the cause of discharge (b) and also whether you desire your previous service in His Majesty's Forces to reckon towards good conduct pay, pension or gratuity, by refunding any gratuity or pension you may have received on or since discharge in not more than 36 monthly instalments, counting from date of re-enlistment? 7. _____
8. Have you truly stated the whole, if any, of your former service? 8. _____
9. Are you in receipt of any allowance from Government; if so, on what account? 9. _____
10. Are you willing to be enrolled in the (c) 10. _____
11. Are you willing to go wherever ordered by land or sea, and allow no caste usages to interfere with your military duty? 11. _____
12. Are you willing to be permanently transferred, at any time when necessity arises, to any corps of the group to which the corps in which you are then serving belongs? (d) 12. _____
13. Are you willing to be vaccinated or re-vaccinated? 13. _____
14. Are you willing to serve until discharged in accordance with the following conditions provided His Majesty shall so long require your services? 14. _____

When you have served till the conclusion of the present war, you will be entitled to receive your discharge with all convenient speed. If, however, at the conclusion of the war you desire to remain in the service, you will be entitled to do so on your signing the agreement printed below under the heading "Variation of Conditions as to Discharge".

- (a) When a Recruit is enrolled for service in a special class (e.g., bandsman, schoolmaster, etc., or when as in the Queen's Own Corps of Guides or the Indian Artillery, two or more classes of combatants exist in the same corps, the class for which enrolled will be entered here. In all other cases this space will be left blank.
- (b) If so, the Recruit should be asked to produce his Discharge Certificate.
- (c) Enter corps in which enrolled.
- (d) Infantry, military, railway companies and signal companies only.

I _____ do solemnly declare that the above answers made by me to the above questions are true and that I am willing to fulfil the engagements made.

Signature of Recruit _____

Signature of Witness _____

CERTIFICATE OF ENROLLING OFFICER.

The conditions of the service for which he is now enrolled were read and explained to the above-named person by me (in my presence).

After having cautioned him that if he made any false answer to any of the above questions, Nos. 1 to 9, he would be liable to be punished as provided in the Indian Army Act, I put these questions to him and his answer to each question has been duly entered as replied to.

I am satisfied that he fully understands the questions put to him and consents to the conditions of service.

Signed at _____ this _____ day of _____ 19 .

Signature of Enrolling Officer _____

ATTESTATION.*

Certified that the above-named person took the prescribed _____ oath _____ affirmation before me at _____

this _____ day of _____ 19 .

Signature of Attesting Officer _____

TRANSFER TO THE RESERVE.†

On being transferred to the Reserve I consent to the conditions as to discharge accepted by me on my enrolment being cancelled and the following substituted for them.

I will be entitled to my discharge at any time unless war is imminent or existing: provided that, if I am discharged at my own request before having served two years in the Reserve, I will, before being so discharged, refund the cost of the passage to my home granted to me when I was transferred to the Reserve.

Signature _____

Signed in my presence at _____ this _____ day of _____ 19 .

Signature of Commanding Officer _____

TRANSFER TO THE COLOURS (FROM RESERVE).‡

On being transferred to the Colours, I consent to the conditions as to discharge accepted by me on my transfer to _____ the Reserve being cancelled and the following substituted for them.

When I have served three years from this date I will be entitled to receive my discharge within two months from the date of applying for it, unless war is imminent or existing, or the squadron, battery or company to which I belong is ten per cent. below strength, provided that in the event of my deserting service between date of desertion and date of apprehension or surrender shall not reckon as service towards discharge.

Signature _____

Signed in my presence at _____ this _____ day of _____ 19 ____.

Signature of Commanding Officer _____

VARIATION OF CONDITIONS AS TO DISCHARGE.

I agree to serve _____ § years from this date before being entitled to my discharge.

Signature _____

Signed in my presence at _____ this _____ day of _____ 19 ____.

Signature of Commanding Officer _____

* To be completed when the enrolled person is attested. I. A. A. Section 12 and Rules 8 and 9.

† For use when a person enrolled for an active establishment is transferred, with his own consent, to the Reserve.

‡ For use when a person serving in the Reserve is transferred, with his own consent, to the Colours.

§ In the case of men who, having enlisted for the period of the war, wish to remain in the service, the period will be four years less the period already served since date of enrolment.

W. R. BIRDWOOD, *Major-General*,
Secretary to the Government of India.

ARMY DEPARTMENT.

NOTIFICATION.

Delhi, the 11th December 1914.

Under Clause 53 of the Regulations appended to the Regimental Debts Act, 1893, it is notified that reports of the deaths of the undermentioned commissioned officers on the dates specified, were received in the Army Department between the 2nd and 8th December 1914:—

Corps.	Rank and name.	Date of Decease.	Place of Decease.	REMARKS.
34th Prince Albert Victor's Own Poona Horse.	Lieutenant Frank Alexander de Pass.	27th November 1914.	France	Killed in action.
10th Jats, attached to 9th Bhopal Infantry.	Captain Gerald Henry Walter Mortimer.	23rd November 1914.	„	Ditto.
34th Sikh Pioneers	Captain Alexander Masters	24th November 1914.	„	Ditto.
2nd Battalion, 8th Gurkha Rifles.	Lieutenant Charles William Maxwell.	24th November 1914.	„	Ditto.
4th Wessex Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, 2nd Devonshire Battery.	Captain H. Wilton	28th November 1914.	Dinapore	...

W. R. BIRDWOOD, *Major-General*,
Secretary to the Government of India.

MARINE DEPARTMENT.

Delhi, the 11th December 1914.

RETIREMENT.

No. 93.—Lieutenant C. O. Campbell, Royal Indian Marine, has been permitted by the Most Hon'ble the Secretary of State for India to retire from the service, with effect from the 24th November 1914.

W. R. BIRDWOOD, *Major-General,*
Secretary to the Government of India.

RAILWAY DEPARTMENT.

(RAILWAY BOARD.)

NOTIFICATIONS.

Simla, the 7th December 1914.

No. 336.—It is hereby notified, for general information, that the Railway Board have sanctioned a survey by State Agency for a re-alignment of the Agra-Delhi Chord Railway from the neighbourhood of Pahargunj on the north to the neighbourhood of Kilokri Railway station on the south.

This survey will be known as the Delhi re-alignment survey.

No. 337.—Mr. G. J. King, Head Draughtsman, Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway (ranking as Assistant Carriage and Wagon Superintendent), is appointed as an Assistant Carriage and Wagon Superintendent in class III, grade 1, of the Superior Revenue Establishment of State Railways, with effect from the 14th December 1914.

No. 338.—Mr. E. Burton, District Locomotive Superintendent, North Western Railway, in class II, grade 1, of the Superior Revenue Establishment of State Railways, is temporarily transferred to the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway, with effect from the 1st October 1914.

The 8th December 1914.

No. 339.—Mr. N. A. Todd, Officiating Assistant Traffic Superintendent, North Western Railway, is confirmed in the Superior Revenue Establishment of State Railways as an Assistant Traffic Superintendent in class III, grade 3.

No. 340.—Mr. G. H. Goff, Officiating Assistant Traffic Superintendent, North Western Railway, is confirmed in the Superior Revenue Establishment of State Railways as an Assistant Traffic Superintendent in class III, grade 4.

No. 341.—Mr. T. W. Richardson, Officiating Assistant Traffic Superintendent, Eastern Bengal Railway, is confirmed in the Superior Revenue Establishment of State Railways, as an Assistant Traffic Superintendent in class III, grade 4, and promoted to class III, grade 3, *pro tem.* until further orders.

No. 342.—In pursuance of sub-section (1) of Section 135 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890), and in continuation of the Notification of the Government of India in the Railway Department, No. 157, dated the 11th June 1914, the Governor General in Council is pleased to declare that the Administration of the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway shall be

iable to pay, in aid of the funds of the local authority set out in the Schedule hereto annexed, the tax specified in the second column thereof.

SCHEDULE.

Local Authority.	Tax.
1	2
Sitapur Municipality.	House Tax.


The 10th December 1914.

CORRIGENDUM.

No. 343.—In the second column of the Schedule annexed to the Notification of the Government of India in the Railway Department No. 222, dated the 24th August 1911, as amended by Notification No. 291, dated the 28th October 1914, specifying the taxes payable in aid of the funds of certain Local Authorities by the Administration of the Burma railways, for the entry “Land tax” against “Nattalin Municipality” read “House and land taxes”.

No. 344.—In the schedule annexed to the Notification of the Government of India in the Railway Department No. 221, dated the 24th August 1911, as amended by Notification No. 24, dated the 16th January 1913, specifying the taxes payable in aid of the funds of certain Local Authorities by the Administration of the Bombay, Baroda and Central India (including Rajputana Malwa) railway, for the entry “House tax” against “Cawnpore-do.” read “Tax on houses, buildings and lands”.

T. RYAN,
Secretary to the Government of India.



21.DEC.1

The Gazette of India.

PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY.

No. 51.} DELHI, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1914.

~~Separate paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation.~~

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PART I.

Government of India Notifications, Appointments, Promotions, etc.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

NOTIFICATIONS.

Delhi, the 18th December 1914.

No. 58.—The Governor General is pleased to accept the resignation by the Hon'ble Major-General William Riddell Birdwood, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., of his office of Additional Member of the Legislative Council of the Governor General.

No. 59.—In exercise of the power conferred by section 10 of the Indian Councils Act, 1861 (24 and 25 Vict., C. 67), as modified by the Indian Councils Act, 1909 (9 Edw. 7, C. 4), and in pursuance of the provisions of Regulation XI (2) of the Regulations for the nomination and election of Additional Members of the Legislative Council of the Governor General, the Governor General is pleased to nominate Colonel Benjamin Holloway, being an official, to be an Additional Member of the said Council, *vice* Major-General William Riddell Birdwood, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., resigned.

W. H. VINCENT,

Secretary to the Government of India.

HOME DEPARTMENT.

NOTIFICATIONS.

ESTABLISHMENTS.

Delhi, the 12th December 1914.

No. 1976.—Mr. J. C. Arbuthnott, C.I.E., is permitted to resign His Majesty's Indian Civil Service with effect from the 19th September 1914.

MEDICAL.

The 15th December 1914.

No. 865-C.—The services of the undermentioned officers are placed temporarily at the disposal of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India:—

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Entrican, M.D., M.Ch., D.P.H., I.M.S.

Major H. A. Williams, M.B., B.A.O., D.S.O., I.M.S.

Captain R. Kelsall, M.B., I.M.S.

Captain L. A. H. Lack, M.B., I.M.S.

The 18th December 1914.

No. 920-C.—In modification of the Home Department Notification no. 478-C, dated the 25th November 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Gould, M.B., I.M.S., Assistant Director General, Indian Medical Service (Stores), is appointed to be Deputy Director General, Indian Medical Service, substantively *pro tempore* during the absence of Brevet-Colonel B. G. Seton, V.H.S., I.M.S., on other duty or until further orders.

POR T BLAIR.

The 17th December 1914.

No. 911-C.—Consequent on the appointment of Mr. S. R. Mayers, Assistant Superintendent of Police, to officiate as 2nd Assistant Superintendent, Port Blair, the following reversions in the Port Blair Commission will take effect from the 19th February 1914:—

Mr. E. H. Thirkell-White, officiating 2nd Assistant Superintendent, to be 3rd Assistant Superintendent.

Mr. H. H. Tayler, officiating 3rd Assistant Superintendent, to be 4th Assistant Superintendent.

Mr. A. L. F. Evans, officiating 4th Assistant Superintendent, to be 5th Assistant Superintendent.

Mr. C. O'D. Hervey, officiating 5th Assistant Superintendent, to be 6th Assistant Superintendent.

Mirza Aslam Beg, officiating 6th Assistant Superintendent, to be 7th Assistant Superintendent.

PUBLIC.

The 17th December 1914.

No. 888-C.—The following Order of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries of Great Britain, relating to the importation of dogs into that country, is published for general information, in supersession of the Home Department notification no. 463, dated the 11th February 1902:—

ORDER OF THE BOARD OF
AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES.

(DATED 23RD OCTOBER 1914.

IMPORTATION OF DOGS ORDER
OF 1914.

The Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, by virtue and in exercise of the powers vested in them under the Diseases of Animals Acts, 1894 to 1914, and of every other power enabling them in this behalf, do order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:

Restriction on Importation of Dogs.

1.—(1) An imported dog, that is to say, a dog brought to Great Britain from any other country, except Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, shall not be landed in Great Britain unless its landing is authorised by a licence of the Board previously obtained, and when landed it shall be subject to the provisions of this Order, and to the conditions inserted in any licence authorising its landing.

(2) The provisions of this Order shall also apply to a dog taken from Great Britain, Ireland, the Channel Islands, or the Isle of Man into any port in any country (except Great Britain, Ireland, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man), as if the animal were an imported animal, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Board that the animal has not been landed in that country and that while on board it has not been allowed to come in contact with any dog or other canine animal from that country, and unless the landing of the animal in Great Britain is authorised by a licence of the Board previously obtained.

Detention and Isolation of Imported Dogs.

2.—(1) An imported dog shall, for a period of four calendar months after its landing, be detained and isolated at the expense of its owner upon premises in the occupation, or under the control, of a veterinary surgeon, which shall have been previously approved in writing by the Board for that purpose, and such premises are in this Order referred to as the "place of detention."

(2) During the said period the dog shall not be moved from the place of detention except to another place of detention or to a vessel for exportation, and in either case only with a licence of the Board authorising such movement.

(3) This Article shall apply to (a) an imported dog which is shown to the satisfaction of the Board to a *bond fide* performing dog, or (b) an imported dog which is intended to be exported from Great Britain within forty-eight hours after its landing, only so far as its provisions are applied by way of conditions inserted in the licence authorising the landing of the dog.

Conditions of Licence.

3. The Board may insert in any licence granted by them under this Order authorising

the landing of an imported dog such conditions as they think necessary or desirable for the following purposes:

- (i) for prescribing and regulating the detention and isolation of the dog so far as the same is not prescribed and regulated by this Order;
- (ii) for prescribing the person by whom and the premises on which the dog shall be detained and isolated;
- (iii) for regulating the movement of the dog to the place of detention, or vessel for exportation, and for prohibiting or regulating its movement during a period of four calendar months after its landing, or until its exportation, as the case may be;
- (iv) for prescribing the confinement of the dog in a suitable hamper, crate, box, or other receptacle during the movement of the dog by railway, or along a highway or thoroughfare;
- (v) for prescribing the mode of isolation of the dog;
- (vi) for prescribing the muzzling of the dog;
- (vii) for prescribing the notice to be given of the death or loss of the dog, or of any matter arising in connection with the movement, detention, or isolation of the dog and the persons by whom and to whom the notice is to be given; and
- (viii) for prescribing the production of a licence for inspection by an officer of the Board, or police constable, or officer of Customs and Excise.

Notice of Detention in case of Illegal Landing.

4.—(1) Where an Inspector or other Officer of the Board, or of a Local Authority, has reason to believe that a dog has been landed in contravention of this Order or of any Order hereby revoked, he may give notice to the owner or person in charge of the dog requiring that, within a time specified in such notice, the dog shall be moved (a) to a vessel for exportation, or (b) to a place of detention for the purpose of detention and isolation in accordance with the provisions of such notice.

(2) Such provisions may be inserted in the notice as the Board may think necessary or desirable for any of the purposes mentioned in the preceding Article.

(3) The operation of a notice under this Article may be terminated by notice to that effect given by an Inspector or other Officer of the Board or of the Local Authority to the owner or person in charge of the dog, on proof to the satisfaction of the Inspector or Officer that the dog was not landed in contravention of the said Orders, or that four calendar months have expired since its landing.

(4) If that owner or person in charge of the dog, after receipt of such notice, fails to move the dog as required by the notice, he shall be deemed guilty of an offence against the Act of 1894.

Withdrawal of Licence in cases of Default.

5.—(1) If an imported dog is not detained and isolated in conformity with the provisions

of this Order or of the conditions or provisions of a Licence or Notice issued thereunder, the Board, or an Inspector or other Officer of the Board, may give notice to such owner or person in charge, requiring him to move the dog to a vessel for exportation within a time specified in such notice.

(2) If the owner or person in charge of the dog, after receipt of such notice, fails to move the dog as required by the notice, he shall be deemed guilty of an offence against the Act of 1894.

Seizure of Dogs in case of Default.

6.—(1) If an imported dog is not detained and isolated as required by this Order or by the conditions or provisions of any licence or notice thereunder, an Inspector of the Board may seize the dog, and thereupon the Board shall detain and isolate it at the place of detention specified in the licence or notice, or any other place of detention selected by them, in accordance with the requirements of this Order or the said conditions or provisions, at the expense of the owner of the dog.

(2) If the owner of the dog does not, within ten days after the expiration of the period of detention specified in this Order or in the licence or notice, claim the said dog from the Board and pay to them their expenses of detaining and isolating the dog, the Board may destroy or otherwise dispose of the dog as they think expedient.

Re-landing prohibited of Imported Dogs moved to Vessels for Exportation.

7. An imported dog which has been moved to a vessel for exportation in accordance with a licence or notice under this Order shall not be re-landed in Great Britain without a licence of the Board authorising such landing.

Regulation of Transhipment of Imported Dogs.

8. An imported dog shall not be transhipped in a port in Great Britain except with the written permission of an officer of the Board or of an officer of Customs and Excise.

Proceedings under Customs Acts for Unlawful Landing.

9.—(1) If any person lands or attempts to land a dog in contravention of this Order, he shall be liable, under and according to the Customs Acts, to the penalties imposed on persons importing or attempting to import goods, the importation whereof is prohibited by or under the Customs Acts, without prejudice to any proceedings against him under the Act of 1894 for an offence against that Act.

(2) The dog in respect whereof the offence is committed shall be forfeited under and according to the Customs Acts in like manner as goods the importation whereof is prohibited by or under the Customs Acts.

Detention of Dogs on Vessels in Port.

10.—(1) Every dog to which this Article applies shall at all times while on board a vessel in any port in Great Britain be—

(a) secured to some part of the vessel by a collar and chain and muzzled with a wire cage muzzle, so contrived as to

render it impossible for such dog while wearing the same to bite any person or animal, but not so as to prevent such dog from breathing freely or lapping water; or

(b) confined in an enclosed part of the vessel from which the dog cannot escape.

(2) If any dog to which this Article applies shall die, or be lost from a vessel, in any port in Great Britain, the person in charge of the dog shall forthwith give notice of such death or loss to the Board.

(3) The provisions of this Article shall apply to every imported dog which is not accompanied by a licence issued by the Board authorising the landing of such dog in Great Britain.

Extension of certain Sections of Diseases of Animals Act, 1894.

11. Dogs shall be animals, and rabies shall be a disease, for the purposes of the following sections of the Act of 1894 (namely) :

Section forty-three (*Police*);

Section forty-four (*General Administrative Provisions*);

Section fifty-six (*Proceedings under Customs Acts for unlawful landing or shipping*);

and also for the purposes of all other sections of the said Act containing provisions relative to or consequent on the provisions of those sections and this Order, including such sections as relate to offences and legal proceedings.

Local Authority to enforce Order.

12. The provisions of this Order, except where it is otherwise provided, shall be executed and enforced by the Local Authority.

Offences.

13.—(1) If a dog is landed or transhipped in contravention of this Order, the owner and the charterer and the master of the vessel from which it is landed or transhipped, and the owner of the dog, and the person for the time being in charge thereof, and the person causing, directing, or permitting the landing or transhipment, and the person landing or transhipping the same, and the consignee or other person receiving or keeping it knowing it to have been landed or transhipped in contravention as aforesaid, shall, each according to and in respect of his own acts and defaults, be deemed guilty of an offence against the Act of 1894.

(2) If a dog is moved in contravention of this Order, or of the conditions or provisions of a licence or notice thereunder, the owner of the dog, and the person for the time being in charge thereof, and the person causing, directing, or permitting the movement, and the person moving the dog, and the consignee or other person receiving or keeping it knowing it to have been moved in contravention as aforesaid, and the occupier of the place from which the dog is moved, shall, each according to and in respect of his own acts and defaults, be deemed guilty of an offence against the Act of 1894.

(3) If a dog is not kept isolated as required by this Order, or by the conditions or provisions of a licence or notice thereunder, the

owner of the dog, and the person for the time being in charge thereof, and the occupier of the place where such dog is detained, and the person failing or neglecting to isolate the dog, shall, each according to and in respect of his own acts, defaults or omissions, be deemed guilty of an offence against the Act of 1894.

(4) If a dog is not secured, muzzled, or confined as required by this Order, or by the conditions or provisions of a licence or notice thereunder, the owner of the dog, and the person for the time being in charge thereof, and the master of any vessel on board which the dog is or has been carried to Great Britain, shall, each according to and in respect of his own acts and defaults, be deemed guilty of an offence against the Act of 1894.

(5) If a person with a view unlawfully to evade or defeat the operation of this Order, or of the conditions or provisions of a licence or notice thereunder, allows a dog to stray, he shall be deemed guilty of an offence against the Act of 1894.

(6) If the owner or person in charge of a dog fails to give, produce, or do any notice, licence, or thing which by this Order, or by the conditions or provisions of a licence or notice thereunder, he is required to give, produce, or do, he shall be deemed guilty of an offence against the Act of 1894.

Revocation of Order; Existing Licences.

14.—(1) The Importation of Dogs Order of 1901 is hereby revoked.

(2) A licence granted or notice given under the Order hereby revoked shall have effect as

if it had been granted or given under this Order, and may be enforced accordingly; but any such licence or notice shall, as from the commencement of this Order, be read and have effect as if the period of detention referred to therein were four calendar months instead of six calendar months.

Interpretation.

15. In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires,—

“The Board” means the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries;

“The Act of 1894” means the Diseases of Animals Act, 1894;

“Master” includes a person having the charge or command of a vessel;

Other terms have the same meaning as in the Act of 1894.

Commencement.

16. This Order shall come into operation on the first day of November, nineteen hundred and fourteen.

Short Title.

17. This Order may be cited as the Importation of Dogs Order of 1914.

In witness whereof, the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries have hereunto set their Official Seal, this twenty-third day of October, nineteen hundred and fourteen.

L. S.

Sydney Olivier,
Secretary.

H. WHEELER,
Secretary to the Government of India.

FOREIGN AND POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

NOTIFICATIONS.

Delhi, the 17th December 1914.

No. 1091-W.—In continuation of the Notification by the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department No. 1047-W., dated the 11th December 1914, the following papers are published for general information:—

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS.

Correspondence and Statements in Parliament, together with an Introductory Narrative of Events.

INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

(1)

On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend Army manoeuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Sarajevo, the Capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed.

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices.

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-78 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not "detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." Forty years later, however in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's attitude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war: but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13—successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened.

(2)

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives.

But the dangers to European peace which it involved were immediately evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed.

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable.

His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Servia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the opinion of the Russian and French—and also of the German—Governments was that the Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated in part on Servian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investigations on foot. The Servian Government also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Servian

Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known ; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August.

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente* remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Servia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence" ; if Servia was to be humiliated ; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburg, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of years could not be pushed aside in a day.

(3)

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Servian national life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Servian Government was to publish on the front page of the "Official Journal" a prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation.

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum.

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan States ; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient ; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Servia did not necessarily affect that interest ; it was a dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute ; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia ; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake ; and from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Servia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice,"—by a "loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis.

(4)

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ultimatum was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that "there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight

hours. He confessed to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Servia.

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum; officially, the German Government called it "equitable and moderate," and said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that, but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm.

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of conciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia declared herself ready; Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired; and after all Servia did not need advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power—Germany not excepted—had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Servia's reply the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation.

But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Servia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.

(5)

During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one question before Europe—how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement? It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy; the popular sentiment of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take no territory from Servia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of violent popular enthusiasm. They said themselves that they would be swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Servia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that she would have to intervene if Servia were attacked; but she promised Austria on the 27th that she would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it was too late. She declared war on Servia on the 28th. Russia ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th.

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey has proposed that the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss the best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted; Russia said she was ready to stand aside; but Germany refused. She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last paragraph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to discuss the Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to

see, after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia therefore fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would consent to work for a settlement.

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the strength of this assurance and similar assurances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Government, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace." The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th.

(6)

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her.

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on the frontiers of Servia and Austria; the only fear of further war had lain in the relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific; Russia had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal development; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace; it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicions between Vienna and St. Petersburg. But now a new element of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that peace.

Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past; her action now was not wanton. Belgium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death; Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Government, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutrality, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there could be no doubt of German designs.

Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and Austria. On the 29th, Germany had suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Servia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of

the sovereignty of Servia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions. For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace.

(7)

At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August. France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable.

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Government failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now remain neutral? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume,* and no additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a European conflagration took place. We give no pledge to our present allies, but to Germany we gave three times—on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August—a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows: "In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with every wish to be fair and just it will be admitted that the response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe.

Foreign Office, September 28, 1914.

*See Part II.

PART I.

CORRESPONDENCE * LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT.

*See Foreign and Political Department notifications Nos. 503-W. and 684-W., dated respectively, the 22nd September and 15th October 1914.

PART II.

SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

(1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914.

LAST week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force thing rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There has been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple *Entente*, for some years past. The Triple *Entente* was not an alliance—it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—also a Balkan crisis—originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing

which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorised that on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd November 1912 I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government:—

“ My dear Ambassador,

“ From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

“ You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

“ I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common.”

Lord Charles Beresford.—What is the date of that?

Sir E. Grey.—The 22nd November 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and, *a fortiori*, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is

only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If you say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government

receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that—confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870, used these words. He said:—

"We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations, that we could not think this country was bound either morally or internationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the country's interests."

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:—

"There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance, that there is already an existing guarantee in force, is, of necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever."

The treaty is an old treaty—1830—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:—

"The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

From the German Government the reply was :—

“ The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor.”

Sir Edward Goschen to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers :—

“ Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said, that in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions ; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.”

It now appears from the news I have received to-day—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgium integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgium neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George :—

“ Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in “Hansard,” volume 203, p. 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said :—

“ We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participants in the sin.”

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests, to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone’s words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things

right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment, that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken place; mobilisation of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realise the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

(2) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914.

GERMANY AND BELGIUM.

I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect:—

“Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian territory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means.”

Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which it has received. I make no further comment upon it.

(3) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914.

Mr. Bonar Law.—I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement that he can now make to the House?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith).—In conformity with the statement of policy made here by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. It was to this effect:—

“The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and

must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply."

We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:—

"German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces."

Simultaneously—almost immediately afterwards—we received from the Belgian Legation here in London the following telegram:—

"General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich (near Aix-la-Chapelle)."

Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has penetrated still further into Belgian territory. We also received this morning from the German Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms:—

"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

I have to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government: We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply to it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this morning—which I have read to the House—should be given before midnight.

(4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,
AUGUST 5, 1914.

Mr. Bonar Law.—May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can give us to-day.

The Prime Minister.—Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening, and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany and ourselves.

We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:—

"I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs,"
—that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs—

"a note of which the following is a literal translation:—

"Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Government that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty."

"Belgian Government are further resolved to resist by all means in their power."

"Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory."

"There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time of guarding the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium."

"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defence of her fortified places."

We have also received to-day from the French Ambassador here the following telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at Brussels:—

"The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French military attaché to prepare at once for the co-operation and contact of French troops with the Belgian army pending the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing Powers

now being made. Orders have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier."

This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving notice that to-morrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of 100,000,000*l.*

(5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,
AUGUST 6, 1914.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £100,000,000 be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or otherwise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war."

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith).—In asking the House to agree to the resolution which Mr. Speaker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which was covered by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago. He stated—and I do not think any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered—the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power. But, Sir, the papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands of hon. Members will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries—universal peace. These papers which are now in the hands of hon. Members show something more than that. They show that were the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere will read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the communication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July, No. 85 of the published Paper.* I think I must refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of things as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward Goschen goes on:—

"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government" —

Let the House observe these words—

"aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue."

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question:—

"I questioned His Excellency about the French Colonies" —

What are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe—

"and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect."

Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the crucial and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States:—

"As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise."

Then we come to Belgium :—

“It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.”

Let the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality; but in regard to Belgium there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added :—

“Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances”—
the assurances I have read out to the House—

“might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired.”

What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient passages. This document, No. 101 of my Paper,* puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. friend says :—

“His Majesty’s Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From the material point of view”—

My right hon. friend, as he always does used very temperate language :—

“such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.”

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded :—

“Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.”

He then says :—

“We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem to us to require.”

And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate :—

“You should . . . add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . For that object this Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will.”

If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy

*See Part II, No. 101, page 77.

would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it"—

The statement was never more true—

"as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto."

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language the attitude of this Government. Can any one who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can any one honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—can any one doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose? I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows, better than the Government, the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if—in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war—we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overwhelming Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured, that I am now about to ask this Committee—to make the very unusual demand upon it—to give the Government a Vote of Credit of 100,000,000L. I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supplementary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confidence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications—whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise—for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it; and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would be a great pity—in fact,

a great disaster—if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision—far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the old days—for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must entailed on any one of them.

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War—a position which I held until this morning—for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case; in fact, I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Department and another, still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties and all opinions.

I am asking on his behalf for the Army power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family.

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in my general description of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose—it is not the purpose of any patriotic man—to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it.

No. 1092-W.—In continuation of the notification by the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, No. 1091-W, dated the 17th December 1914, the following papers having been presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty are published for general information:—

**DESPATCHES FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN
RESPECTING AN OFFICIAL GERMAN ORGANISATION FOR
INFLUENCING THE PRESS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.**

No. 1.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

Berlin, February 27, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the establishment, under Government control, of a powerful secret association for the purpose of influencing the foreign press in the interest of the German export trade and of the spread of German influence generally.

I have, etc.,

W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Report.

For some time past a variety of schemes had been ventilated in the press with the object of improving German prestige abroad. It was said that in certain foreign parts Germany was being persistently and wrongfully abused, that she could obtain no fair hearing because the press of those distant countries was in hands hostile to any German enterprise, and because the telegraphic agencies serving those countries were equally biased. An "*Association for World-Commerce*" was to have remedied this evil by a persistent pro-German propaganda in the countries most bitterly complained of. It was hoped that the necessary funds could have been raised by contributions from all the trading and industrial societies interested in the German export trade, and, in view of the supreme importance to Germany of her export trade, it was intended that agents of the Association should be sent and stationed abroad to assist the exporting industries by timely advice and an active policy generally, such as private individuals could pursue more effectively than officials.

The opportunity for realising this scheme seemed to offer itself under the following circumstances. A plan was being prepared to start a German-American Economic Society. Similar societies with an application to other countries already exist—e.g., a German-Argentine Society, a German-Canadian Society, a German-Russian Society, etc. The foundation of a German-American Society had been advocated in connection with the revision of the American tariff which gave German industries new chances of an intensified export to the United States. As was natural in any matters dealing with German-American affairs, M. Ballin, of the Hamburg-America Line, was approached to take the matter in hand. He consented. Under his inspiration the idea of a German-American Society was abandoned and the idea of a World Society was substituted. A preliminary meeting was held at which the various German-foreign societies were represented; there were present also representatives of the "Central Association of German Industrials," and of its great rival, the "Federation of Industrials," as well as of most of the leading industrial firms. Internal dissensions, however, soon appeared, and several important members sent in their resignations.

The details of the foundation were to have been settled at a meeting convened for the 26th February; to-day the whole scheme stands prorogued *sine die*. If it is ever realised its plan will have to be considerably altered. In the meantime the original plan of a German-American Society has been revived. This society is, in fact, to be constituted in Berlin early in March in the form originally intended.

It would seem strange had M. Ballin so readily accepted defeat. The explanation lies in the fact that, at the request of very highly-placed persons, his interest has been transferred to another more delicate and more or less secret organisation, devised to undertake those duties of M. Ballin's would-be "*Weltverein*" which concerned the German reputation abroad.

A short time ago, a meeting, of which the secret has been well kept, was convened in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of which Dr. Hamann, the notorious head of the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office, was the originator and at which the Foreign Secretary himself was present. The meeting was attended by members of the leading industrial concerns of this country: the North German Lloyd, the Hamburg-America Company, the Deutsche Bank, the

Disconto Gesellschaft, the Allgemeine Electricitatsgesellschaft, Siemens and Halske, the Schuckert Works, Krupp, the Cruson Works, etc. They formed a private company with the purpose of "furthering the German industrial prestige abroad"—a conveniently vague purpose. The company will be financed by private subscriptions and by a Government grant. The sum at first suggested as a necessary revenue from private subscription was 12,500*l.*, but the company present at the first meeting was so enthusiastic that it definitely promised annual subscriptions amounting to 25,000*l.* The Government will add 12,500*l.* per annum—the whole Secret Service Fund, in fact, at the disposal of the Imperial Foreign Office for similar purposes (e.g., for the payment of subsidies to certain papers abroad).

* The company has entered into an agreement with the "*Agence Havas*" that the latter will in future only publish news concerning Germany if supplied through "*Wolff's Telegraphen-Bureau*." The latter will receive its German news exclusively from the new company. The company intends to make a similar arrangement with Reuter's Telegraphic Bureau for those foreign countries in which Reuter controls telegraphic communications. If Reuter declines, the "*Deutsche Kabelgesellschaft*," a smaller German news agency supplying telegrams from certain countries (e.g., Mexico) and working in agreement with Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau, is to be financed by the new company to run a service in competition to Reuter's.

All the concerns represented at the meeting have furthermore agreed to pay into the company's hotchpot the very vast sums which they are accustomed to spend abroad for their advertisements in foreign papers. The total of this item alone is believed to be not less than 25,000*l.* per annum—so the annual sum available for the purpose of the new company will reach a total of 50,000*l.* to 75,000*l.* The company will in future issue the advertisements of its members only to those foreign papers which publish German information originating exclusively from the new company, which is to be regarded as the only authentic source of information concerning Germany and all things German. This information they are to receive free of cost or at a nominal sum—so that the willing foreign papers will derive very material benefits from their collaboration with the company; viz., lucrative advertisements and free matter written in the language of the country in which the papers are published. The foreign press is to be watched by the company's agents appointed in the various foreign centres. Any incorrect reports are to be telegraphed home and corrected by telegrams issued by the company. The countries in which the system is to be immediately inaugurated are chiefly the South American States and those of the Far East, but the system is to embrace all countries outside Europe. The German cable rates for press telegrams are to be reduced in the interests of the new company.

It is difficult to say whether the evil which the new company is to remedy really exists or exists to any perceptible extent, but it is certain that a very influential private company has been called into existence with every official encouragement commanding an enormous revenue for the purposes of a pro-German newspaper propaganda. Whether the evil exists or not—the money will be spent on secret service to popularise Germany abroad. It does not seem to have occurred to the promoters of the scheme that they are preparing the ground for a vast system of international blackmail—hardly a proper way to reach the desired end.

* NOTE.—Information since furnished to the Foreign Office has conclusively established that such an agreement, whilst apparently intended by the German Company, was not in fact entered into, or indeed ever contemplated, by the *Agence Havas*.

No. 2

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

Berlin, April 3, 1914.

Sir,

IN my despatch of the 27th February last concerning the secret foundation of a German society to supply the foreign press of certain countries with news favourable to Germany and German interests, it was foreshadowed that German cable rates for press telegrams would probably be reduced in the interests of the new society.

I have the honour now to report that, in fact, reduced rates for telegrams to the United States, Canada, Argentine, Chile, Peru, and the German colonies are to come into operation, as from the 1st April 1914. These telegrams, which are to be officially known as week-end telegrams, will be admitted at a reduced rate between Saturday midnight and Sunday midnight, to be delivered on Monday or Tuesday respectively. These week-end telegrams must have reached the cable station at Emden before midnight on Saturday, but can be handed in at any telegraph office in the course of the week.

The rates, which in some cases represent a reduction to one-fourth of the usual rates fixed, are:—

	Pfennings per word.
To New York, Canada, Argentine, Chile, Peru (minimum charge for each telegram 20 M.)	80
To Togo and Cameroons (minimum charge 18 M.)	90
To German South-West Africa (minimum charge 15 M.)	75

Negotiations are pending for extending the week-end telegram service to other distant countries.

Telegrams sent to the United States or Canada are sent at the reduced rate only to New York or Montreal respectively; thence they are forwarded either free of charge, by letter, or at the local telegram rates per word by telegram.

I have, &c.,

W. E. GOSCHEN.

No. 3.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey.—(Received May 4.)

Sir,

Berlin May 2, 1914.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 3rd ultimo, I have the honour to report that according to an announcement in the "North German Gazette," the system of reduced rates for what are called "week-end telegrams" is to be extended as from the 1st instant to Cape Colony, Natal, The Orange Free State, Transvaal, South and North Rhodesia, Nyasaland, British India, Burma, Ceylon, Malacca, Penang, Singapore, and Labuan, under the conditions described in my above-mentioned despatch.

The rates are as follows:—

	Pfennings per word.
To Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, Transvaal	70
To South Rhodesia, Malacca, Penang, Singapore, and Labuan	80
To North Rhodesia and Nyasaland	95
To British India, Burma, and Ceylon	50

I have, &c.,

W. E. GOSCHEN.

No. 4.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

Sir,

Berlin, June 9, 1914.

I HAD the honour, in my despatch of the 27th February last, to explain a scheme under which a society had been founded with the object of supplying the foreign press, by telegraph, with information favourable to Germany generally and to German industrial enterprise in particular. I have since transmitted lists of the countries to which, under the name of "week-end telegrams," the cable rates have been very considerably reduced to assist the propaganda of the said society.

I to day have the honour to forward a translation of a cutting from the "Deutsche Export Revue," of the 5th June, 1914, in which the existence of the scheme is, for the first time, as far as I know, admitted in public print.

The "Deutsche Export Revue," which is published in Berlin, is a weekly periodical devoted to the interests of the German export trade. It is regarded as well informed, and enjoys a good reputation generally.

The article confirms the various particulars set out in my despatch; it confirms more especially the fact that the Imperial Foreign Office is supporting the scheme with an annual subscription of 12,500*l.*, paid out of its secret service fund. It supplies a list of the members of the society, the names of the directors, &c. The last paragraph of the article merits special attention on account of a certain refreshing ingenuousness.

I am informed that the order has gone forth from high official quarters not to reproduce or in any way to refer to this article, as its inadvertent publication is not unnaturally considered extremely inopportune and embarrassing.

I have, &c.,

W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 4.

EXTRACT FROM THE "DEUTSCHE EXPORT REVUE" OF JUNE 5, 1914.

GERMANY'S WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC AIM.

A Syndicate for the supply of News Abroad.

Our readers will remember that one of the items in the programme of the German Association for World Commerce was the establishment of a new service abroad on generous lines. Whilst the other parts of the Association's programme met with hostile criticism as soon as they became known, the proposed service for the supply of news abroad was greeted with general sympathy, as such activity promised to have a useful effect on our foreign relations. The failure to organize the Association for World Commerce seemed unhappily to render it doubtful whether the organisation of the news service could be realised

It is all the more gratifying that, according to information which has reached us from well-informed quarters, the scheme for a German news service in foreign countries has by no means been abandoned, but that, on the contrary, an extensive organisation is actually doing work in the desired direction.

A German syndicate was very quietly formed a few weeks ago for the purposes of this foreign news service. It uses the organisation of a news agency already in existence; its activity is gradually to be extended over the whole globe. Its main object will be to reply in an appropriate form to the prejudiced news concerning Germany and to the attacks made upon her, and by the judicious publication of newspapers inspiring the necessary articles to spread abroad the knowledge of the true state of German industry and of Germany's cultural achievements.

We are in a position to give the following information concerning the organisation of the enterprise. It is presided over by a directorate, consisting of three men, *viz.* :—

Privy Councillor von Borsig ;
"Landrath" Roetger (retired) ; and
Herr Schacht, a director of the Deutsche Bank.

A special administrative board, the main duty of which it is to make suggestions as to the organisation and the methods of reporting, comprises among others :—

Professor Duisburg, of the dye works, "Bayer" ;
Herr Hagen, of the Disconto Gesellschaft ;
Commercial Councillor Hasenclever, of Remscheid ;
Herr Hermann Hecht, of Berlin ;
Director Heineken, of the North German Lloyd ;
Director Helfferich, of the Deutsche Bank ;
Director Huldermann, of the Hamburg-America Line ;
Director Kosegarten, of the "Deutsche Waffen-und Munitions-Fabrik" ;
Herr von Langen, of the Disconto Gesellschaft ;
Privy Councillor Rathenau ;
Director Reuter, of the Maschinen Fabrik, Duisburg ;
Director Salomonsohn, of the Disconto Gesellschaft ;
Privy Councillor von Siemens ;
Herr Edmond Bohler, Hamburg, &c., &c.

The management will be entrusted to two managers, Herr Asch and Dr. Hansen. The former has for years edited several foreign news agencies; the latter is known to the readers of the "Deutsche Export Revue" through a series of articles dealing with the question of a supply of news covering the whole world.

For the present the enterprise has taken the form of a loose syndicate constituted for three years, which is, later on, to be replaced by a more systematic form of organisation. The annual subscription payable by the firms which are members amounts to a minimum of 50*l.* It is a significant fact that the Imperial Foreign Office has voted a grant of 12,500*l.* towards the expenses of the syndicate, provided the same amount is contributed by German industrial houses. As the subscriptions and the contributions by the latter already exceed the sum of 12,500*l.* the contribution from the Foreign Office funds seems secured. As every firm subscribing a sum of 50*l.* has a vote, or, rather, as for every 50*l.* subscribed the subscriber receives a vote, it may be expected that the Imperial Foreign Office will have a powerful and decisive influence upon the management of the syndicate generally and upon the development of the news service in particular.

We further learn that efforts are now being made to induce the joint German and Foreign Economic Societies to join the syndicate, as these societies embrace pre-eminently merchants and manufacturers interested in the German foreign trade. These societies, it is true, appear to be still divided in their opinion concerning the new enterprise—at least, so far no definite decision has been arrived at.

It is believed that an increasing membership will make it possible to establish a reserve fund out of subscriptions and voluntary contributions received, so that, later on, the interest of the reserve fund may suffice to defray the expenses of the news service. It is also hoped that the foreign press may eventually be induced to pay for the news supplied. Finally, it is intended to send journalists to the various countries who are there to busy themselves in favour of German interests in the manner indicated above.

The task which the syndicate has set itself is in itself worthy of acknowledgment. But only the future can show whether the task can be accomplished in the manner indicated. We are of opinion that good results could be achieved, and perhaps with greater success, by utilising the German legations and consulates abroad, if ample funds for this purpose were placed at the disposal of the official departments. At the same time, the joint German and Foreign Economic Societies might well, as indeed some of them already do, work quietly for a better appreciation abroad of the state of German industry and of German cultural progress. The intended despatch of journalists we believe, however, in any case to be a mistake, as it would certainly soon become common talk in the editorial offices in the several places abroad that they represent a syndicate officially supported by the German Empire. If such things are intended, it would be better to fall back upon gentlemen who are already in touch with the respective editorial offices, and who could serve German interests without attracting so much attention as would journalists sent out of the purpose.

No. 1093-W.—In continuation of the Notification by the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, No. 1092-W., dated the 17th December 1914, the following papers having been presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty are published for general information :—

CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EVENTS LEADING TO THE RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH TURKEY.

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.

TURKISH ships building in Great Britain.

Arrangements are being made with the firm of Armstrong, Whitworth, and Co. for His Majesty's Government to take over the Turkish battleship "Osman I" now building with that firm.

Please inform Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government are anxious to take over the contract.

No. 2.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 3, 1914.

GRAND VIZIER and Minister of the Interior spoke to me with some vexation of the detention of Turkish ship, which they seemed to consider an unfriendly act as Turkey is not at war. Minister of the Interior referred to the very heavy financial sacrifices by which this ship had been paid for with money borrowed at a rate amounting to interest at 20 per cent.

No. 3.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 4, 1914.

GRAND VIZIER to-day renewed assurances that Turkey intends to observe strict neutrality. Mobilisation had been decided upon only because it would take months to complete, and because the Government wished not to be taken by surprise in case of aggression by Bulgaria, though they had also been alarmed by rumours of action by Russia—attributable, I think, to German Ambassador. Retention of German military mission meant nothing and had no political significance. He regarded them as Turkish employés who were doing good work, and, as they had offered to remain, it would have been ungracious to refuse.

No. 4.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 3rd August.*

I am sure Turkish Government will understand necessity for His Majesty's Government to keep all warships available in England for their own needs in this crisis.

Financial and other loss to Turkey will receive all due consideration, and is subject of sincere regret to His Majesty's Government. You should inform Grand Vizier.

* See No. 2.

No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 7, 1914

IF Turkey remains neutral and Egypt remains quiet, and should no unforeseen circumstances arise, His Majesty's Government do not propose to alter the status of Egypt.

A report has reached me that it is being alleged that the annexation of Egypt is under consideration by His Majesty's Government.

You should emphatically contradict this to the Turkish Government, and say that we have no intention of injuring Turkey, and you should add an assurance in the sense of the first paragraph.

No. 6.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 9, 1914.

AN official communiqué was recently published here which showed a distinctly hostile tone towards Great Britain. This communiqué dealt with the requisition of the Turkish warships by His Majesty's Government. The Grand Vizier has told me that Turkish Government had to pretend to the Turkish public, as the latter had subscribed towards the purchase money for the vessels, that they were taking a stronger line than really was the case. He said, however, that we should not attach too much importance to publications of this kind.

Public opinion is daily growing more excited, and I think that if His Majesty's Government were able to give an assurance that Turkey would have the ships, if possible, on the conclusion of hostilities, such an assurance would have a soothing effect.

I have received a most emphatic assurance from the Grand Vizier that nothing will induce Turkey to join Austria and Germany as long as he remains in power. His position is strong enough to give a certain value to this assurance.

No. 7.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 11, 1914.

A REPORT has reached me from vice-consul at the Dardanelles, dated evening of the 10th August, that two large warships, thought to be the "Goeben" and the "Breslau," have entered the Straits, and that the German consul went to meet them. Arrival of these vessels at Nagara late on same evening was reported in a second telegram.

No. 8.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 11, 1914.

I LEARN that at 8-30 P.M. last night "Goeben" and "Breslau" reached the Dardanelles. These ships should not be allowed to pass through the Straits, and they should either leave within twenty-four hours, or be disarmed and laid up. You should point out to the Turkish Government that these are the duties entailed upon them by their neutrality, and that His Majesty's Government expect that they will act up to their obligations.

No. 9.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 11, 1914.

MY telegram of 11th August.*

The Ottoman Government have bought "Goeben" and "Breslau." Officers and men will be allowed to return to Germany. Grand Vizier told me that purchase was due to our detention of "Sultan Osman." They must have ship to bargain with regard to question of the islands on equal terms with Greece, and it was in no way directed against Russia, the idea of which he scouted.

He formally asked that the British naval mission might be allowed to remain.

*See No. 7.

No. 10.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 11, 1914.

FOLLOWING from Consul, Dardanelles, to-day:—

"The large German ship has just left for Constantinople.

"Boats from small German ship have perquisitioned our ships here, and destroyed Marconi apparatus on French ships under threat of sinking them.

"We have protested, demanding disarmament or expulsion of German ship before night.

"It seems that they desire to force Turkey into war."

Military authorities seem to have completely lost their heads. British ships are capriciously detained at Dardanelles, and port officials here are refusing to issue papers to outgoing vessels.

No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 12, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 11th August.†

If the crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" are returned to Germany at once and if the transfer of those vessels to Turkey is *bona fide*, so that they can only reappear as Turkish ships with Turkish crews, there seems no reason that the British naval mission should be withdrawn.

†See No. 9.

No. 12.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey—(Received August 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople August 12, 1914.

I SAW the Grand Vizier this morning and made strong representations to him against restrictions of free passage of the Straits, which the military authorities are now imposing under various pretexts. I said they had been holding up passenger and grain ships in the Dardanelles, refusing to deliver papers to ships wishing to leave Constantinople, and ordering grain ships to return to Constantinople at their caprice.

The Grand Vizier admitted that the War Office had been most high handed in their action, in violation of international obligations.

It seems that the Minister of War has now got entirely out of hand, and I gather that he alone is responsible for the present situation. Matters are undoubtedly becoming serious, but a Cabinet Council is being held this afternoon, and I hope I may be able afterwards to report some improvement.

I should add that all foreign shipping is affected by the restrictions to which I have alluded above.

No. 13.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 12, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 11th August.*

You should at once point out to Grand Vizier that Turkish Government must not permit German ships to commit acts of war in the Straits, and ask why British merchant ships are detained.

* See No. 10.

No. 14.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(Translation.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey et a l'honneur de communiquer ci-dessous à son Excellence le texte du télégramme qu'il vient de recevoir à l'instant de son Gouvernement :

“ Pour ne laisser subsister aucun doute sur l'attitude pacifique que le Gouvernement Impérial a décidé d'observer dans les conflits actuels, je vous informe derechef qu'il est résolu de garder stricte neutralité.”

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres, le 13 août 1914.

THE Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to Sir E. Grey and has the honour to communicate herewith the text of a telegram just received from his Government, which runs as follows :—

“ In order that there may be no doubt as to the pacific attitude which the Turkish Government have decided to observe in the existing struggle, I inform you forthwith that they are determined to maintain strict neutrality.”

*Turkish Embassy, London,
August 13, 1914.*

No. 15.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 14, 1914.

ADMIRAL LIMPUS has received promise from Minister of Marine that his Excellency will make crews for the “Goeben” and “Breslau.” This will take time, but nevertheless it will be done; and his Excellency has undertaken to hand over the two ships bodily to the British admiral.

Admiral Limpus informs me that a month will probably elapse before “Sultan Selim” (late “Goeben”) can be even moved by the Turkish crew; but the formalities of transfer may be complete technically in a day or two. Further delay in taking delivery from the Germans is unavoidable.

Minister of Marine declared there was no intention of sending the ships outside Sea of Marmora until the end of the war.

No. 16.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 15, 1914.

ADMIRAL LIMPUS and all officers of British Naval Mission have suddenly been replaced in their executive command by Turkish officers, and have been ordered to continue work at Ministry of Marine if they remain. Although I have been given to understand by a member of the Government that they are still anxious to get officers and crew of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" out of Turkey, this will probably mean retention of mechanics and technical experts at least, which will create most dangerous situation here.

No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 16, 1914.

AS soon as French and Russian Ambassadors are similarly instructed, you are authorised to declare to Turkish Government that if Turkey will observe scrupulous neutrality during the war England, France, and Russia will uphold her independence and integrity against any enemies that may wish to utilise the general European complication in order to attack her.

No. 18.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 16, 1914.

THIS morning Grand Vizier assured me again most solemnly that Turkish neutrality would be maintained. That Germany was doing her utmost to compromise the Turkish Government he did not deny, and he went so far as to admit that there was a danger of provoking Russia if Turkey lent herself to German designs which it served Turkey's interests to acquiesce in. This ambiguous expression no doubt refers to the fact that a certain number of German experts will be left on "Goeben" and "Breslau," owing to the inability of the Turks to handle those ships themselves. It would have been an impossible situation for Admiral Limpus, if he had had under his direct orders a mixed crew of Turks and Germans, and perhaps reason of his withdrawal from executive command may lie in this consideration.

The "Goeben" and "Breslau" are at present lying off Constantinople. The Grand Vizier has assured me that there is no intention of moving them from Marmora. They are now flying the Ottoman flag under nominal command of Turkish officer, and have been transferred. This at least is a good sign.

No. 19.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 16, 1914.

I HAVE received the following telegram, dated the 15th August, from His Majesty's vice-consul at Dardanelles:—

"A new field of mines has been laid in the zone formerly sown with mines of observation type. It may be assumed that these latter had previously been removed."

"The new contact mines, to the number of forty-one, were laid by the 'Mtibah' from Kephez to Suandere in a double line. Seven were kept on the ship, and the twenty-four from the 'Selanik,' which is proceeding to Constantinople, were also taken on board."

"The 'Lily Rickmers,' a German ship which has arrived here, carries a wireless installation."

No. 20.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 18, 1914

I HAVE been accorded most cordial reception upon my return to my post by the Grand Vizier, of whom I enquired whether the German crews would be removed soon, and what guarantee he would give that the "Goeben" and "Breslau" would be used neither against Great Britain nor against Russia. I also expressed my surprise that the Turkish Government should be apparently entirely under German influence, and that they should have committed such a serious breach of neutrality as was involved by their action in the matter of the German ships.

His Highness said that he deeply deplored this breach of neutrality, which he could not deny. He begged me to give him time to get rid of German crews, which he promised he would do gradually, but until arrival of Turkish transport with crews from London, Turkish Government had no crew to replace Germans.

His Highness added that he had protested against the action of the "Breslau" in boarding British and French ships at the Dardanelles, and he expressed the hope that I would not take too serious a view of that incident.

Situation is delicate, but I have great hopes that if His Majesty's Government will exercise patience, it may yet be saved; for Grand Vizier solemnly assured me that neither the "Goeben" nor the "Breslau" would go into the Black Sea or the Mediterranean.

His Highness said that seizure of Turkish ships building in England by His Majesty's Government had caused the whole crisis, and, as almost every Turkish subject had subscribed towards their purchase, a terrible impression had been made throughout Turkey, where British attitude had been attributed to intention to assist Greece in aggressive designs against Turkey. Turkish population would have understood if Great Britain had paid for the ships, or if she had promised to return them when the war was over; but as it was it looked like robbery. Germans had not been slow to exploit the situation, of which they had taken every advantage.

His Highness was much impressed and relieved when I informed him of the declaration authorised in your telegram of the 16th August.* He said that this would be of enormous assistance to him, and he assured me that I need not be anxious lest Turkey should be drawn into war with Great Britain or with Russia. The present crisis would pass.

I am convinced of the absolute personal sincerity of Grand Vizier in these utterances.

* No. 17.

No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 18, 1914.

I told the Turkish Ambassador, who had expressed uneasiness as to our intentions towards Turkey, that Turkey would have nothing to fear from us, and that her integrity would be preserved in any conditions of peace which affected the Near East, provided that she preserved a real neutrality during the war, made the "Breslau" and "Goeben" entirely Turkish by sending away the German crews of these vessels, and gave all ordinary facilities to British merchant vessels.

No. 22.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 19, 1914.

In view of the possibility that a *coup d'Etat* may be attempted with the assistance of the "Goeben," in co-operation with the military authorities under German influence,

who exercise complete control, I wish to make it clear that in my opinion the precaution of presence of British fleet at the Dardanelles is wise. I am anxious to avoid any misunderstanding as to the gravity of the situation, notwithstanding the assurances received from the Grand Vizier.

No 23.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople August 19, 1914.

I saw the Grand Vizier on the afternoon of 17th August, and made strong representations to him with regard to the detention of vessels laden with cargoes consigned from Russian ports to the Mediterranean.

He promised to give immediate instructions that ships should be allowed to proceed.

The port authorities were undoubtedly instructed yesterday morning to permit seven ships loaded with grain and one with petroleum for the Mediterranean, and one ship with coal for the Danube, to depart, but this permission was cancelled later.

It appears from this as if the military party, supported by the Germans, were determined to reassert themselves, and that a serious conflict of authority has arisen.

I propose to see Grand Vizier, whom I was unable to see last night, as early as possible this morning, and to insist upon his carrying out of his promise with regard to laden ships.

If these are permitted to leave, only four ships will remain, and no others have arrived since yesterday.

Of these four ships only one is in a position to leave immediately, but their case is different to that of the nine ships mentioned above, of which the cargoes have never touched Turkish soil, and which are covered by treaties guaranteeing free passage of the Straits at all times, thus making their detention a far more serious matter.

No. 24.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 20, 1914.

MINISTER of Marine came to see me to-day and expressed his relief at being able to talk to me freely.

He put forward the following proposal :—

Firstly, that the Capitulations should be abolished immediately. I pointed out the difficulty of this, and he suggested that the Minister of Finance should come and discuss the question with me.

Secondly, he demanded the immediate return of the two Turkish battleships acquired by His Majesty's Government at the commencement of the war. I told him that this was impossible, but that I would endeavour to obtain as good terms as possible for them, and that I hoped they would not be needed during the war, and would soon be returned to Turkey ; in the meanwhile they should be regarded as a loan from Turkey to a friend.

Thirdly, he asked for renunciation of any interference with the internal affairs of Turkey. This need not be taken seriously, and is, of course, an absurd proposal.

Fourthly, he asked that if Bulgaria should intervene against the Triple *Entente*, Western Thrace should be given back to Turkey.

Fifthly, he wanted the restoration of the Greek islands. I told him that this was impossible, and he finally agreed to the basis arranged just before the present war broke out.

His final proposal was that the Allied Powers should undertake to oblige the Triple Alliance to accept any agreements which might be reached with respect to the Capitulations.

Our conversation was of the friendliest description, and at its close the Minister of Marine asked whether I would sanction the chartering of a British oil-tank steamer now at Tenedos to convey oil from Constanza. I asked him the purposes for which this oil was required, and he replied that it was for use in Turkish destroyers. I said that I thought that such a request, when the German crews of the "Breslau" and "Goeben" were masters of the situation here, would greatly surprise His Majesty's Government, and he replied that he did not wish to create any suspicion in their minds, and would therefore withdraw his request, adding that any suspicion that the German ships would be allowed to attack our shipping was absurd.

I said that, although I personally believed in the sincerity of his assurances, there seemed to be no doubt that the German admiral was now the master here. Minister seemed greatly surprised at this, but finally asked me to assure you that he would open the Dardanelles to the British fleet, if the German crews would not leave the two ships when he told them to do so.

No. 25.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 20, 1914.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's vice-consul, Dardanelles, dated 19th August:—

"Passages were stopped this afternoon, while seventeen more mines were laid in a zig zag line along one side of the channel, which has been rendered extremely narrow. There is a heavy oil-steamer to pass to-morrow, and it may not be easy.

"Mines remain, but I suspect that there are more on board 'Rickmers.'

"Weber Pasha, who has returned with other German officers, is believed to be on board the latter vessel.

"Several Hotchkiss guns have arrived and have been mounted on both sides of the Straits commanding minefield."

No. 26.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 21, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 12th August.*

Reply to representations received from Porte expresses regrets for unfortunate incident of which British merchant vessels at Dardanelles were object, and gives formal assurances that similar acts shall not occur again. Explanation of detention of ships given in Porte's note is that in consequence of some mines having been detached from their moorings, authorities had prevented vessels from continuing their voyage until mines had been picked up, in order to avoid accidents.

No mention is made of real reason, which was wish of military authorities to requisition grain and other cargoes.

* See No. 13.

No. 27.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 21, 1914.

I WAS informed by the Grand Vizier to-night that he wanted all the support that the Triple Entente could give him, and that the sooner they could give a written declaration respecting the independence and integrity of Turkey the better.

A sharp struggle, which may come to a head at any moment, is in progress between the Moderates and the German party, headed by the Minister for War, and is meanwhile creating anarchy here.

Marshal Liman* and the German Ambassador are recklessly striving to force the Turks into declaring war on Russia, in which case the "Goeben" and "Breslau" would presumably sail for the Black Sea. They are prepared to achieve this object, if necessary, by a *coup d'Etat*, making the Minister of War dictator.

It is said that the Dardanelles forts have German garrisons, and that the "Goeben," which has been slightly damaged, will be repaired by the 2nd September, or possibly earlier.

Head of the German Military Mission in Turkey.

No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 22, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 20th August.†

The demands made by the Turkish Government are excessive; we do not, however, wish to refuse all discussion, and you may, therefore, as soon as the French and Russian Ambassadors have received similar instructions, address the following communication to the Porte:—

"If the Turkish Government will repatriate immediately the German officers and crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau," will give a written assurance that all facilities shall be furnished for the peaceful and uninterrupted passage of merchant vessels, and that all the obligations of neutrality shall be observed by Turkey during the present war, the three allied Powers will in return agree, with regard to the Capitulations, to withdraw their extra-territorial jurisdiction as soon as a scheme of judicial administration, which will satisfy modern conditions, is set up.

"They will further give a joint guarantee in writing that they will respect the independence and integrity of Turkey, and will engage that no conditions in the terms of peace at the end of the war shall prejudice this independence and integrity."

† See No. 24.

No. 29.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey et, se référant à la conversation qu'il a eu l'honneur d'avoir avec son Excellence et dont il avait rendu compte à son Gouvernement par un télégramme en date du 18 courant, s'empresse de l'informer que son Altesse Saïd Halim Pacha vient de lui faire savoir par une dépêche responsive expédiée hier et parvenue à l'instant :

1. Que less ordres nécessaires ont été donnés à qui de droit pour le libre commerce dans less eaux ottomanes de tout navire marchand ;

2. Que le Gouvernement Impérial procédera au remplacement des officiers et équipage allemands par ceux du "Sultan Osman" dès qu'ils seront arrivés à Constantinople.

*Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 22 août, 1914.*

(Translation.)

THE Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to Sir E. Grey, and with reference to the conversation which he had with him, and which he reported to the Turkish Government in a telegram of the 18th instant, hastens to state that his Highness Said Halim Pasha has just replied in a telegram dated yesterday, and just received, as follows:—

1. The necessary orders have been given in the proper quarter for the free navigation of Turkish waters by all merchant vessels.

2. The Turkish Government will replace the German officers and men by those of the "Sultan Osman" as soon as they arrive at Constantinople.

No. 30.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

I SAW Minister of Marine, as the Turkish transport has now arrived, and asked him when the crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" would be repatriated.

He said that it depended upon the Grand Vizier. He was himself in favour of their repatriation.

I shall press the matter strongly, but do not know whether the Moderates are sufficiently strong to insist upon such a step being taken at once.

Constantinople, August 22, 1914.

No. 31.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 23, 1914.

I HEAR that a further contingent of German officers has recently arrived via Sophia for service here.

No. 32.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 24, 1914.

THE Minister of War has not yet recovered from his illness. I have made it absolutely clear to the Grand Vizier that there is evidently no reason for delaying transfer of ships now that changes have come, and I said that His Majesty's Government would not tolerate that the Turkish fleet, as well as the Turkish army, should be in the hands of Germany, warning his Highness that the British fleet would not leave the Dardanelles until His Majesty's Government were satisfied that the Turkish Government had loyally carried out the condition laid down, and until British merchantmen could navigate Turkish waters without either delay or molestation. It was therefore obvious that if there was any idea of manning the Turkish fleet with German officers and men it must be given up. The situation was already quite humiliating enough for the Turkish Empire, which was in peril of total ruin if the Turkish Government allowed the domination of Constantinople by Germany. The Grand Vizier assured me that the Turkish Government had not the slightest intention of Germanising their fleet; and while it is my impression that the forces in favour of the maintenance of strict neutrality by Turkey are slowly gaining, I replied that I should not be satisfied with less than the actual departure of the German crews.

No. 33.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 25, 1914.

I RECEIVED yesterday a written assurance from Grand Vizier that merchant vessels will be allowed to go and come in Turkish ports without hindrance in accordance with treaties.

No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 25, 1914.

HIS Majesty the King desires that your Excellency should convey to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey a personal message from His Majesty, express-

ing his deep regret at the sorrow caused to the Turkish people by the detention of the two warships which His Imperial Majesty's subjects had made such sacrifices to acquire. His Majesty the King wishes the Sultan to understand that the exigencies of the defence of his dominions are the only cause of the detention of these ships, which His Majesty hopes will not be for long, it being the intention of His Majesty's Government to restore them to the Ottoman Government at the end of the war, in the event of the maintenance of a strict neutrality by Turkey without favour to the King's enemies, as at present shown by the Ottoman Government.

No. 35.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 25, 1914.

I HEAR from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem that forty camels laden with food-stuffs have been seized from Egyptians at Gaza.

No. 36.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 25, 1914.

SEIZURE of camels reported in my telegram of to-day.*

I am making strong representations to Ottoman Government. The Germans, who are no doubt responsible for the activity now reported, are doing their best to embroil us with the Turks.

The Grand Vizier vehemently denies that it is his intention to attack Egypt in any way or to attempt any sort of intrigues there. In this, I think, he is sincere. He is forming a Moderate party genuinely in favour of Turkey remaining neutral.

* See No. 35.

No. 37.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 25, 1914.

HIS Majesty's vice-consul, Dardanelles, reports that former channel on the European side of the Straits was further mined on the 24th August. More buoys have been placed in the new channel on the Asiatic side and that channel may now be followed. Passages were prevented on the 24th August by the work of laying these buoys, but they have been resumed from to-day.

No. 38.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, August 26, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which your Excellency was so good as to address to me on the 22nd instant.†

In reply, I have the honour to state that I have taken note that:—

1. The necessary orders have been sent by the Imperial Ottoman Government to the competent authorities to allow free passage in Ottoman waters to all foreign merchant vessels.

† See No. 29.

2. That the Imperial Ottoman Government will replace the German officers and crews of the late "Goeben" and "Breslau" by those of the "Sultan Osman" the moment the latter arrive at Constantinople.

I have, etc.,

E. GREY.

No. 39.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 26, 1914.

NINETY German sailors passed through Sophia yesterday on their way to Constantinople. I have protested strongly, but Grand Vizier is unable to control the situation, which is dominated by the German Ambassador and generals. Weber Pasha, who is in command at the Dardanelles, is said to be urging closing of the Straits. I have brought this to the notice of the Grand Vizier. His Highness most positively repudiated any such idea, and begged me to have patience, as this situation would not last, and he was gaining authority.

In the meantime, general mobilisation is proceeding feverishly, and preparations are being pushed on in the fleet. Eighty pounds' worth of surgical appliances, dressings, etc., were bought by doctor of the "Corcovado" to-day. I am informed that there is a 5-inch gun hidden by canvas at her stern. She still lies at Therapia. It is not likely that the two German men-of-war will come out of the Dardanelles, but there are grounds for thinking that German plan is to urge Turkey to attack Russia after France is beaten—about ten days hence, in their estimation. Straits would be entirely closed, and, according to the German Ambassador, quite impossible to force, since Germans have taken special measures to make them impregnable.

To sum up, the situation is most unsatisfactory, though not actually desperate.

No. 40.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bucharest, August 27, 1914.

PRESS to-day reports special train from Berlin, carrying 500 German marines, passed through Bucharest yesterday for Constantinople.

Official communication this evening states that this was not a military transport, but that men were workmen, mostly Germans, under the direction of several engineers and functionaries, on the way to Turkey via Bulgaria for work on Bagdad Railway.

Communiqué adds that in future foreign subjects will not be allowed passage through the country in groups of more than twenty, even if their individual passports are in order.

No. 41.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 27, 1914.

GERMAN ships.

There are grounds for thinking that Germans are urging Turks to send "Goeben" into Black Sea, where they would argue that she has a right to go as a Turkish ship. Germans would count upon Russian warship attacking her, and war would ensue, seemingly provoked by Russia.

Object of Germans is to create a diversion here, draw off some Russian troops and enemies from Austria, and embroil us at the same time.

There are, it is said, 162 German officers here and many reservists.

No. 42.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 27, 1914.

MY telegram of 27th August.*

Russian Ambassador is at present with Grand Vizier, whom I have just seen. I again impressed upon his Highness my apprehensions lest "Goeben" should make a raid. I expressed my conviction that, should Turkey be so unwise as to provoke the Powers of the Triple *Entente*, it would mean the end of the Ottoman Empire. To these observations on my part, his Highness replied that the "Goeben," manned as she was with German crew, would never be allowed by the Turkish Government to enter the Black Sea. His language on this point was most emphatic, and I believe that he was sincere in what he said. I did not fail, however to draw his Highness's attention to the fact that, if the Minister of Marine, the Minister of War, and the German Ambassador ordered the "Goeben" to go there, I did not quite see how his Highness was going to prevent it. If the German Emperor ordered the German admiral to go in to the Black Sea, it did not seem to me that the two Turkish Ministers could even if they would, prevent the admiral from obeying those commands.

Grand Vizier assured me most emphatically that my fears were entirely without foundation, but he did not give me any reasons to back up this optimistic opinion. His Highness was much upset when I rejoined that, so long as German crews remained his Highness was not master of his own house, but at the mercy of the Germans, who had, to all intents and purposes, occupied Constantinople. His Highness admitted that Germans were urging Turkey to depart from her neutrality, and that they wished to embroil her with the Russians and ourselves but he nevertheless solemnly assured me that Turkish Government would not depart from their neutrality. He fully understood Germany's aims in this matter, and all Turkish Government were determined not to fall into the trap.

Grand Vizier is, I am sure, absolutely sincere himself. But none the less the situation is as I have described it in the preceding paragraphs.

* See No. 41.

No. 43.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28).

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 27, 1914.

My telegram of 24th August.†

In reply to my enquiries, Grand Vizier stated that neither he nor Minister of Marine knew anything about the reported arrival of German sailors. They had not been asked for by the Turkish Government.

I said that, if this really was the case, it furnished yet another proof of how completely Germany had obtained control here. German merchantmen were, to my knowledge, arming in the port of Constantinople, and it was obvious that the German sailors were to be put into these ships or on board the Turkish fleet. This being so, it was my duty to warn his Highness of the unfortunate effect that this continued violation of Turkish neutrality in favour of Germany was bound to have upon the Governments of the Triple *Entente*.

† See No. 39.

No. 44.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28).

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, August 28, 1914.

OTTOMAN forces are being mobilised in Hedjaz and further south, and existing military activity in Red Sea may thus be explained. About sixty Turkish officers

arrived at Alexandria recently and passed through Egypt down Red Sea. Their destination was the Yemen.

Twelve thousand Turkish troops are reported in Jeddah region.

Signs are not lacking that, in case of war, an attack on Egypt is contemplated by Turkey. A few Turkish officers are now in the Delta. Steps have been taken to watch all those that are known. I learn from a good source that all information of Turkish mobilisation reported from Constantinople is correct. Meanwhile emissaries are being sent to India, the Yemen, Senoussi, and Egypt, to stir up feeling against Great Britain. Activity at Gaza is reported, but it is uncertain whether this is more than raising of levies to replace regulars withdrawn from the north by mobilisation.

No. 45.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29).

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 28, 1914.

GENERAL situation here.

It is possible, though I consider it highly improbable, that Turks may make a dash out of the Dardanelles when their fleet is better prepared. It is equally possible that Turkey may make some forward movement against Servia or Greece on land. Nevertheless, I trust that you will not read my various reports to mean that I have abandoned last hope that neutrality will be maintained to extent of not actually attacking Russia in Black Sea. I still think that it is far from probable that Turkey will for the time being make any forward move.

News propagated by German Ambassador here this morning is that Germans are marching on Paris, and that they have decisively worsted the allies. This message has without doubt come by wireless, as the Ambassador is in direct communication with German General Staff. This news will, I fear, tend to shake Turks still further, as they now confidently expect that Triple *Entente* will be annihilated. There is also no doubt that very active preparations are in hand, and that Germans here are confident of hostilities. Consignments of gold from Germany have arrived for German and Austrian banks, private German residents have sent away their wives, and quantities of medical stores have been purchased and put on board German ships.

I hear that German Ambassador is adopting tone of friendly commiseration for Great Britain, who, he asserts, will never assist Russia in any movement against Turkey. He has made the remarkable statement that his Government will now offer favourable terms to France, which she will certainly accept; that Germany will then wage a platonic war with England, whose heart is not in the struggle, and who will make terms to save her fleet; and that Germany and England will then combine against Russia.

German Ambassador's attitude seems to indicate great preoccupation as regards British fleet and as regards Russian advance in East Prussia, and a desire to make terms now in order to save Germany's resources for a final struggle with us under more favourable conditions. I have made it known privately in the proper quarter that under no conditions would Great Britain abandon her allies, and that whatever the present situation in the field may be, it is still but the beginning of a struggle from which we are firmly resolved to emerge victoriously.

No. 46.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 28, 1914.

FROM information that has reached me, there is no doubt that in course of time the whole area of the Dardanelles, Constantinople, and the Bosphorus will become nothing more nor less than a sort of German enclave. Sailors recently arrived from Sophia will be sent to Straits forts and more will follow. This is over and above German military reservists already allotted to garrison those forts.

I hear that, although Turks have not yet any ordnance of the more modern type for mounting in Straits defences, it is very probable that consignment of guns will arrive in the near future from Germany and Austria through Constanza.

No. 47.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Sophia, August 28, 1914.

SPECIAL train full of German sailors with officers passed Sophia last night for Constantinople, making total passed about 600.

I am informed credibly that large consignment of guns and artillery material has passed through Roumania to Giurgevo and is now being brought across to Rustchuk.

No. 48.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 30, 1914.)

I AND my colleagues still do not regard situation as hopeless, and are of opinion that we should go on as long as possible without provoking a rupture. I find it hard to believe that, when it comes to the point, Turks would declare war on Russia or on ourselves.

Eventuality of a general war is doubtless counted on by Germany with the object of diverting energies of Russia from the main object of European conflict. Germans may even argue that, in the event of Russians receiving serious check in Germany, they might be induced to desist from struggle by bait of Constantinople.

There is no doubt that it is object of Germany to involve Russia and Great Britain in serious troubles here in the hope of general Balkan conflagration and of complications for us in India and Egypt. I heard to-day on good authority that it is admitted in Berlin that, if necessary, they will encourage a "Jehad"** with this object.

I have strong impression that Turkish Government, with exception of its extreme chauvinists, are aware of Germany's objects, which I have not ceased to instil into them, and that time may cool their ardour for their German masters. I warned Grand Vizier this morning of inevitable results of siding with Germany against us, and said that our patience was not inexhaustible, and that consequences of allying themselves with our enemies would be serious. His Highness seemed to be impressed, and promised that German sailors should be sent away.

*I.e., Holy War.

No. 49.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 1, 1914.

MINISTER of Marine called on Russian Ambassador last night and assured him that he was working hard for neutrality, that he would send away German sailors in fortnight, and that 200 were leaving to-day, truth of which we shall verify. He may only be gaining time.

No. 50.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 1, 1914.

I AGAIN discussed subject of Turkish neutrality to-day with Grand Vizer. His Highness evidently relies on Minister of Interior, who returns shortly. He assured me most solemnly that Turkish Government would not depart from their neutrality. I replied that we should not be satisfied until the German sailors left, as Turkish neutrality had already been so gravely compromised already. He reiterated with much vehemence that all German sailors should go.

No. 51.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 1, 1914.

SULLEIMAN-EL-BUROUNI, a highly-placed senator, is in Egypt, probably in Cairo, engaged in fomenting revolutionary movement.

No. 52.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 1, 1914.

IN order that there may be no room for misconception, you should inform Turkish Government that Egyptian Government are taking measures to patrol Suez Canal on both banks, and that this step is necessary to protect the safe and proper working of the Canal. You should add that no advance into Sinai, nor military operations in that region, are under contemplation.

No. 53.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 2, 1914.

I SHOULD be glad to learn whether British Admiral has instructions in case "Goeben" went into Mediterranean under Turkish flag. Should I tell Turkish Government that, so long as she has Germans on board, we shall regard her as a German ship and treat her as such, and that, before she goes out into Mediterranean, Admiral Limpus must be allowed to assure himself that there are no Germans on board?

I do not anticipate her going out, but should like to make it clear beforehand what our attitude would be in case she does so.

No. 54.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 2, 1914.

AM I authorised to make public statement that Turkey will have nothing to fear from British ships if she maintains strict neutrality and keeps peace during European conflict, if British trade is not interfered with, and if German naval officers and crews are sent out of the country?

No. 55.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 3, 1914.

I SHOULD be glad to have discretion to let it be known that if Turkish fleet leaves the Dardanelles we shall treat it as part of the German fleet, as it has German crews and officers on board.

No. 56.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 3, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 2nd September.*

So long as German crews have not be sent away, "Goeben" will certainly be treated as a German ship if she comes out of the Straits. It was only on express condition that German crews would be sent away that we waived demand, to which we were strictly entitled, that ship should be interned until the end of the war.

* See No. 53.

No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 4, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 2nd September.*

You may make statement you propose, but we cannot restrict movements of British fleet.

* See No. 54.

No. 58.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 4, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 3rd September :* Turkish fleet.
Proposal approved.

* See No. 55.

No. 59.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 5, 1914.

I HEAR that Inspector from Constantinople of Committee of Union and Progress left Erzeroum on the 1st September for Persia, where he has previously lived. He was accompanied by three Persian revolutionists from Constantinople, one of them named Agha Mehemet Ali. They have ideas about Afghan and Indian Moslems, and also intend to stir up anti-Russian trouble in Persia.

No. 60.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 5, 1914.

I HAVE to-day gone over the whole ground with the Minister of the Interior, who seems more inclined to be reasonable. I think there is an improvement in the situation.

Minister quite understands that "Goeben" will be treated as a German ship if she goes out. They assure me that Turkish fleet will not leave the Dardanelles on any account.

No. 61.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey—(Received September 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 6, 1914.

SURPRISES are always possible, but I feel fairly confident, from what I hear from many prominent people with whom I am in touch, that public opinion will change in our favour.

There is growing discontent among influential people, who are now beginning to realise that they are in German hands. This they resent, and they are openly declaring that they will not allow war.

In view of all this, I think I can safely say that there are many signs of an improvement in the situation here.

No. 62.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

Sir,

Constantinople, August 19, 1914.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 12th August* to Mr. Beaumont, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a *note verbale* addressed by him to the Sublime Porte in the sense of your instructions respecting the perquisitions effected by the German cruiser "Breslau" off British ships in the port of Chanak and the detention of British ships in the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

* See No. 13.

Enclosure in No. 62.

Note verbale communicated to Sublime Porte, Constantinople, August 14, 1914.

IT having been brought to the notice of His Britannic Majesty's Government that, while in the neutral port of Chanak (Dardanelles), boats of the cruiser "Breslau," flying the German flag, boarded and effected perquisitions on British ships, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to request that the Imperial Ottoman Government will not permit German ships to commit acts of war in Turkish ports or in the Straits, the neutrality of which is guaranteed by international treaties.

Mr. Beaumont is instructed at the same time to enquire on what grounds British ships have recently been prevented from leaving the port of Constantinople, and have been detained on arrival at the Dardanelles, in some cases for several days.

According to a telegram received to-day from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at the Dardanelles, British ships are still being held up there, and His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has the honour to request that immediate orders may be sent to allow them to proceed.

No. 63.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

Sir,

Constantinople, August 21, 1914.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch,* I have the honour to forward herewith a *note verbale* from the Sublime Porte, expressing regret for the incidents at the Dardanelles and offering explanations.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

* See No. 62.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Note verbale communicated by Sublime Porte.

(Translation.)

LE Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note verbale que l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu lui adresser en date du 14 courant.

En réponse, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères s'empresse d'exprimer tous ses regrets à M. le Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté britannique pour le fâcheux incident dont furent l'objet quelques bâtiments de commerce battant pavillon anglais dans le port de Chanak ; la Sublime Porte est en mesure de donner les assurances les plus formelles que pareil fait ne se répétera plus.

Quant aux bateaux retenus à Chanak, des torpilles sous-marines s'étant détachées, les autorités Impériales ont cru de leur devoir d'empêcher ces bateaux de continuer leur voyage jusqu'au repêchage desdites mines, pour éviter de fâcheux incidents. Cette interdiction provisoire est donc le résultat d'une mesure générale que le Gouvernement Impérial s'est vu obligé de prendre afin d'assurer la sécurité de la navigation dans les eaux Impériales.

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que les mines, ayant été repêchées, les autorités compétentes ont été invitées par le Gouvernement Impérial de lever l'interdiction de passage et de faciliter de leur mieux la navigation à tous les navires.

Le 16 août, 1914.

THE Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs had the honour of receiving the *note verbale* which His Britannic Majesty's Embassy was good enough to communicate on the 14th instant.

In reply the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs hastens to express great regret to the Chargé d'Affaires for the annoying incident suffered by some merchant vessels flying the British flag in the harbour of Chanak ; the Sublime Porte are able to give the most formal assurances that such an act shall not be repeated.

As regards the vessels detained at Chanak, some submarine mines having become detached, the Imperial authorities thought it incumbent upon them to prevent those vessels from continuing their voyage until the said mines had been recovered, in order that annoying incidents might be prevented. This provisional prohibition is, it will thus be seen, the result of a general measure which the Imperial Government have been obliged to take with a view to ensuring the safety of navigation in Turkish waters.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that, the mines having been recovered, the competent authorities have been requested by the Government to raise the prohibition of free passage, and to do their best to facilitate navigation for all vessels.

August 16, 1914.

No. 64.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 6, 1914.

MINISTER of Interior yesterday assured me that there was no question of Turkey going to war.

I used every possible argument to dissuade Minister of the Interior from leaving on a military adventure, reminding him that in the end Turkey would inevitably pay. I told him His Majesty's Government regarded Turkish fleet as annex of German fleet, and that if it went out into the Aegean we should sink it. He quite realised this, and said that fleet had no intention of leaving Dardanelles.

I went carefully over several infringements of neutrality of which Turks had been guilty, and I said that so long as a single German officer, naval or military, remained here I should consider Turkey as a German protectorate ; that I had been informed that Turkish Government attached no importance to written declaration which I and

my French and Russian colleagues had made them respecting their integrity. I was greatly surprised at this attitude, but personally somewhat relieved, as to guarantee integrity and independence of Turkey was like guaranteeing life of man who was determined to commit suicide.

We sincerely desired independence and integrity of Turkey, but he must not imagine that Great Britain was afraid of Turkey, or that we feared to face alternative if forced upon us. Most ridiculous stories about insurrections in India and Egypt and approaching downfall of British Empire were being circulated broadcast, and were apparently believed by Minister of War. I hope that Minister of the Interior was not under those and similar dangerous illusions.

Minister of the Interior said that he understood.

He then proceeded to state that Turkish Government now wished to sell us two Turkish ships outright. They wanted money badly, as the economic situation was desperate. I replied that I did not know His Majesty's Government's views, which I would enquire, but that, personally, I should be reluctant to inflict so mortal a stab on the wounded heart of the Turkish people, who were already suffering so much by temporary detention of their ships. Their purchase might give rise to another tempest of indignation.

Moreover, I doubted whether His Majesty's Government would readily pay several millions to a country which was entirely in German hands, and which was breathing out threats against ourselves and our allies.

He replied that His Majesty's Government could make what conditions they liked if they bought ships; and that Turkish Government would send away all Germans. I said that I would reflect on proposal and repeat it to you.

No. 65.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 7, 1914.

THERE is fresh evidence that there has been no sale of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" to Turkey. I learn on unimpeachable authority that German Ambassador has twice sent down orders to customs for admission, duty free, of effects for His Imperial Majesty's ship "Goeben." I have brought this to notice of Grand Vizier, and have reminded him that we do not recognise sale.

Should I not tell his Highness that His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that the sale is a genuine and legal one, before they can recognise the ship as Turkish? I think that this should be done, even if the German crews go.

I have said to both Talaat and Grand Vizier that if "Goeben" and "Breslau" leave Dardanelles they will be treated as German ships. They fully realise this, and have assured me that the ships will on no account leave.

No. 66.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, September 8, 1914.

PRESENCE of numerous Turkish officers in Egypt is undoubtedly a danger, and measures against suspected individuals may become necessary at any moment. A Turkish naval officer recently left Egypt hurriedly for Beirut. A letter belonging to him has been found, in which it is stated that he has been doing his best to cause a strike amongst Moslem stokers and engineers of four Khedivial mail steamers, which are to be used as transports for our troops. The letter continues that he has not succeeded in his attempts, but that he will do his best to sink the vessels after the troops have embarked. It is worth noting that a strike on steamers in question has now occurred.

No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 8, 1914.

BRITISH Naval Mission.

Before any decision respecting the recall of the mission is taken by His Majesty's Government, I wish to have your views on the subject. I am reluctant to take any step, however justified it may be, that would precipitate unfavourable developments, as long as there is a reasonable chance of avoiding them. What effect do you consider that withdrawal of mission would have upon the political situation?

The Admiralty are of opinion that the position of the mission may become unsafe and that it is already undignified. They therefore wish it to be recalled and attached to the Embassy until you can arrange a safe passage home for Admiral Limpus and the other officers. There is clearly ample justification for the view taken by the Admiralty.

No. 68.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey—(Received September 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 8, 1914.

I HAVE on more than one occasion told Grand Vizier that resentment is probable in England, especially in present circumstances, at the slight put upon British Admiral, and that, much as His Majesty's Government desire to remain on friendly terms with Turkey, such proceedings on the part of the Turkish Government cannot be indefinitely overlooked.

In many respects the situation seems to show improvement, but unless His Majesty's Government wish mission to remain indefinitely it seems to me that the present would be a suitable moment to withdraw it. The Turks could not regard this step as a grievance as it is obviously justified by their conduct. The mission are at present treated as non-existent, and their position is consequently both false and invidious. German hold on the navy is becoming stronger daily, and there is no sign of German crews leaving. As a matter of fact, far from being disadvantageous to us, this is becoming embarrassing to the Turkish Government, who are at last beginning to realise that the Germans are not an unmixed blessing. Great discontent reigns among Turkish naval officers, so Admiral Limpus tells me, as they dislike German officers, and they even hint that they would rather mutiny than serve under them.

I am of opinion that the time has come to withdraw the mission, and if this can be approved in principle, I will speak to the Admiral, who feels his position acutely, and ask him to make the necessary arrangements.

* This telegram crossed Sir E. Grey's telegram of September 8, see No. 67.

No. 69.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 9, 1914.

GRAND VIZIER admitted this morning that the Turkish Government were going to abolish Capitulations.

I said that this information would greatly surprise my Government, whom I would at once apprise.

The Capitulations and conventions were not a unilateral agreement; we had on a former occasion informed the Turkish Government that we were willing to consider any request they might put forward in a generous spirit, but I did not imagine that my Government would acquiesce in their total abolition by a stroke of the pen. We were now under martial law. Did he expect us to allow British subjects to be judged by court-martial, especially so long as army was in hands of Germans?

His Highness made some ineffectual endeavours to defend his action, but I cut them short.

No. 70.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 9, 1914.

MINISTER of Interior told me to-day that note to embassies on subject of the abolition of the Capitulations had already been despatched. German Ambassador had just called to protest. Earlier in the day the Italian Ambassador had informed me that German and Austrian Ambassadors were ready to associate themselves with us in protesting against the abolition.

German Ambassador has disclaimed authorship of this move on the part of Turkey, and I think that he may be speaking the truth; but every statement he makes must be received with caution. Nevertheless, statement by Minister of Interior, to which I have alluded above, seems to bear him out in this case.

I have discussed the proposed abolition with the Minister of the Interior, and he maintains that they all feel that the time has come to emancipate Turkey from foreign shackles. But he disclaimed any intention of hostility against foreigners. He had already sent instructions to all Valis and police officials not to inflame people against foreigners, and he would give strictest orders that no foreigners should be taken before courts-martial.

I told His Excellency that I thought the action of the Turkish Government would inevitably lead to greater interference than ever in the internal affairs of Turkey. I could only regret that they should have acted so precipitately.

No. 71

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 9, 1914.

ABOLITION of Capitulations.

It has been arranged that all the Embassies shall send in identic notes to-morrow acknowledging Turkish note and pointing out that abolition of the Capitulations can not be accepted, as consent of both contracting parties is necessary.

No. 72

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

Constantinople, September 10, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

CONSIGNMENTS of warlike materials from Germany traced up to date amount to 3,000 rounds of projectiles for "Goebén," battery of field guns with ammunition, several batteries of heavy howitzers, probably for field army use, and some thousands of rifles. More consignments are on the way. All German reservists who have not been able to leave Turkish Empire have been instructed to report for enrolment with Turkish troops.

No. 73.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 10, 1914.

MY telegram of 9th September.*

Note abolishing all the Capitulations was received last night. All my colleagues, including German and Austrian Ambassadors, have to-day addressed identic notes to

*See No. 71.

the Sublime Porte stating that, while communicating to our respective Governments note respecting abolition of Capitulations, we must point out that capitulatory régime is not an autonomous institution of the Empire, but the resultant of international treaties, diplomatic agreements, and contractual acts of different kinds. It cannot be abolished in any part *à fortiori* wholly, without consent of contracting parties. Therefore, in the absence of understanding arrived at before 1st October between Ottoman Government and our respective Governments, we cannot recognise executory force after that date of a unilateral decision of Sublime Porte.

No. 74.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey — (Received September 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 13, 1914.

I HEAR that Germans are now dominant at Alexandretta, and secretly suggest and control everything. From 7th September to morning of 12th September, 24 mountain guns, 400 horses and mules, 500 artillery troops belonging to service of 6th Army Corps, and large quantity of ammunition passed through Alexandretta, proceeding by railway to Constantinople.

No. 75.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received September 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 14, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador has received instructions from Berlin to publish widely report of revolution in India, with addition that His Majesty's Government have asked Japan to assist, and that Japan has agreed, in return for free immigration into the Pacific Coast, a free hand in China, and a 40,000,000*l.* loan. I was warned in time by the Russian Ambassador, and instructed all consuls by telegraph to deny it, if published, and wrote to the Grand Vizier.

Nothing official has appeared here, but the agencies are publishing part of the story.

No. 76.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received September 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 15, 1914.

FLEET is now entirely in German hands, and Minister of Marine is powerless. Germans consider that Dardanelles are now impassable, and they are impressing this upon military authorities. It is said that, if the Turkish fleet moved into the Black Sea, Straits would be entirely closed by additional mines, which have just been sent there on the "Nilufer."

Though I do not say that this *coup* will actually come off, danger is undoubtedly greater since news has been received of the recent successes of the allies, as the Germans are all the more anxious to create a diversion. My impression is that majority of the Cabinet and the Grand Vizier himself are entirely opposed to any such adventure, and that they are doing their utmost to prevent it; but they are finding out, though they will not admit it, that they are powerless to stop matters.

Both I and my Russian colleague have received independent information that German and Austrian Ambassadors are making a determined effort to force the Minister of War to send the "Goeben" and the rest of the fleet into the Black Sea. Fifty transports have been ready for some time, and I understand that everything is prepared for the reception on board these vessels of a large number of Turkish troops.

Abolition of the Capitulations is now the principal card in the hands of the peace

party. They would, I think, be ready to defer discussion of abolition of judicial Capitulations if abolition of fiscal and commercial treaties could be agreed to forthwith by the three Powers.

I hear that 15 per cent. duties will be applied from the 1st October, but a law is at present under consideration exempting existing contracts. As nothing is at present coming into ports, application of these duties is, as a matter of fact, of little consequence. The temettu also will be applied to foreigners.

No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Malle.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 16, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 15th September :* Abolition of Capitulations.

I am inclined to point out to Turkish Government that, so long as they maintain neutrality, what we have said to them already holds good, and that we shall be prepared to consider reasonable concessions about Capitulations ; but they must not expect concessions from us while their present irregular conduct in the matter of the German officers and crews continues. Perhaps we might also say that if they break the peace we cannot be responsible for the consequences ; that we hope they will keep the peace, but whether they do so or not is their own affair.

* See No. 76.

No. 78.

*United Shipowners' Freight, Demurrage, and Protective Association to
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)*

Sir,

*Vienna Chambers, Bute Docks, Cardiff,
September 16, 1914.*

WE are instructed by the owners of the steamship "Reliance" to seek your aid for the recovery of compensation from the Turkish Government for the detention of their steamer by the Turkish authorities.

The facts of the case are as follows :—

On the 1st August last the steamship "Reliance" sailed from Nickolaief with a cargo of barley for Hamburg and arrived off Constantinople at noon on the 3rd. The captain waited at Constantinople for orders from the owners of his steamer until the 6th, but he received no communication from his owners as the Turkish authorities had stopped the delivery of telegrams.

On the 6th August the captain proceeded on his voyage and arrived off Nagara Point, Dardanelles, on the following day at 8 A. M. when he sent his permit to pass through the Dardanelles ashore in accordance with the usual practice and received a signal from the fort that the canal was blocked. This blocking signal was kept up on the 8th, 9th, and 10th August ; on the latter date several Italian vessels were piloted out and the German warships "Goeben" and "Breslau" were piloted in by Turkish torpedo craft and anchored in Nagara Bay. A German merchant vessel, the "General," was also piloted in.

The captain of the "Reliance" daily saw the British consul at Chanak, but the consul was unable to obtain permission for the "Reliance" to pass through the Dardanelles.

On the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th August the "Reliance" remained off Nagara Point, and on these days Roumanian, French, and Italian steamers were piloted in and out, but no British ships were allowed to leave.

At 5-50 P. M. on the 14th August the captain received orders from Turkish officials to proceed to Constantinople and remain there until the cargo had been discharged. Several other British steamers that were waiting received similar orders, amongst them being the steamship "Hillhouse," the steamship "Countess of Warwick," and the steamship "Barrowmore."

The captain proceeded to Constantinople and arrived there at 1 p. m. on the 15th August. On arrival he went ashore and noted protest against the detention of his steamer and also saw the British Consul. On the following day the "Goeben" and "Breslau" arrived off Constantinople under the Turkish flag. On this day the "Reliance" was boarded by a Turkish officer who asked for the displacement of the vessel and for information as to the capacity for carrying horses and troops.

On the 18th the captains of all British ships at Constantinople were told by the British harbour-master, on instructions from the British consul-general, that they were now allowed to proceed and were again to apply for permits. On the same day the captain of the "Reliance" obtained a permit and sailed from Constantinople and arrived again off Nagara Point at 8 a. m. the following morning (19th August) when he sent his second permit ashore, but the Turkish authorities cancelled the permit and ordered the "Reliance" to anchor. On the 20th August one Italian ship and the British ship "Ryton," in ballast, were allowed to pass through, and on the following day the steamship "Bullmouth" loaded with kerosene and three other steamers were piloted out. It was not until the 22nd ultimo at 11-40 a. m. that the "Reliance" was allowed to sail.

We respectfully submit that the Turkish authorities should be made to pay compensation for their action in detaining British ships, and on behalf of the owners of the "Reliance" we request that their claim of 640*l.*, being at the ordinary charter-party rate of 40*l.* a day, for the detention of their steamer from the 6th to the 22nd August, should be made against the Turkish Government by the British Ambassador at Constantinople.

We are, etc.,

DOWNING AND HANDCOCK.

No. 79.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 16, 1914.

MINISTER of Marine has assured me that he is quite aware of German intrigues, and that Turkish Government are not so innocent as to fall into the trap that has been laid for them. His Excellency admitted, however, that there had been an idea of sending the fleet to visit Trebizon, as he claimed that the Government had a right to do.

I pointed out, should they do so, as long as German officers were on board, there was bound to be a certain risk of some incident occurring, in view of well-known desire of Germans to provoke trouble between Russia and Turkey. His Excellency did not demur to this opinion, and said that he would at once see the Grand Vizier in order to stop it.

I have also seen Grand Vizier. His Highness said there was no intention of sending the "Goeben" into the Black Sea, and stated that the Minister of War must obtain the authorisation of the Cabinet before he could issue any such order.

No. 80.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 18, 1914.

FOLLOWING telegram received from His Majesty's Consul at Basra:—

"I am informed officially by Turkish commodore that a British man-of-war is lying near boundary line in Shatt-el-Arab, whole of which is within Ottoman waters. Vali intends to ask the captain to allow wireless apparatus to be sealed and to leave, as more than twenty-four hours have elapsed since ship entered the river. Vali knows that I am informing you."

No. 81.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19).

(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING sent to Basra :—

“ Turkish authorities have, of course, no right to interfere with wireless on men-of-war.”

Constantinople, September 18, 1914.

No. 82.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 19, 1914.

TURKISH military preparations.

In conversation with the President of the Chamber to-day, I said that if it was really Turkey's intention to go to war with Russia, I considered such a policy absolute madness.

President said that, even if Turkish fleet went into Black Sea, it would not be with any hostile intention towards Russia, with whom they were not going to war. I pointed out to him that Germany was pressing Turkey to send their fleet into the Black Sea with one object only, namely, that war might be provoked by some incident. I therefore urged him most strongly against any such action. He said that he was against it, and that he saw the force of my argument, to which I replied that as the Minister of War was supreme it was unfortunately no guarantee that it would not be done. President told me that the Cabinet had their own policy, which was to remain neutral, and that they were all alive to the aims of Germany. I pressed him hard as to what was the policy of the Minister of War.

I do not regard situation as hopeless. Party in favour of neutrality is growing, but it would be unsafe to rely on their power to restrain war party.

I hear that 156 more mines and the minelayer “ Ghairet ” have been sent to Roumeli Kanak, on the Bosphorus. Turkish fleet went to Halki yesterday for review, and will probably remain there till next week, when the “ Hamidieh ” and “ Messudiye ” will be ready. German officers and men continue to arrive by train. It is probable that there are German reservists resident in Turkey who have been incorporated in Turkish army. 200 Germans arrived at the Dardanelles on September 17th.

Cavalry and horse artillery are reported to have moved from Erzeroum towards the frontier.

No. 83.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 20, 1914.

I BELIEVE that Minister of War is the only firebrand. Committee of Union and Progress is exercising a restraining influence. I think it is undoubted that party in favour of peace is daily increasing.

French Ambassador had a conversation yesterday with Minister of Marine. Latter assured his Excellency that Turkish Government were determined not to be drawn into war, to which his Excellency retorted that if this assurance was correct, it was difficult to understand why preparations to send Turkish fleet into Black Sea were being made. Minister of Marine replied that Council of Ministers had decided that two destroyers only should go into Black Sea and that the fleet should not go. He admitted that the Minister of War, who was generalissimo of the army and navy, had, as a matter of fact, ordered the fleet to go, but, as all orders had to pass through him as Minister of Marine, he had insisted that this order should be referred to the Council, with the result above stated.

As an illustration of the entire lack of control possessed by the Cabinet over the Minister of War and the Germans, if any further illustration is needed, I have to report that, despite this assurance from the Minister of Marine, the "Breslau" and three other smaller ships passed us this morning and entered the Black Sea. My Russian colleague trusts that no incident will happen and proposes to ignore this proceeding.

No. 84.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 20, 1914.

I HAVE just had an animated interview with the Grand Vizier, and I am convinced that he is sincere. Other Ministers are all peaceably inclined, with the exception of the Minister of War. So long as the latter remains supreme an incident may occur at any moment. I tackled the Grand Vizier on the subject of the "Breslau" entering the Black Sea. He vehemently disclaimed any intention of attacking Russia, and said that Turkish Government had a right to send their fleet into the Black Sea if they wished to. I reminded him that neither the "Goeben" nor the "Breslau" were Turkish ships according to international law, and said that if they left the Dardanelles we would most certainly treat them as enemy ships. He replied that I had told him this often before, and there was no question of the ships leaving the Dardanelles. I then said that information had reached me that Council of Ministers, in order to avoid risk of an incident, had come to the wise decision that the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" should not go into the Black Sea; and yet on the very day on which this decision had been reached by the Cabinet, it was totally disregarded by the Minister of War, as his Highness was doubtless aware. This showed how much control his Highness now exercised. Constantinople and the neighbourhood formed nothing more nor less than an armed German camp, and we all, including his Highness, were at the mercy of Liman Pasha* and the Minister of War. Many more German officers and men had arrived, and there must now be between 4,000 and 5,000 German soldiers and sailors here. Grand Vizier replied that he was determined to maintain peace, and that more adherents were joining the peace party every day. He would never allow Minister of War or anyone else to supersede him. Speaking with the utmost energy and even violence he assured me that, in spite of appearances, which he admitted looked bad, nothing would happen.

I said that doubtless peace party was growing, but, nevertheless, Minister of War was pushing forward warlike preparations uninterruptedly. I was receiving constant information respecting British official war news being stopped, cases of requisitions, etc., and I knew as a fact that intrigues against Egypt were being carried on. If his Highness could stop these things, why did he not do so, and when would he be able to do so? His Highness gave me to understand that if a crisis did come there would be a means of stopping Minister of War.

* General Liman von Sanders, Head of the German Military Mission.

No. 85.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, September 21, 1914.

INFORMATION respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt receives fresh corroboration. There has been no slackening of military preparation in Palestine and in Syria.

If Turkish preparations continue, it may become necessary to put patrols into Sinai and to support our posts in the Peninsula. Action of forces in Egypt has been hitherto confined, as you are aware, to patrol of Suez Canal, but I think that Turkish Government should be warned that measures for the protection of the Egyptian frontier may become necessary.

No. 86.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 22, 1914.

A LETTER was yesterday received by British postmaster from a subordinate official in the Turkish postal administration. In this letter postmaster was informed that foreign post offices in Turkey would be abolished as from 1st October next. I instructed British postmaster to return the letter, and to say that matter had been referred to his Ambassador.

This discourteous manner of communication was my first official information of any intention to abolish foreign post offices in Turkey. I accordingly saw Grand Vizier at once, and said that I resented the manner of communication, and had instructed British postmaster to return the letter. Post offices did not depend upon the Capitulations, and if Turkish Government wished to see the system modified, they should approach His Majesty's Government through the usual diplomatic channel. I warned him that His Majesty's Government would not allow themselves to be ignored in this manner, and I would not, unless by your instructions, consent to summary closing of British post offices on 1st October unless Turkish Government had given guarantees for safeguarding British interests. His Highness said that Great Britain was not aimed at specially. A similar communication had been addressed to all the Powers I said I was indifferent as to view of the matter taken by my French and Russian colleagues, nor had I yet had time to ascertain what they thought. Grand Vizier assured me that until an understanding had been come to with His Majesty's Government nothing further would be done in the matter.

I would observe that, in my opinion, considerable modification of existing system cannot properly be resisted. If Russian and French Ambassadors agree, may I come to some arrangement on the lines of consenting to incorporation of the British post office as a section of the Ottoman post, if the latter will undertake to take over some of present British employés? I think we might also consent to use Turkish stamps.

No. 87.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 22, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 25th August.*

Sultan received me yesterday in audience, when I delivered the King's message. His Majesty expressed his earnest desire for good relations with Great Britain, and emphatically declared his firm intention of maintaining peace. He requested me to thank the King for his message. Full report follows by despatch.

* See No. 84.

No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 23, 1914.

POLITICAL situation in Turkey.

His Majesty's Government regard state of things at Constantinople as most unsatisfactory. On behalf of His Majesty's Government you should speak in the following sense to the Grand Vizier:—

British Government contemplate no hostile act towards Turkey by British fleet, and they have no desire to precipitate a conflict with her. But the fact that Great Britain has not taken any hostile action against her must not mislead Turkish Government into supposing that His Majesty's Government consider Turkey's attitude is consistent with the obligations imposed upon her by the neutrality which she has officially declared. German officers and men are participating increasingly in Turkish

fleet and Dardanelles defences, and not only has Turkey failed to send away the German officers and crews, as she promised, but she has admitted more overland, and they are now in active control of the "Goeben" and "Breslau." The capital is undoubtedly now under the control of the Germans. If His Majesty's Government so desired, present state of things affords ample justification for protesting against violation of neutrality. Great Britain has not, however, so far taken action, as she cherishes the hope that the peace party will win the day. It should, however, be realised by the Grand Vizier and his supporters that unless they soon succeed in getting the situation in hand and bringing it within the limits of neutrality, it will become clear that Constantinople is no longer under Turkish but German control, and that open hostility will be forced on by Germany.

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 24, 1914.

I HEAR that Egyptian frontier has been violated by armed mounted Arabs said to be encouraged by Turkish troops, and also that Hedjaz line is being reserved for troops. British military authorities consider that breach of the peace on Egyptian frontier is imminent, whether with or without sanction of Turkish Government. You should bring these facts to the knowledge of the Grand Vizier and of the Khedive, who is at present at Constantinople.

No. 90.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25).

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 24, 1914.

TURKISH preparations against Egypt.

I have addressed a note to the Grand Vizier recapitulating information recently received on this subject. I reminded his Highness of the assurances which I had several times given him, based upon your telegram of 7th August,* and I specially pointed out their conditional nature. Finally I warned him that the information respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt would infallibly produce a most serious impression upon His Majesty's Government.

I later communicated the contents of my note to President of the Council, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Interior, and asked them what explanation they could give, whereupon they enquired why so many thousand Indian troops were being sent to Egypt by His Majesty's Government. To this I answered that it was essential to ensure the safety of Egypt and the protection of the Suez Canal, and that as the British garrison of Egypt had been sent to France, it was necessary to replace it by British Indian troops. This seemed to satisfy them.

I cannot believe that they are not alive to the disastrous consequences of going to war with us, or that they seriously can contemplate an expedition against Egypt. They have undoubtedly been strongly urged to send such an expedition by the Germans, and I think that they have allowed preparations to be made, partly to profit as much as possible by German connection and by allowing the Germans to think that they will act, and partly in order to be ready, if Great Britain sustains a serious defeat by land or sea.

Danger of the present situation is obvious, and developments are not improbable, and I shall see the Grand Vizier this morning and endeavour to bring him to book. There is a circumstantial report that the Germans are now making desperate efforts to force the Turks' hands and to compel them to fulfil their part of the bargain, but that at the same time their efforts are meeting with considerable resistance.

* See No. 5.

No. 91.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25).

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 24, 1914.

I HAVE informed the Grand Vizier that Austro-German intrigues to involve Turkey in an expedition against Egypt are within my knowledge. Grand Vizier denied that such intrigues existed, but he finally admitted that pressure was being exerted. He declared that he was firmly resolved to keep out of any such intrigue, any complicity in which he disclaimed with emphasis. I strongly urged his Highness to make his position clearer, for preparations at the Dardanelles showed that he was either guilty of complicity or that he was not master in his own house. He answered that his intentions were entirely pacific, and that he did not mean to engage in any quarrel with Great Britain.

His Highness seemed more preoccupied with the Balkan situation at the moment than with anything else. He said that Turkish Government would be unable to refrain from an attempt to get back what they had lost in Balkan wars if Balkan complications ensued. No arguments of mine would induce him to change his attitude in this respect. He said he would be powerless to prevent it.

No. 92.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, September 25, 1914.

TURKISH preparations on Sinai frontier.

Two thousand men with stores passed Gaza on night of 18th September following coast towards frontier. Six more battalions are expected at Gaza. In that neighbourhood very strong and secret military preparations are being made on the frontier. Three battalions of Redif completely mobilised have marched to a place one day south of Jaffa on their way to the frontier.

No. 93.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 25, 1914.

ABOLITION of post offices.

You should make the best arrangements you can will regard to post offices, but it must be on record that we reserve the subject for future settlement, and that we do not agree to their abolition.

No. 94.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 25, 1914.

YOUR telegram of the 23rd September.*

I have again seen Grand Vizier, and pointed out to him as earnestly as is within my power the fatal result to the Turkish Empire of persisting in a course of veiled hostility and petty intrigue against the British Empire. I recalled to him that time and again he had undertaken that the German crews of the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" should be sent out of Turkey, and that not only had these promises been broken, but further German officers and men had actually arrived. This proved conclusively that he was either insincere in his assurances or that he was powerless.

* See No. 88.

His Highness begged that I would credit him with the fact that for eight weeks he had kept the peace. He assured me that he had every intention of seeing to it that peace was maintained. I replied that it was not his good intentions that I doubted, but I did distinctly doubt his ability to control the situation. The Germans had evidently gained complete control. An incident might happen at any moment, and the most serious consequences might be involved. His Highness was evidently nettled at what I said, and angrily replied that he was determined to keep the peace, and that, in a matter of peace and war, he was absolute master. This I met by referring him to the serious character of the preparations at present on foot, and by pointing out that, whether he wished it or not, a repetition of the Arab raid across the Egyptian frontier might lead to incidents which would involve him. His Highness said that Minister of War was returning to-day, and that he would at once ask what the preparations were to which I referred. He asserted with violence that no incident would occur.

I have also seen Halil Bey, to whom news of preparations against Egypt seemed to be unknown. He expressed astonishment to hear of them, and was evidently horrified at the idea of war with us. He promised to go and see the Minister of War at once.

Position of Grand Vizier is difficult, and, to maintain any kind of control, he is obliged to shut his eyes to much that is going on. I am still strongly of opinion that, unless some act of gross antagonism takes place, we should maintain policy of reserve and abstain from making categorical demands with which His Highness is not yet able to reply, continuing to devote all our efforts towards preventing Turkey from taking active part in hostilities which German and especially Austrian Ambassadors are urging. Main fact of the situation is that, in spite of great pressure, Grand Vizier has kept the peace, and that his party is gaining ground.

No. 95.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 25, 1914.

ON 22nd and 23rd September, 183 horses, 112 nizam, 2 officers, and 88 carts and carriages, all from Aintab, were entrained at Aleppo for Damascus.

Secret notice was given that in six days' time 120 railway waggons were to be in readiness to convey to Damascus troops arriving from Mosul *via* Tel Abiyat, and that in all from 25,000 to 30,000 troops were to be drafted from Mosul to Aleppo, of which at least half are destined for Hama or Damascus.

Two Germans connected with Bagdad Railway, one of whom is an expert in blasting operations and mine-laying, left Aleppo this morning for Damascus, the other telling his servant that they were going to Akaba. They had with them 1,600 dynamite cartridges and 1,500 metres of detonating wires. They may, perhaps, be commissioned to lay mines in Red Sea as there has been talk of Turkish military designs regarding Akaba recently.

No. 96.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 26, 1914.

GRAND VIZIER has been informed of the information reported by Mr. Cheetham in his telegram of 25th September,* and in my telegram of the same date.† I warned his Highness that if these preparations against Egypt were allowed to continue, serious consequences would ensue. Minister of War was with Grand Vizier when I made these representations, and his Highness informed me that he fully realised the importance of the question, with which he was occupying himself. I have taken steps to enlighten influential people with what is being done as regards Egypt, and I have seen Minister of Interior and left a memorandum with him on the subject; I have also put the facts before other prominent members of the Cabinet.

* See No. 92.

† See No. 95.

No. 97.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 27, 1914.

AN incident has occurred outside the Dardanelles. At 6 o'clock this evening I heard that a Turkish destroyer was stopped last night outside the Dardanelles and turned back by one of our destroyers. Upon this, Commandant of the Dardanelles closed the Straits. When the news arrived, the Russian and French Ambassadors were with me, and we at once went to see the Grand Vizier. When I arrived the Grand Vizier was in a state of some perturbation. He said sudden action of British fleet had given rise to the belief that an immediate attack was contemplated. Having reassured his Highness that any such belief was unfounded, I said that it seemed to me highly desirable that the Dardanelles should be opened at once, for should the incident become known, it would certainly create the impression that some desperate step was intended by Turkish Government. I explained to his Highness that we were naturally apprehensive lest Germans on Turkish destroyers might endeavour to torpedo or mine our ships, and that it was for that reason that British fleet had been instructed to prevent any Turkish ships from leaving the Dardanelles, so long as any German officers or crews remained.

Grand Vizier asserted that he, personally, favoured the reopening of the Straits, and he requested me to assure His Majesty's Government, in the most formal and solemn manner, that Turkish Government would never make war upon Great Britain. I said that if the accounts that I had received were accurate, Turkish action on Egyptian frontier required explanation, where they had already committed acts of war. He said that facts had been greatly exaggerated; that I might rest assured that there would be no more acts of aggression; that there was no thought or question of attacking Egypt; and that orders had been sent for the immediate withdrawal of raiding Bedouins. He added that mobilisation was general, and therefore included those parts of the Empire contiguous to Egypt. He has promised to send a formal answer to my representations on the subject.

No. 98.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 27, 1914.

MY telegram of to-day.*

I have just received a message from the Grand Vizier that, if His Majesty's Government will move the fleet a little further from the entrance to the Dardanelles, the Straits will be reopened. I said that I would ask for your instructions.

* See No. 97.

No. 99.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 29, 1914.

DARDANELLES.

Germans are making capital out of closure of the Straits, and I hear on good authority that great pressure is being exerted by them to induce Turkey to attack Russia in the Black Sea. Turks have, however, refused so far to fall in with this scheme.

Great umbrage has been caused to the Turks by fact that it was upon the German Ambassador's order that the "Breslau" went into the Black Sea the other day.

Grand Vizier is most anxious to reopen the Straits, and has again begged me this morning to let him know whether His Majesty's Government would not consent to move British fleet a little further off.

No. 100.*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 29, 1914.

INFORMATION has reached His Majesty's Government that Turkish Minister of War telegraphed to Bin Saud, Emir of Nejd, several times towards the end of July that, owing to the imminence of war in Europe, arms, ammunition, and officers for training his Arabs were being sent to him.

Vali of Basra has been informed by Turkish Minister of War that thirty-two secret emissaries, including German officers, are on their way to preach a "jehad" in India, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan; that arms and ammunition are being sent to Basra under German flag, and that Turkish Government are prepared to help Germany in return for assistance received during Balkan war.

No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 29, 1914.

UNDER instructions from his Government, Turkish Ambassador has reverted to the continued presence in the Shatt-el-Arab of H.M.S. "Odin." Tewfic Pasha said that we would doubtless observe the rules of neutrality in other countries, since we had gone to war to defend the neutrality of Belgium. I informed him that, as Turkey had violated the rules of neutrality on her own initiative, and so long as she persisted in her present unneutral attitude, His Majesty's Government did not admit that she could appeal to those rules.

In the event of your being approached on this matter by the Grand Vizier, you should state that His Majesty's Government will observe neutrality towards Turkey, if Turkey will do so towards us, and you should inform him of the reply which has been given to Turkish Ambassador.

No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 30, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 27th September* and subsequent telegrams Dardanelles were closed unnecessarily by Turkish authorities, and there is no reason why they should not be reopened. Turkish Government are well aware that we have no intention of initiating any aggressive action against Turkey.

The watch maintained by British fleet outside Dardanelles cannot be withdrawn so long as German officers and men remain in Turkish waters and are in control of Turkish fleet. Until, therefore, the German officers and crews are repatriated, the request that the fleet should be moved cannot be entertained.

You should inform Grand Vizier.

* See No. 97.

No. 103.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 1, 1914.

CONSUL at Basra reports to-day that British man-of-war has left Turkish waters.

He had previously telegraphed that he heard there was an intention to block Shatt-el-Arab in order to prevent departure of British man-of-war, and I had already called Grand Vizier's notice to this report.

No. 104.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 2, 1914.

INFORMATION continues to reach me corroborating reports of Turkish preparations against Egypt. Large transport camel corps arrived at Jerusalem yesterday, and I hear of transport of warlike materials, food-stuffs, and military stores on line Jenin—Nablus—Jerusalem, and also to Maan. Seven German military officers have been sent to Damascus and neighbourhood. This has stimulated preparations, and it is believed in Syria that Turkish Government has decided upon a movement against Egypt, Damascus division being assembled for advance by Akaba, Jerusalem division for that by Rafa. Inhabitants at Beirut and Haifa are being removed inland as a precautionary measure against any action which may be taken by British fleet when the advance on Egypt begins. It is reported from Haifa that localities along the coast are being garrisoned by newly-arrived troops. I have brought the gravity of the existing situation to the notice of the Grand Vizier in the strongest terms in a further note, though I do not view any actual movement against Egypt as imminent at the moment. In my note I have informed His Highness that the measures now undertaken can have no reason except as a threat against Egypt, and that they can no longer be regarded as incidental to an ordinary mobilisation of troops in their peace stations, and I have stated that His Majesty's Government can only view any further preparations at Jerusalem or at Maan in a serious light.

In addition to above-mentioned military measures, movements of suspicious individuals have now been supplemented by those of a German naval officer named Hilgendorf, who is at present on his way from Damascus to Petra with a party of eight Germans. It is understood that they will be joined by a smaller party from Haifa *via* Amman, and that they are conveying a large supply of explosives. I have made representations to the Grand Vizier explaining that such hostile enterprises against Great Britain cannot be allowed in a neutral country, and that these people must be arrested.

Speaking generally, I am inclined to think that both in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, on the Black Sea, the Egyptian frontier, and elsewhere, the Turks intend to have their troops all ready for action at a favourable point should the general European situation afford a good opportunity. Should the German Admiral take the "Goeben" into the Black Sea and attack the Russian fleet, or should things take an unfavourable turn for the Allies, Turkish troops would be in a position to cross the Egyptian frontier without much further delay. His Majesty's Government will doubtless consider what, if any, military measures are necessary for the strengthening of strategical points in the Sinai peninsula.

No. 105.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 3, 1914.

CLOSING of Dardanelles.

Germans have certainly long been working for the closing of the Straits, presumably with the object of obtaining a freer hand in the Black Sea. There is every reason to suppose that the Dardanelles are closed to shipping not only by administrative act, but also effectively by mines. From information that reaches me from a reliable source, it seems that these mines have been laid by the Germans, and that the Turks are unaware of their position.

No. 106.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 4, 1914.

HIS Majesty's Consul at Basra telegraphs as follows dated the 3rd October:—
" Warships in Shatt-el-Arab.

"I have received a letter from the Vali saying that Your Excellency has been informed by the Turkish Government of the measures proposed to be adopted in Turkish waters with regard to foreign belligerent warships; he says that the Shatt-el-Arab from Fao to Durna is closed to foreign warships, being inland waters just as much as Smyrna and the Dardanelles. British men-of-war must therefore leave Shatt-el-Arab within twenty-four hours. Vali ends by saying that he will have to apply strict measures if I cannot induce captains of His Majesty's ships to go outside Fao. I told the Vali that I was asking for instructions from Your Excellency, and I informed His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah of the gist of Vali's communication.

"It is possible that H.M.S. 'Lawrence' may also be in the river."

No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 4, 1914.

DARDANELLES.

It is the Germans who keep the Straits closed, to the great detriment of Turkey. If you concur, you may point out to the Turks that the British fleet will move away as soon as the German officers and crews leave and the Turkish navy ceases to be under German control. We should then have no fear of hostile action on the part of the Turks.

No. 108.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 5, 1914.

TURKEY is now bankrupt. Supply of coal is, I am glad to say, cut off. Fresh provisions are not coming in, and there is some discontent in the navy and even in the army. Situation is doubtless very delicate, but Turks would be unlikely to go all lengths with Germany, at any rate until German success in the war seems more assured. I think that Turks are possibly less blind to their interests than is generally supposed, and I am still of opinion that situation may be saved. Time is now on our side, and I am strongly in favour of avoiding all occasion of conflict by temporising.

The question of reopening the Dardanelles is really no longer a practical one, for the Straits are now effectively closed by mines, and I am informed that their position is unknown to the Turks themselves.

Russian and French Ambassadors agree with me that our interests are not primarily affected by the closure, as the requisitioning and other measures taken by the Turks against our nationals had already stopped our trade. This is the line I am taking with the Turks. I think they will begin to realise the facts before long. Total cessation of imports is already causing anxiety to Minister of Finance, and Turkish Government will soon become aware that they are the chief losers. The Germans have closed the Straits from political motives, partly, no doubt, because they believe that, by closing the Straits and preventing the entry of the British fleet, it will be easier for them to induce the Turks to take action against Russia in the Black Sea; partly, no doubt, in order to injure the trade of the Allies and to prevent communication by sea with Russia.

I think that self-interested designs of Germany are not unknown to the Turks, who are playing up to Germany, not with the intention of falling in with those designs, at any rate for the present, to the extent of making war, but in order to extract as much as possible from her. In the opinion of many people, Germans are now in a position to take matters into their own hands, if they think that German interests demand it. If, however, the Turks' game is such as I have outlined above, it is undoubtedly a dangerous one. As is only natural, Turkish Government profess their ability to check any attempt on the part of Germany to take matters into their own hands, but it is not quite clear how they would be able to prevent it.

No. 109.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 6, 1914.

MILITARY attaché had a long interview with Minister of War yesterday, from which he derived the impression that his Excellency had ambitious schemes in the Arab world and in Egypt. These may perhaps refer more to the future, and possibly measures are now being taken so as to prepare for the eventuality of Great Britain being worsted in war with Germany; meanwhile the way is being paved indirectly for present or future action. During the conversation, Minister of War disclaimed any intention on the part of the Turks of initiating, themselves, any offensive movements against Egypt, and pointed out that ordinary Syrian garrison had not been reinforced. He said that, as in the case of other troops within the Empire, Syrian garrison had been fully mobilised. It was being equipped with necessary transport animals, etc., on a war scale, and it was being carefully trained with the help of the officers of the German mission as elsewhere throughout Turkey. Everything, he said, depended on the political situation, for which he was not responsible individually; and it was quite possible that the Syrian army corps might finally be moved in another direction, even, perhaps, to Constantinople. He scouted the idea of individual Germans undertaking enterprises against the Suez Canal or elsewhere, but he admitted that proposals had certainly been made to the Bedouin tribes to enlist their sympathies as supporters of the Empire in all eventualities. He defended the concentration of stores at Maan, Nablus, and Jerusalem, and he added that no troops, but only gendarmes, had been moved in the direction of Gaza. Nevertheless, he could not deny that some of the measures taken were certainly precautionary against Great Britain, and in justification of this he pointed to the entrance of British men-of-war into the Shatt-el-Arab, to the arrival of Indian troops in Egypt, and to the presence of the British fleet in Turkish territorial waters outside the Dardanelles. Military attaché said that, as far as the action of the fleet and of His Majesty's Government were concerned, this was due to infringement of neutrality by the Turks, and Great Britain certainly had not the slightest intention of making any attack upon Turkey. It was quite ridiculous to suppose that the arrival of Indian troops in Egypt had anything to do with hostility to Turkey. Minister of War at once advanced such arguments as that Turkey had maintained her neutrality; that German officers and men on auxiliary ships were entirely under Turkish control, indeed they were in the Turkish service. Military attaché said that Turks could not be surprised that Great Britain should be preoccupied if Turkish troops were assembled further south than Jerusalem or Beersaheba on the one side, or Maan on the other.

No. 110.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 6, 1914.

HIS Majesty's consul at Basra telegraphs to-day as follows:—

"Vali says that he must obey the orders which he has received. He has communicated a copy of these to me. They are to the effect that the whole of the Shatt-el-Arab and sea within six miles of the shore are closed to warships, as they are territorial waters. Any men-of-war disregarding this prohibition will be fired upon by the guns at Fao. These regulations will be enforced from to-morrow evening, Wednesday, 7th October. They are somewhat obscure, but they mean that H.M.S. 'Espiegle' in the Karun and H.M.S. 'Dalhousie' at Abadan will be interned, unless they leave before the time fixed. No other British man-of-war is this side of Fao. H.M.S. 'Lawrence' is in the Shatt-el-Arab to the best of my belief. His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah has been informed of the above."

No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 7, 1914.

BRITISH warships in the Shatt-el-Arab.

H.M.S.S. "Espiegle," "Odin," and "Dalhousie" are not in Turkish waters. There can be no question of their being ordered out of waters which are not Turkish nor of their being interned by the Turkish Government. According to generally accepted principles of international law, Turkish territorial waters extend to 3 miles out to sea from the coast. Two of His Majesty's ships are being instructed to keep outside the 3-mile limit, while the remaining ship is being told to remain at Mohammerah, which does not belong to Turkey. Our long-established right to pass freely up and down Shatt-el-Arab at all times is not in question, and it must be recognised that we fully reserve that right.

No. 112.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)**Constantinople, September 22, 1914.*

Sir,

REFERRING to your telegram of 25th August,* in which I was authorised to convey to His Imperial Majesty a message from the King, on the occasion of my reception in audience after my return from leave of absence, I have the honour to state that I was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty yesterday.

In view of the difficulty of conversing with His Majesty in an ordinary way, I prepared a written statement containing the message, and I read a separate statement of my own on the subject of the withdrawal of Admiral Limpus, having previously arranged with the Master of the Ceremonies, who was to act as interpreter, that this should be translated clause by clause as I read it. I enclose a copy of these statements which I read as arranged, subject to some slight modifications necessitated by the turn which the interview took.

His Imperial Majesty seemed not only fully to grasp the sense of the communication, to which he listened with eager attention, but responded to it immediately with great vivacity and vehemence, showing a considerable grasp of the issues with which his country is now confronted.

I was much impressed with the earnestness of His Imperial Majesty's repeated assurances of his desire and determination to maintain the ancient friendship between the two Empires and to avoid war with any Power.

A memorandum is enclosed recording what passed at my audience.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

* See No. 84.

Enclosure 1 in No. 112.

Communication read to the Sultan by Sir L. Mallet on September 21, 1914.

(Translation.)

MON Souverain m'a chargé d'exprimer à votre Majesté son profond regret de ce que les exigences d'une situation imprévue aient forcé son Gouvernement à détenir les deux vaisseaux de guerre destinés à la marine Impériale. Sa Majesté le Roi se rend compte des sentiments douloureux que cet acte a dû inspirer à votre Majesté, mais il espère que la décision prise par son

MY Sovereign has commanded me to express his profound regret to your Majesty that the exigencies of unforeseen circumstances have compelled his Government to detain the two warships intended for the Imperial Turkish Navy. His Majesty the King is aware of the painful impression that this action must have made upon your Majesty, but he thinks that the

Gouvernement de rendre ces vaisseaux à la Turquie à la fin de la guerre actuelle suffira pour la convaincre que leur détention ne fut motivée par aucune intention inimicale envers l'Empire, qui est lié avec le sien par une amitié plus que séculaire. C'est parce que cette amitié n'a jamais été rompue que mon Souverain espère que la Turquie ne fera rien qui puisse empêcher son Gouvernement de donner suite à cette décision, qu'elle gardera une neutralité stricte et absolue pendant la guerre actuelle, et que l'on ne tardera pas à mettre fin à quelques faits contraires à la neutralité qui ont provoqué quelque inquiétude au sujet de l'attitude du Gouvernement ottoman.

decision of his Government to return these vessels to Turkey at the end of the present war will suffice to convince you that their detention was due to no unfriendly intention towards an Empire bound to his by a friendship of more than a century. It is owing to the fact that this friendship has never been broken that my Sovereign trusts that Turkey will do nothing to prevent his Government from acting up to this decision, that she will maintain strict and absolute neutrality during the present war, and that there will be no delay in putting an end to certain facts contrary to neutrality which have caused some anxiety as to the attitude of the Turkish Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 112.

Statement by Sir L. Mallet with regard to Admiral Limpus on September 22, 1914.

(Translation.)

L'AMIRAL LIMPUS, qui, sous les auspices de votre Majesté, a rendu de si grands services à la marine Impériale, m'a prié de faire part à votre Majesté de son regret de ne pas avoir pu déposer ses hommages au pied de son trône avant de quitter Constantinople. Votre Majesté n'ignore pas les circonstances qui ont nécessité son départ, du moment que lui et la mission navale qu'il présidait ont été relégués à une position où ils ne pouvaient plus rien faire pour le bien de la marine ottomane. Kappelé par mon Gouvernement dans ces circonstances regrettables, l'Amiral Limpus s'est vu forcé de se rendre aux ordres de ses chefs et à quitter Constantinople dans un délai trop court pour lui permettre de demander une audience de votre Majesté.

ADMIRAL LIMPUS, who, under your Majesty's auspices, has rendered such great services to the Turkish navy, has begged me to inform your Majesty of his regret that he was unable to pay his respects to your Majesty before leaving Constantinople. Your Majesty is aware of the circumstances necessitating his departure from the moment when he and the naval mission under his command were relegated to a position in which they could do nothing further for the welfare of the Turkish navy. Recalled in these regrettable circumstances by my Government, Admiral Limpus was obliged to obey the orders of his superiors and to leave Constantinople within too short a space to be able to request an audience of your Majesty.

Enclosure 3 in No. 112.

Memorandum.

THE Sultan listened to my communication in silence until the Master of the Ceremonies translated the clause containing the words "quelques faits contraires à la neutralité". He then broke in with an eager disclaimer of any unneutral conduct on the part of Turkey. On my mentioning, as a specific instance, the retention of German officers and crews on board the "Goeben" and "Breslau," His Majesty explained with some lucidity that they had been kept for a short time to train the Turkish crews. The "captains" available in the Turkish navy were unequal to the task, and it was necessary for that reason to do what had been done. The German crews would be sent away in "five or ten days," and the officers also. Only one or two of the latter would be retained. He would speak frankly, he said. Great Britain was a great Power with a great navy, and had no need of the two ships of the Ottoman fleet. Great Britain had taken them, but he knew they would be given back at the end of the

war. On my remarking that Great Britain wished to make absolutely sure of the position at sea, the Sultan again said that she was too great a maritime Power to need these ships, but he once more stated his conviction that they would be given back. Anyhow, he and his Government were not going to depart from their neutrality. His Majesty repeated this more than once, saying that they knew that that was the only path of safety, and that his great desire was to keep the peace. He laid stress on the friendship between Great Britain and Turkey. This was the more striking, because the words were not put into his mouth, as might be supposed, by myself, the Master of Ceremonies having quite failed to render the parts of my communication in which I dwelt on past relations between England and Turkey.

When, referring to what the Sultan had said about the need for training his navy, I expressed regret that the British naval mission had not been allowed to complete that task. His Majesty did not seem to grasp the main point, but on my referring to the circumstances of Admiral Limpus's departure, he broke in with some emotion, and said twice over that it was not by his wish that the admiral had left Constantinople without an audience. The admiral had not asked for one or come to the Palace. Had he done so he, the Sultan, would have postponed all other business in order to see him. I said I would convey this to Admiral Limpus. I also promised to communicate the Sultan's assurances, which I said I sincerely believed, to the King who would be gratified at receiving them.

Just before I took my leave, His Majesty was good enough to express his warm personal regard, and made some further kind remarks about the value which he attached to his personal relations with me. The Sultan spoke throughout in the most homely language, but with great liveliness and point, and with obvious sincerity. His assurances about his desire to observe neutrality and remain at peace, rather lost than gained in force by the way in which the Master of Ceremonies (whose mind is slow and whose French is defective) translated them. His remarks on the embargo on the two ships were plainly, but not discourteously or resentfully, worded.

No. 113.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 7, 1914.

BRITISH warships in Shatt-el-Arab.

Grand Vizier assured me this afternoon that Vali of Basra had been instructed to avoid all interference with His Majesty's ships in the Shatt-el-Arab.

No. 114.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 7, 1914.

THERE has been fighting during the last few days on frontier between Russian troops and Kurds supported by Turkish troops. Last night Russian Ambassador made strong representations to the Grand Vizier, and said that the Turkish Government must restrain the activities of their troops on the frontier. Furthermore, Russian consul had been arrested. Replying to these representations, Grand Vizier assured Russian Ambassador, in writing, that the consul should be released at once and that the fighting should cease. Russian Ambassador has certain information that Turks are being incited to fight by Germans and Austrians. His Excellency agrees with me that Grand Vizier is honestly exercising what influence he has in favour of peace, but it is doubtful if he has the power to restrain the military party under Enver Pasha.

No. 115.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 10, 1914.

IT is highly probable that for some time past money has been sent to Syria mainly with the object of subsidising the Bedouins. It is also supposed that the

Germans in Syria have had sums of money with them. The following is the number of German military officers known to be in Syria at present: Seven who went there some time ago, of whom Colonel Kress von Kressenstein is one, four who arrived 2nd October at Damascus, and five more who arrived there on 6th October. My information is to the effect that seven more may since have arrived at Alexandretta. Meanwhile, another party of Turkish sailors is leaving Constantinople overland for Bagdad and the Tigris. Information has just reached me from Damascus to the effect that Colonel von Kressenstein had gone to Maan to inspect, but only two military trains with details and stores had left in the last two days. West of the Jordan no movements had taken place. Two railway vans of dynamite had left Damascus for Beirut; 4,000 Mosul troops had reached Aleppo, but were waiting there for the present.

No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 11, 1914.

IT seems to me that the key of the situation lies in Constantinople. It would be fatal to give way to Turkish demands beyond a certain point, especially in the Persian Gulf, but, nevertheless, I entirely share your view that His Majesty's Government should avoid giving even a plausible cause of offence to Turkey. I think that our attitude during the past eight weeks has shown irrefutably that we desire to avoid a rupture with Turkey.

No. 117.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 12, 1914.

I HAVE received note dated the 11th October from Porte, of which following is substance:—

From information received by Porte, two British men-of-war have one after the other passed up the Shatt-el-Arab to anchor at Mohammerah.

According to Treaty of Erzeroum, the town of Mohammerah and its port belong to Persia, whilst Shatt-el-Arab is under Turkish domination.

This principle was reaffirmed by Turco-British Declaration of the 29th July, 1913, which specifies that from Nahr Nazaille, above Mohammerah, frontier follows river to sea, leaving under Turkish sovereignty river itself and all the islands except ten, and modern port and anchorage of Mohammerah. This port and the anchorage thus formed an enclave in Ottoman waters which must be traversed in order to reach them. Consequently men-of-war in question have not respected Imperial territory in penetrating into her internal waters and have disregarded neutrality of Porte, whose duty it is not to allow passage of foreign men-of-war.

On these grounds the Porte asks me to cause instructions to be sent to commanders of men-of-war in question to leave the port of Mohammerah within eight days and to go to sea.

No. 118.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 12, 1914.

MY despatch of the 4th October.*

I have received note from the Porte in reply to my note of the 2nd October respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt.

It says that military activity in Syria is common to all provinces of the Empire and is natural consequence of mobilisation, having no other object than to put

* Received on October 19. See No. 148.

Turkey on a footing to defend her neutrality. Turkey's position being one of simple and legitimate precautions, it will be readily recognised that it would not be conceivable that she should change it in order to attack Egypt, which is one of her own provinces.

The Porte goes on to observe that, although I have on several occasions assured Grand Vizier that His Majesty's Government have no intention of altering status of Egypt, yet declaration that Egypt is in a state of war, dismissal of German and Austrian agents, who receive their exequaturs from the Porte, and above all arrival in Egypt of important contingents from India as well as other acts, have attracted serious attention of Imperial Government and have created real anxiety.

Note concludes by reiterating to me assurance that Turkey has no hostile intention towards any Power whatever, and that military preparations have purely and exclusively defensive character.

I think that it would be right to remind Grand Vizier that I have always made it perfectly clear that undertaking not to change the status of Egypt was conditional on Turkey maintaining strict neutrality.

No. 119.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 12, 1914.

THIS morning Turkish fleet left Constantinople and steamed into the Black Sea.

No. 120.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 12, 1914.

I DO not think that we could now leave Mohammerah without loss of prestige. In view of receipt of Vali's note respecting presence of British men-of-war in the Shatt-el-Arab, effect of moving His Majesty's ships at the request of the Turkish Government, once they were sent to Mohammerah, might have led the Arabs to misinterpret the action of His Majesty's Government.

I would not regard the note in the light of an ultimatum, though it is not impossible that Turks might close the channel, and thus prevent His Majesty's ships from going out, except in agreement with the Turkish authorities.

General belief is that Germans are at present applying considerable pressure upon the Turks to take part in the war, but that the Turks are so far resisting. My anxiety is lest the resistance which the Minister of War is encountering from the Moderates should be weakened by any act on our part which could be interpreted as aggressive by the Turks. Enver Pasha is said to be in favour of immediate co-operation with the Germans.

No. 121.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 12, 1914.

MY telegram of 12 October.*

I have informed Grand Vizier that I was surprised to receive His Highness's note, inviting His Majesty's ships to leave Mohammerah within eight days. I knew His

Highness had no intention of creating difficulties, but it sounded almost like an ultimatum. Mohammerah was, as His Highness was aware, a Persian port. Grand Vizier replied at once that there was no question of an ultimatum. I explained His Majesty's Government's point of view, and he said that he was at present awaiting your reply to Turkish note.

In the course of ensuing conversation, His Highness seemed as confident as ever that he was able to resist German pressure, and he repeated that he was absolutely determined to avoid war in any case.

In reply to some observations of mine in regard to Turkish fighting recently reported in Persia, he said that strict orders had been sent that no Turkish troops were to cross the frontier.

No. 122.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 13, 1914.

CONSULAR officer at Basra telegraphs as follows:—

“I have been notified by Vali that H. M. S. ‘Espiégle’ must be interned until the end of the war unless she departs from Mohammerah and the Shatt-el-Arab within eight days from the 11th instant. If she attempts to leave after the expiration of the said period, her passage through the Shatt-el-Arab will be stopped by force of arms. The ‘Dalhousie’ departed several days ago.

“I have informed His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah of the Vali's communication.”

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 13, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 12 October.*

Your Excellency should make the following reply to the Turkish note protesting against the presence of British men-of-war in the Shatt-el-Arab:—

“As regards the passage through the Shatt-el-Arab to and from the port of Mohammerah, His Majesty's Government maintain in principle the legitimacy of such passage, but express themselves quite ready to examine in a friendly spirit any representation that the Ottoman Government may make on the subject, if the Sublime Porte themselves strictly observe their neutrality, which they have gravely violated by continuing to retain the German officers and crews on the ‘Goeben’ and ‘Breslau,’ in spite of all assurances and promises to the contrary.

“His Majesty's Government are prepared to respond in a conciliatory spirit whenever the Ottoman Government shall have conformed, as a neutral, to the principles of international law prescribing the duties of neutral Powers.

“As regards the presence of British warships at the port of Mohammerah, this is a matter with which the Sublime Porte is in no wise concerned, since Mohammerah is not in Ottoman territory; Porte have, therefore, no right to request their departure.”

* See No. 117.

No. 124.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 14, 1914.

MOSLEMS in Aleppo district are reported to have been so inveigled and incited by German and Turkish deliberate official misrepresentations and falsehoods of every kind that masses seem to believe German Emperor has embraced Islamic faith, and that Germans are fighting for Islam against Russia.

No. 125.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

Sir,

Cairo, September 30, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two interrogatories which I have received from the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, regarding the case of Lieutenant Robert Mors, a German employé of the Alexandria City Police, who was arrested on his return from leave, *via* Constantinople. He explained his return by stating that he had been excused from military service in Germany.

I have, &c.,

MILNE CHEETHAM.

Enclosure 1 in No. 125.

Interrogatories of Lieutenant Mors.

(1)

MULAZIM AWAL ROBERT CASIMIR OTTO MORS, Egyptian Police, examined, states:—

"At Constantinople I was acquainted with a German official who was formerly in the German diplomatic agency in Cairo. This gentleman, whose name I must refuse to give, was in agreement with the Turkish Government on the subject of military operations in Egypt, and as he knew that I knew Egypt very well, he conducted me to Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of War. The latter questioned me on the military situation; if it were true that the British had disarmed the Egyptian army, etc. I replied that I did not know, and thought it unlikely. I then left the presence of Enver, and he remained talking with the German official. I forgot to mention that he asked me if I would participate in operations in Egypt. I replied that I would only participate in open military action. I was afterwards informed by the German official that Enver had sent officers from the Turkish army to Egypt to prepare native public opinion for action in favour of Turkey. I also heard from the German official that one of Enver's emissaries was an officer of the Egyptian army, but I did not know his name then. I must mention here that I understood from various things and from conversations that I overheard between the said German official and various people that he had the intention of sending printed matters and explosives to Egypt. I also understood that it was the Egyptian army officer who was charged with the transport of these things. We were held up in the Dardanelles for six days owing to the wreck of a cargo boat. On the second we were stopped there; the 'Bash Reis' (boatswain) of the 'Saidieh' brought me a small leather bag (which I recognised as being the property of the said German official), and told me that somebody on board had given it to him to give to the passenger in No. 7 cabin, *viz.*, my cabin. At the same time the 'Bash Reis' asked me if it belonged to me. I said 'Yes,' because I began to suspect that the contents of the bag were the explosives that I had heard about. I opened the bag and found it was half full of packing material; and on probing it I found there were hard substances underneath. I thought that if I said that the sack did not belong to me it might be handed over to the ship's captain, and it would then be discovered what the contents were, and an accident might even occur. I did not know at this time that the 'Bash Reis' had guilty knowledge of the contents of the bag, and therefore told him that there was nothing in it. I then took it into my cabin to examine it, and found the two tin boxes which you seized. Whilst we were still in the Dardanelles—as far as I can remember it was the fourth day there—the Egyptian officer came to me and said in Arabic: 'Are you not the passenger occupying No. 7 cabin?' I said: 'Yes; why?' and he said: 'Have you received the things?' ('Wasal-lak el shay?') I replied: 'Was it you who sent it to me?' He said: 'Perhaps' ('Yimkin').

"I then said: 'What have such things to do with me?' He said: 'I cannot keep such things myself.' I then asked him who gave them to him. He replied: 'Fouad.' I do not know who this Fouad is exactly, but it is possibly Ahmad Fouad at Constantinople, whom I have seen with the German official, and who is an intimate

friend of Sheikh Abd-el-Aziz Shawish, according to all reports. He then told me his name was Ahmad Hamuda, and that he had fought against the Italians in Tripoli. He showed me his card, on which was written : 'Ahmad Hamuda, Officer of the Egyptian Army.' I do not remember if the card bore his rank or not. I saw Ahmad Hamuda Effendi after leaving Piræus, when he came and asked me what I had done with the tin boxes. I understood, from the way he put it, that he wanted to take them from me, but this is only an idea I had. I told him I had thrown them overboard. When we were anchored in the harbour, he again came and asked me to take his revolver ashore. I replied that I had my own revolver, and that I should be searched like everybody else. He then asked me if they would search his wife. I said : 'Naturally they have female searchers at the Customs.'

"I had the intention of throwing the tin boxes overboard, but I was afraid that they might explode on striking the water. I therefore procured some cord with which I meant to lower them into the water. I never got a chance, and I was afraid that the propeller would catch the cord, and the steamer might be blown up or damaged.

"Another thing which deterred me was that I was afraid the boxes might float and be dangerous to shipping, so I postponed it until our arrival at Smyrna, where I telegraphed to the German official at Constantinople stating that two tin boxes with unknown contents had been handed to me, and I desired instructions. At Piræus I received a telegram telling me to throw them overboard, which, for the reasons I have just given, I again postponed."

Q. Have you any witnesses to prove that the boatswain gave you the bag containing the tin boxes?—A. Yes; a certain Fortunato, the cabin steward, was present, and I gave him the bag with the packing after removing the tin boxes, asking him to throw the packing overboard. He did so, and returned me the bag.

On arrival in port here I gave the tin boxes to Mohamed Ali, the purser, and asked him to keep them with him until he had a chance to throw them overboard without being observed by the various launches. I also recommended him not to throw them from the deck, but to descend the gangway and drop them into the sea carefully after weighting them with a piece of iron. I told him they contained dangerous substances, and to be very careful. I noticed he seemed afraid, and told him if he did not wish to do it he should give them back to me. He said he did not mind doing it, and if I wished he would pass them through the Customs for me without difficulty.

Q. Why did you select Mohamed Ali for the mission?—A. Because I heard at Piræus that he was a Turkish Agent.

Q. From whom did you hear this?—A. From a Turk at the German consulate at Piræus.

Q. How did you meet this Turk?—A. He was introduced to me by the German vice-consul.

Q. What is his name?—A. I do not remember. He gave me his visiting card, and I destroyed it.

Q. How did you approach Mohamed Ali on the subject?—A. I showed him the visiting card of the Turk, to which he said at once, salaaming with his hand, "Ahlan wa Sahlan."

Q. Where did you procure the map of the Suez Canal?—A. It was given to me by the German official.

Q. Why did he give you the map?—A. I do not know. We were talking together, and he showed me the map. I admired it, and he told me to take it.

Q. Where did you get the cypher found with your effects?—A. I invented it with the assistance of the German official, for correspondence with him at Constantinople.

Q. Where is the key to it?—A. I destroyed it.

Q. Can you tell me what it was?—A. It was to let him know if the Egyptian army had been disbanded; if there were difficulties for me here to enter the country; by what route I intended to return, etc.

R. MORS.

Alexandria, September 28, 1914.

(2)

*Enquiry into Mors's Case, held on September 28, 1914.*1. *Mors interrogated.*

Q. Can you explain this telegram (telegram addressed to "Prill, Bacos, Bulkely, Alexandria," from Schneider)?—A. No. You must ask the French lady who is staying with us ("il faut demander à Mademoiselle chez nous"), as it is a private telegram of hers. It seems to be asking news of her health.

Q. Who is Schneider?—A. I do not know.

Q. Who is Omar Fawzi and Suliman Askari?—A. Two officers I met in Constantinople whom the German introduced to me.

Q. Where did you meet them?—A. At the hotel Tokatlian in Constantinople.

Q. What is the name of this German official?—A. I do not know.

Q. When was he in Cairo?—A. Two years ago.

Q. Was this your first visit to Constantinople?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you know this gentleman before?—A. No.

Q. You realise that your position is a serious one?—A. Yes.

Q. You refuse to give his name?—A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me the name of the Turk whom you met in Alexandria?—A. I must refuse, but if you suggest his name I will tell you if you are right or wrong.

Q. Do you deny that the German official is Baron Oppenheim?—A. Yes; Oppenheim is at Berlin.

Q. Do you know Baron Oppenheim?—A. I have never seen, but often heard of him. He is over 50 years of age. According to Berlin opinion, he is merely a "blagueur," and of no importance.

Q. Did you see Ezzedin Fawzi in Constantinople?—A. No; he had left before I arrived.

Q. What did he do there?—A. I do not know. I heard from my sister-in-law that he had left for Constantinople. He was charged with my private affairs.

Q. Was not this rather a serious arrangement to make?—A. No; he was always a great friend of mine.

Q. Do you know his political opinions?—A. No.

Q. You appear to have had some previous knowledge of the preparation of explosives for use in Egypt?—A. I heard in Constantinople that something of the nature of explosives were to be prepared and sent to Egypt.

Q. What was the ultimate destination of these things?—A. I don't know. I was only three days at Constantinople.

Q. Have these explosives penetrated into Egypt?—A. I don't know. Perhaps other emissaries arrived in Egypt at the same time as I did.

Q. Who is Fahmy Bey?—A. Mohamed Bey Fahmy, Master of Ceremonies in the Khedive's household, who arrived in Constantinople in the "Saidieh."

Q. How did you get to know him?—A. He rented our house three years ago.

Q. Who sent you this telegram?—A. It was the answer to my telegram.

Q. Why did you send the first telegram?—A. To see if it were possible and advisable, in view of the reported state of things in Egypt, for me to return here, or if it would be better for my family to join me there.

Q. Is this the bag you brought with you?—A. Yes.

Q. Who sent it to you?—A. I do not know. The boatswain brought it to me saying it was for whoever occupied cabin No. 7. Probably Ahmad Hamuda gave it to him to give to me.

Q. Did you see Enver Pasha in Constantinople?—A. Yes. I had a conversation with him.

Q. How was it that you had this conversation?—A. The German official introduced me to Enver at the War Office.

Q. What did Enver Pasha say to you?—A. He questioned me as to the state of affairs in Egypt.

Q. Is the German official a German naval officer?—A. No.

Q. Did Enver Pasha express any opinions?—A. He said that he wanted a campaign against Egypt, should war break out, for which two army corps would be required.

Q. What did he want you to do here?—A. He asked me if I would help.

Q. What did you reply?—A. I agreed to do so in the event of a military expedition.

Q. Who gave you the idea that explosives were being prepared to be sent to Egypt?—A. I suspected the German officer, whom I saw with an Egyptian Effendi unknown to me.

Q. How did Ahmad Hamuda get to know you?—A. He came to see me on the voyage—in the Dardanelles, I think.

Q. Why did he trust *you*?—A. I do not know.

Q. Had you made no previous promises?—A. No.

Q. Whom did you see at the Piræus?—A. The consul, where I saw the telegrams and the Turkish gentleman who told me of Mohamed Ali, the purser.

Q. Why did you send this telegram?—A. Because I knew something was being prepared, and suspected that the bag had some connection with it. Besides there were several emissaries on board, and there had been many circulars in the hotels in Constantinople.

Q. Who were these emissaries?—A. I do not know, but I heard that Sheikh Shawish had said there were thirteen who had left.

Q. Will you explain how you knew of these preparations?—A. Through the German official and various people I met casually at odd times. The German official arrived in Constantinople from Berlin the day before me.

Q. Did Omar Fawzi speak to you of Egypt?—A. Yes; he said he had fought in Tripoli and had been to Egypt where he had many friends.

Q. Where did you meet the Turk at Piræus?—A. At the German consulate.

Q. Have you ever visited Tchiboukli Palace?—A. No.

Q. Why did you write Omar Fawzi's name in the piece of paper?—A. Because I had to meet him at the "Petit Champs," a restaurant in Constantinople, and I wished to remember.

Q. Will you explain what the code found in your tarbush was?—A. The references to cotton were information about troops, the best quality denoted British and the inferior Native soldiers. Kantars referred to the number of men. Certain phrases referred to the disarmament of Egyptian troops. "Suis disposé," I recollect, meant that I should return.

Q. When did you want to leave the country?—A. As soon as possible, for I understood that all Germans serving under foreign Governments had to resign.

Q. What did "venez par le premier bateau" mean?—A. That things were in a dangerous state here.

Q. And No 15?—A. "Don't come to Turkey."

Q. "Ne venez pas-tout arrangé"?—A. I have forgotten.

Q. "Venez de suite"?—A. I have forgotten.

Q. "Bébé va mieux"?—A. I have forgotten—all this was made up hurriedly before I left Constantinople during the last half-hour when I was packing my luggage. I did not look at it again before I destroyed the key; it is now three weeks since I left Constantinople.

Q. How is it that you know some of the expressions and not others?—A. In view of what I have explained, it seems clear. Those referring to the "Santé de la famille" refer to Turkish officers, but I cannot remember the details.

Q. Did it refer to their going to the Red Sea?—A. I don't know, but I have an idea it was with a view to finding out what difficulties were placed in the way of Turkish officers in Egypt.

Q. Who was to have taken charge of the explosives here?—A. The agents of Sheikh Shawish.

Q. Who?—A. I do not know.

Q. Did you not know that the German official was going to give you these things?—A. No.

Q. How did you recognise the bag?—A. I saw it in the hotel at Constantinople and recognised the repair which I had seen at a restaurant in the hands of an effendi.

Q. How did you get to know so many people?—A. I met them casually at the hotel and the German Embassy, where I called and learnt that it was difficult to get to Egypt.

Q. How did you meet the German official?—A. I met him at the embassy.

2. *Boatswain interrogated.*

Q. Have you seen this bag before?—A. Yes. I first saw it on board the "Saidieh" in Constantinople on the 3rd September with a sailor called Ali, who asked me to give it to the occupant of cabin No. 7.

Q. Where was it given to you?—A. I think on deck. I told Ali that he had better give it to a steward in the first class, which he did. The next morning Mors asked me who had given me the bag.

Q. Why should Mors have asked you this? How was it that he connected the bag with you?—A. Because I told the steward to give it to him, and perhaps he told Mors so.

Q. When did Mors speak to you?—A. The next morning at about 8 A.M. He brought me the bag and asked me who gave it to me, as he wanted to give me a tip. I refused the latter as it was not I who brought the bag.

Q. Who gave Ali the bag?—A. He told me an Arab did so.

Q. Was the latter on the steamer?—A. I do not know.

3. *Mors and Boatswain confronted.*

Q. (To Mors.) Who brought you this bag?—A. This boatswain with the steward.

Q. Did you offer the boatswain a tip?—A. Yes, but he refused it.

Q. Why did you want to give it to him if the bag was not yours?—A. I accepted the bag for the reasons I have already given you.

Q. Why offer him a tip?—A. For the sake of my friend, and because I did not want the matter exposed.

Q. Who gave him the bag?—A. I do not know, but it must have been Ahmad Hamuda.

Q. (To the Boatswain.) Do you know Ahmad Hamuda?—A. No.

Alexandria, September 29, 1914.

No. 126.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 14, 1914.

THE whole of the Turkish fleet has re-entered the Bosphorus.

The "Leros" and "Lrisso," two German steamers which have been convoyed from Sulina by the "Breslau," sailed under the Turkish flag until they were inside the Bosphorus. The same thing was done on a former occasion, when two ships from Black Sea ports were similarly convoyed by the "Breslau."

No. 127.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 14, 1914.

ABOUT 600 Moslem "fedahis," dressed in various guises, have arrived at Aleppo in batches during past fortnight, their head being an officer related to Ottoman Minister of War; 400 of these came from Smyrna, where they had incited Moslems against Greeks. At Aleppo they intrigued, with the aid of Committee of Union and Progress, with sheikhs against Great Britain. Discourses of a guarded anti-British tendency were pronounced in mosques. The last batch left Aleppo 12th October by rail. Parties of them have proceeded to Hama, Homs, Baalbek, Damascus, the Hauran to incite sheikhs against Great Britain, and they are to continue their journey south by Hedjaz Railway, and to find their way into Egypt to incite Moslems there. Many of the principal sheikhs of Aleppo seem now gained over to side of Germany.

No. 128.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 14, 1914.

WITH the object of spreading the belief that Great Britain is the enemy of Islam, the German Embassy daily emits a stream of mendacity and calumny, which is circulated throughout the country by the Turkish newspapers all of those in the capital being in the pay of the German Embassy as a result of the large sums spent by it in corruption both in Constantinople and in the provinces.

No. 129.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 15, 1914.

SON of Kurdish chief Issa, who is stated to have influence in Mesopotamia, and who has been in Constantinople for instructions, is said to have left for Basrah to work anti-English propaganda, and other agents, including Germans, are said to be on their way to Afghanistan on similar errand.

I learn that Zekki Pasha, commander of 8th corps, has lately received £5,000 to distribute amongst Bedouins, and that as much as £35,000 in gold left here by train on 12th for Syria. Senator Abdurrahman is working among Bedouins at Maan and Muntaz Bey on the west by Beersheba and Jerusalem.

Party of Turkish sailors mentioned as having left here by train for Basrah are now stated to be on the way to Akaba with consignment of metal boats. Another lot of boats is at Rayak, possibly on the way to Beirut. Quantities of dynamite have been sent to the coast towns of Syria, probably to serve for mining purposes of land defence. This is in addition to sea mines which have been also forwarded. Numbers of "working battalions" (soldiers as yet untrained) are road constructing in southern Syria.

All above and previous reports in a similar sense show that there is very considerable activity being directed in a sense hostile to us, and this activity is being worked by German influence and agents in every conceivable direction. Probably Government as a whole have little control over these activities, but do not disapprove of them. As regards actual military preparations, German element has sufficient power to persuade the authorities on certain points. German press is directing movement, and has obtained despatch of numbers of German officers to Syria to superintend preparations and training of corps there for war, concentration of stores and supplies at suitable spots, preparation of lines of communication and defence of coast.

No. 130.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 15, 1914.

GERMAN plots have been so extensive that it is conceivable that they may introduce individuals into Egypt who, impersonating Indian soldiers, may cause mischief.

In substantiation of this I have to state that His Majesty's consul at Aleppo has learnt that a tailor in that town has been commissioned to make a variety of Indian costumes and head-dresses on design and measurement supplied by German officers there.

No. 131.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Sophia, October 16, 1914.

NINETY-SEVEN cases of bullion passed through Rustchuk yesterday for Constantinople, accompanied by six Germans. The consignment was preceded by 200 other cases. In the last three weeks many heavy cases and stores have passed through same town.

Armaments are believed to be sent through in the night.

No. 132.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 16, 1914.

LOCAL authorities at Jaffa have distributed 10,000 rifles amongst Bedouins, each with 100 cartridges, 5,000 ten-shot to owners of horses and riding camels, and 5,000 single-shot to owners of baggage camels. Bedouins have been employed to dig wells, and Germans to fit them with motor pumps; ovens have been built near frontier.

It is believed that Bedouins' next move is to be towards Akaba.

Horses and mules throughout the whole district are being requisitioned most energetically.

No. 133.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 16, 1914.

MAJOR OMAR FEVZI BEY, son of Arimm Effendi, ex Governor-General of Damascus, accompanied by five German officers, arrived at Aleppo 14th October from Constantinople bringing 25,000 liras. The officers passed for engineers, and are buying saddle horses to proceed to Bagdad via Ana. From Ana they are to take two batteries of guns, which, together with money and loads of rifles and ammunition taken from Aleppo, they are to deliver to Ibn-el-Reshid.

Railway trucks full of dynamite for Alexandretta and Damascus are expected to arrive from Constantinople. German officers of "Breslau" have already laid thirteen mines at Alexandretta according to report that has now reached me.

No. 134.

(Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 16, 1914.

MINISTER of War, who is willing tool of Germans, is now supreme. Minister of the Interior was most influential Minister before mobilisation, but is so no longer. His position now is rather mysterious. Whilst taking advantage of European struggle to carry through so-called emancipation of Turks from foreign control, he is not supposed to be in favour of war, which he thinks would end badly for Turkey. If this diagnosis is correct, he and others like him are more or less powerless at present, and, though they declare their ability and intention to stop military preparations, evidently are unable to check them.

No. 135.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)**Constantinople, October 17, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

RELIABLE information reaches me that mines are being sent to Basra, and will reach Bagdad in a day or two.

No. 136.

*Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey—(Received October 17.)**Athens, October 17, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

ONE Bouhadi Sadil has been discovered buying arms for importation into Egypt. He had already bought 700 Gras rifles and ammunition. I understand that two of this man's accomplices were recently convicted in Egypt.

No. 137.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.**Foreign Office, October 17, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

ANY attack upon H.M.S. "Espiègle" by Turkish authorities will be a wanton act of aggression, as she is not in Turkish territorial waters.

You should inform Turkish Government that there is no present intention of her passing down the Shatt-el-Arab, but His Majesty's Government consider they have a right to claim that passage so long as "Goeben" and "Ireslau," with German crews and officers, have free use of Turkish territorial waters and the Straits.

No. 138.

*Sir. L. Mallet to Sir. Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)**Constantinople, October 17, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

SINCE end of September following have reached Constantinople:—

Six thousand nine hundred cases of Mauser ammunition, 540 cases of Mauser rifles, 13 trucks of war material, and about £800,000. in bar gold.

Arrival of a submarine in sections is expected shortly, and I am informed that such a consignment, together with two aeroplanes, left Rustchuk on 8th October.

Two German ships were recently escorted from Sulina by "Breslau," and are reported to have brought submarine. But there is no evidence at present to prove this.

No. 139.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)**Constantinople, October 18, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

AEROPLANE, three airmen, and several mechanics left Beersheba yesterday. Governor left Jaffa with a view to allaying panic.

Following is résumé of a telegram from Minister of War to commandant at Jaffa which has come to my knowledge:—

"On the approach of enemy warships destroy boats and lighters, kill horses break carriages, and destroy railway. Strictly guard telegraph. When surrender of town is demanded ask for time to consult Jerusalem. If Jerusalem instructs you not to surrender, oppose landing of the enemy by force of arms. See no looting of town takes place, and find suitable place to shelter your archives. Explain above to the population and arm them, taking oath from them. At signal not to surrender send away women and children. Hoist flag on konak and barracks so as not to have other places bombarded. Break enemy's flagstaff and remove insignia from the door of his consulate."

No. 140.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey—(Received October 19.)

Constantinople, October 2, 1914.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram of the 22nd September* and your telegram of the 25th September† I have the honour to forward herewith copies of notes exchanged between the Grand Vizier and myself respecting the suppression of the British post offices in the Turkish Empire.

I have &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

*See No. 86.

†See No. 93.

Enclosure 1 in No. 140.

Grand Vizier to Sir L. Mallet.

(Translation.)

Constantinople, le 27 septembre 1914.
M. l'Ambassadeur,

POUR faire suite à ma note du 9 courant, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que par suite de l'abrogation des Capitulations à compter du 1^{er} octobre, 1914, les bureaux des postes étrangères fonctionnant provisoirement dans l'Empire devront cesser leurs opérations à partir de cette date.

Je prie, par conséquent, votre Excellence de vouloir bien inviter les directeurs des bureaux de postes anglaises se trouvant en Turquie à agir en conformité des communications qui leur ont été faites par le Ministère Impérial des Postes et Télégraphes et dont copies ont été déjà transmises à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique en date 24 septembre, 1914.

Veuillez, &c.,
SAÏD HALIM.

Constantinople, September 27, 1914.
Your Excellency,

IN continuation of my note of the 9th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, in consequence of the abolition of the Capitulations as from the 1st October, 1914, the foreign post offices provisionally existing in the Turkish Empire must cease working from that date.

I accordingly request your Excellency to be so good as to request the directors of British post offices in Turkey to act in conformity with the communications addressed to them by the Imperial Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, copies of which have already been communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy on the 24th September 1914.

M. le Ministre,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note dated 27th September, by which your Highness requests me to instruct the directors of the

Enclosure 2 in No. 140.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

Constantinople, October 1, 1914.